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This thesis explores the debate for public sector and 
private sector agency for the provision of local authorit y 
services. 
A methodological approach was devised to examine each 
potential case for privatisation and to evaluate both the 
public and private sector agencies i n terms of the three 
identified criteria viz. economic and financial, strategic 
and political, and administrative and managerial. 
The field study included an investigation, aided by a 
literature survey and the collection of further relevant 
data pertaining to selected local authority services. Data 
and evidence were collected primarily through personal 
structured interviews with senior executives in both the 
public and private sectors. 
The methodological approach was applied to case studies of 
t he solid waste ( collection and disposal) and construction 
(c i vil engineering and building) services of the Cape Town 
City Council. 
iii 
The choice of agency for local authority services i� a 
complex matter. The privatisation concept has considerable 
merit where implemented in the correct manner and 
appropriate circumstances. However, if dissatisfaction 
exists regarding the provision of a local authority service 
it should not automatically be assumed that privatisation 
will provide the panacea for local authority fiscal and 
service delivery problems. Each potential case for 
privatisation should be examined on its merits as 
generalisation could be misleading. 
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The test of a first-rate intelligence is 
the ability to hold two opposed ideas in 
mind at the same time and still retain the 
ability to function. 
- F Scott Fitzgerald 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
OBJECTIVES, MOTIVATION AND PRECIS 
2 
CHAPTER ONE 
OBJECTIVES, MOTIVATION AND PRECIS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The provision of local authority services requires the 
participation of both the public sector and the private 
sector. 
Local authorities are continually striving to reduce 
the cost of services while at the same time maintaining 
their quality. The process of constant examination and 
evaluation affords local authorities the opportunity of 
deciding which of their services could be produced more 
efficiently and effectively by the private sector. 
Will this result in the citizens receiving a better 
quality service at a lower cost? 
Can the profit motivated market mechanism of the free 
enterprise system be used to assure efficient and 
effective provision of local authority services? 
Efficiency and effectiveness are often quantifiable. 
Efficiency measurements determine if inputs have been 
used to their best advantage. Effectiveness 
measurements determine the extent to which the task has 
been achieved. However an effective solution may be 
costly and therefore inefficient. A cost-effective 
solution for the same problem may require reducing the 
effectiveness in order to lower costs to an acceptable 
level. (Wall 1982 : 6.) 
The choice of agency is a complex matter and a sound 
methodology is essential to ensure that an objective 
and balanced decision is made in each case under 
consideration. 
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The motivation for this thesis stems primarily from the 
author's interest in the Government's stated commitment 
to the investigation of possible privatisation within a 
broad range of public services. The private sector has 
urged the Government to speed up its privatisation 
programme, the main impetus therefor being the current 
recessionary state of the economy. 
1.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
The following is the full set of the objectives of the 
thesis: 
- to examine the issues involved in comparing private 
with public provision of local authority services 
- to establish criteria against which the private and 
public sector agencies can be assessed objectively 
(the primary objective) to contribute to a 
methodology which will assist the choice between a 
public sector agency and a private sector agency for 
the provision of certain local authority services 
- to examine the devised methodological approach and 
illustrate its application to selected case studies 
of services presently provided by the Cape Town City 
Council. 
l. 3 PRECIS 
Chapter l is introductory, states the objectives of the 
thesis and concludes with a precis. 
Chapter 2 discusses the . definition, concepts and 
background to privatisation, the methods of delivering 
local authority services and the overseas and local 
experience. The intensity of the debate and complexity 
of the issue are described. 
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Chapter 3 examines the definition and importance of 
local authority services. The purpose of local 
authorities with regard to service provision and their 
contractual capacity are discussed. The 
characteristics of private and public goods and 
services and their effect on the choice of agency are 
described. Necessity for change and alternatives are 
considered. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the effect of competition (or 
lack thereof) and the market system on local authority 
services. The principles and facts are highlighted in 
three concise case studies concerning the Cape Town 
City Council. The author concludes that no service 
should be privatised unless adequate competition exists 
to prevent a monopolistic situation. 
Chapter 5 outlines the difficulty of comparing costs 
between private enterprise and local authorities. 
Reference is made to the presentation and accounting 
for costs and the method of depreciation of assets. 
Recommendations for comparative purposes are concluded. 
Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive listing of the 
factors which influence the choice of agency, derived 
from the literature survey and the author's research. 
This listing becomes an integral part of the 
methodological approach for determining the choice of 
agency. The author concludes that the factors can be 
grouped into the following criteria: economic and 
financial, strategic and political, administrative and 
managerial. 
Chapter 7 sets out the characteristics of the 




Chanter 8 The methodological approach is applied to 
the · solid waste collection and disposal facet of the 
Cape Town Municipality's cleansing · operation. The 
investigation includes local authorities adjacent to 
Cape Town and the major private sector contractors. A 
case study is developed, conclusions are drawn and 
recommendations are made. 
Chapter 9 The methodological approach is applied to 
the construction function of the 
Municipality. The two facets of the 




engineering construction are investigated and examined 
separately. The private sector and the in-house 
construction uni ts are assessed in the case study and 




















BACKGROUND TO AND OVERVIEW OF PRIVATISATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The economic recession of the 1980' s, the continuing 
high inflation rate, the growth in size and cost of 
government, increasing ratepayers' demands for 
improvement and economy, and continual pressure for 
financial stringency and the scepticism about the 
ability of local government to perform efficiently and 
effectively are all leading to alternative actions for 
service deli very being explored by local government. 
One such alternative action 
contracting out of services and 
authorities. 
is privatisation or 
functions by local 
A succession of cost efficiency programmes at both 
central and local government level, have predictably 
produced poor results for governments as diverse as 
those of Britain and Bangladesh. Pri va tisa tion on the 
other hand, has produced remarkably successful 
results. Scores of programmes at national and local 
authority level have resulted in considerable savings 
and greatly improved services. 
(Privatisation News Vol. l No. 1, 1986.) 
To equal the success achieved overseas, it is essential 
in South Africa that privatisation be investigated and 
implemented in the correct manner. Certain essential 
criteria have emerged from the international experience 
which could enhance the probability of success in South 
Africa. 
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It should be appreciated that it is in everyone's 





as possible. Waste, 
can only lead to higher 
taxation and lower standards of service. 
One main purpose of privatisation is to reduce 
governmental participation in the economy. 
2.2 DEFINITION 
The South African Treasurer (1985-09-01 pl63) defines 
privatisation as •an alteration in status of (business 
or industry) from public to private control or 
ownership•. 
The privatisation concept entails •the private sector 
involvement in financing, 
ownership and/or operation and 
(Goldman & Mokuvos 1984 : 70.) 
design, construction, 
delivery of service." 
Contracting out, of ten used synonomously with the term 
privatisation can be viewed as a "management tool that 
shifts the performance of functions previously 
performed by public employees to the private sector". 
(Cryder 1985 : 40.) 








Advisory Services in the State President's Off ice, has 
defined it to include: 
- the transfer of functions to the private sector 
- the contracting out of activities relating to a 
function 
- the withdrawal from a function 
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- the performance of a function in partnership with the 
private sector 
- the sharing of facilities with the private sector 
- the granting of concessions. 
Rix (1983) has defined privatisation to mean •the 
carrying out of a specific task, at a stipulated 
service level, at the lowest possible price at all 
times throughout the contract period, at minimum 
management cost to a local authority and with the 
maximum public accountability•. 
Dr Wim de Villiers, special advisor from the private 
sector to the Cabinet Committee for Privatisation has 
delineated four methods: 
- deregulation, increasing the free market 
- sale of non-essential services to the private sector 
- contracting out 
- total privatisation. 
There is a certain lack of clarity on the definition of 
privatisation among the writers on the subject in 
different countries. certain wricers define 
privatisation as the total transfer of the 
responsibility for a service from the public sector to 
the private sector, and therefore regard the 
involvement of a private company to carry out the 
function as •contracting out• and not really 
privatisation. Dunleavy (1986 13), •strictly the 
permanent transferring of service 
activities previously carried out 
bureaucracies to private firms or 
or goods production 
by public service 
to other forms of 
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non-public organisation, such as voluntary groups". In 
many cases the local authority can not privatise the 
service fully because it remains under a statutory 
obligation to manage and control the service. 
For the purpose of this thesis the author prefers to 
define privatisation broadly but simply as "using 
private enterprise to perform the work of local 
government•. 
The involvement of the private sector in the service 
provision function of the public sector can take many 
forms. These are discussed further under section 2.5. 
When considering a specific application of 
privatisation then its meaning should be precisely 
defined. To refer generally to 'privatisation' is 
insufficient. The degree to which the private sector 
is involved, 
subject to 
and the nature of that involvement is 
considerable variation. This matter 
receives further attention under section 3.6. 
2.3 THE OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE 
Historically the American Government has provided most 
public services directly but there has always been some 
degree of contracting out particularly at federal 
level. In the early part of this century American 
cities turned to private enterprise to run local 
streetcar systems, for refuse removal, to provide fire 
protection and other basic public services. 
"Contracting out has become a major business force in 
the United States and in the year 1980 State and Local 
Governments paid an estimated $66 billion to private 
firms to provide public services." 
(Atkinson 1984 : 30.) 
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In t he United States early in the century private 
contractors providing services 
plentiful but poor standards of 
to the public were 








generated a successful 
to professionalise all 




It is frequently reported that in the United States 
there is widespread contracting out of several public 
services to private contractors. The claimed 
attraction is that private contractors provide better 
managed and cheaper services than public employees. 
A survey of the literature shows significantly that the 
growth has not only been in traditional areas such as 
solid waste collection and disposal but also in 
building maintenance, health care, transportation, 
social welfare, security services and even police and 
fire protection. 
Similar trends 
involvement in the 
towards greater private sector 
delivery of public services have 
occurred in Canada, Great Britain and West Germany. 
(AFSCME 1984 : 9.) 
This trend supports a basic philosophy of the Reagan 
Administration; that they have too much government, 
that the government provides too many services and that 
the private sector can provide whatever public services 
are needed more economically and efficiently than the 
public sector. 
This philosophy can not go unchallenged but at this 
stage it will suffice to note that "there may be reason 
to believe that private sector ownership promotes 
efficiency but there are no empirical studies to show 
that this is so". (Temkin 1984 : 16.) 
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It is not necessary to look far for a reason for the 
swing toward the private sector. It is caused by t he 
recession forcing private f i r ms to look increasingly 
toward the public sector for new sources of revenue and 
on the other hand local authorities are becoming 
increasingly cost-conscious as their revenues have been 
cut by the recession and ravaged by inflation. 
The involvement of the private sector in the work of 
local government has enabled more cost-effective 
services to be operated. It has created a yardstick by 
which the existing services could be judged. The use 
of its resources, finance and expertise has 
significant financial and operation benefits to 
given 
local 
authorities and it has created an environment which has 
enabled many outdated practices to be removed and fresh 
perspectives to be brought into the service which was 
operated. (Bury 1983 : 413.) 
In the United States the extent of contracting by state 
and local governments varies from state to state and 
community to community. The extremes run from 
localities which do not contract any services to a city 
such as Phoenix, Arizona, which had 450 outside 
contracts in effect in the early 1980's. 
(AFSCME 1984 : 11.) 
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
was instrumental in set ting up commit tees to examine 
closely the desirability of private business taking 
over functions from both central and local governments. 
In fact the United Kingdom 
legislate the promotion of 
Local Government Planning 
has gone so 
competition in 







required direct labour organisations to compete with at 
least three private contractors for all maintenance 
jobs worth more than 10 000 pounds. 
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All general highway works worth over 50 000 pounds must 
go out on tender. ( Imeson 1984 3) 
Th e British Trade Unions are strongl y opposed to 
privatisation which they perceive as putting private 
profit before the public good, a threat to the jobs of 
its members and a danger to the quality of a service. 
At the roots of local authority "direct labour 
operations" was the establishment of a high quality 
service whose standard and delivery could be guaranteed 
by using a workforce directly employed by the 
authority. "By eliminating the need for profit and 
advertising the notion was that a better value service 
would be obtained than any which could be produced 
commercially." (Ryan 1984: 1128.) 
Many local authority services were originally provided 
because: 
- no private sector organisation was available or able 
to perform the service or carry out the work 
the private 
unprofitable 
sector found the service to be 
- there were risks of public health, safety, security 
or confidentiality which could not be entrusted to 
the private sector. 
The first direct labour building department was set up 
by the London County Council in 1892 and currently 
there are 532 local authorities in Britain with some 
kind of direct labour building department. 
(Imeson 1984 : 3.) 
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The reason direct labour organisations were set up 
initially was simply because private contractors were 
making excess profits from public works. At the least 
a direct labour organisation gives the ratepayers 
protection against organised price rings and provides a 
'yardstick' against which tenders can be compared. 
Urban Innovatfon Abroad (June 1984, p2) reports that 
privatisation is seriously considered in West Germany 
where more than fifty communities ranging in size from 
West Berlin with about two million inhabitants to towns 
of ten thousand have contracted out or are currently 
debating turning over to private enterprise, under 
contract, the performance of traditional public 
services. 
What is of particular interest in the current British 
experience is that the threat of privatisation has been 
effective in making direct labour organisations more 
efficient and responsible than they have been for a 
long time. (Imeson 1984 : 1.) 
Spearheading this threat in Britain was the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act 1980 which arose from 
growing Government· concern at the performance and 
efficiency of local authority construction and 
maintenance work. This Act further required direct 
labour organisations to compete with the private sector 
for a large proportion of their work and to achieve a 
5 % rate of return on capital employed. 
(Davies & Grey 1985 : 792.) 
It is regrettable that it was necessary in the first 
instance to legislate in order to achieve better 
efficiency. Local authorities should continually 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
services and operational activities. Reaction to this 
15 
legislation from the British experience shows that some 
local authorities disbanded their direct labour 
organisations readily and privatised. Others 
procrastinated in search of alternative action and 
simply lost the majority of their traditional work to 
the private sector by way of competitive bidding. The 
third category employed a more sensible reaction and 
readily accepted the challenge. They quickly and 
radically reviewed the management and operational 
activities of their direct labour organisations and 
drastically reformed to compete (successfully) with the 
private sector. 
As reported in The Economist, (1986-02-01, p34) 
privatisation will be one of the principal themes in 
President Reagan's budget this year. Nevertheless, the 
evidence on privatisation at the level of American 
state and local government is mixed. Many cases are 
documented where cities have saved large amounts of 
money by contracting out local services to private 
enterprises. However, in 1984, one of the public 
worker unions conducted a survey of local authority 
contracting and found dozens of cases of excessive 
costs, wasteful duplication of resources, incompetence 
and fraud. (The Economist 1986-02-01 page 34.) 
2.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
In South Africa, the Carlton Conference (1979) opened a 
new deal between the private and public sectors. The 
Prime Minister stated that: "The basic responsibility 
of Government is to establish, maintain and protect the 
national and international order within which private 
enterprise can fulfil its function of producing goods 
and services it is private enterprise which 
combines all the elements of production to produce 
wealth". 
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The concept, in principle, has received official s t a te 
approva l , yet it s implementat i on has been slow and of a 
l i mited scale. 
In the Johannesburg Municipality the bulk of t he Water 
and Sewerage capital works programmes are carried out 
by private enterprise through the medium of contracts. 
Similarly more than 50 % of the Roads and Works total 
capital programme is put out to contract. In 1981 a 
shortage of mechanics in the departmental workshops 
lead to an experiment to have 80 vehicles serviced and 
maintained by private enterprise. Johannesburg has 
progressively privatised the majority of its refuse 
collection fleet. Wade Refuse (Pty) Limited remove 
refuse each day from residential areas, on a basis that 
they provide each truck, a driver and an operator while . 
the municipality is responsible for the remainder of 
the workers in each team. 
A survey of the Cape Town Municipality revealed that 
private enterprise plays a significant 
operation of the City. A synopsis of 
provided in Appendix A. 
role in the 
the survey is 
In 1980 the report of the committee of Enquiry into the 
Finances of Local Authorities in South Africa (Browne 
Cornrni ttee) recommended inter alia that local 
authorities should give out to private enterprise those 
services which on the basis of cost benefit analysis 
could be more advantageously performed by private 
enterprise. (Browne et al 1980, paragraph 16.) 
One can not resist querying the wisdom of utilising 
cost-benefit analysis as a guide as t he curren t 
political unrest sterns partly f rom t he Black 
population's desire to have their areas upgraded. This 
could hardly be evaluated on a cost-benefit bas i s as 
the fundamental agitation is a socio-political one. 
17 
In recent times the South African Government appears to 
be paying more than lip service to a commitment to 
privatisation. Finance Minister Barend du Plessis 
declared in his budget speech in March 1985 that in 
keeping with the pol icy of promoting free enterprise, 
the Government was seeking ways of defining and 
effecting the privatisation of Government and State 
corporations and enterprises. (The Argus 1985-03-18.) 
On 1985-11-08 the State President Mr PW Botha declared 
that "a committee of Cabinet Ministers has been 
appointed to pilot a programme to implement the 
Government privatisation action". 
(Cape Times 1985-11-08.) 
At the 1985 Annual General Meeting of the South African 
Institute of Building the Deputy Minister of Finance, 
Mr Kent Durr stated: "Our (government's) commitment to 
privatisation stems from the strong conviction that in 
the final analysis it is not the bureaucrats but the 
free enterprise system ( the profit motive) that brings 
about economic growth and development." 
(The Professional Builder, March 1986 Vol. 4 No. 1.) 
Is the government serious . about privatisation? 
Apparently so, job advertisements for senior posts in 
the public service advertised in this regard are 
included in Appendix B. 
The posts offered include the following functions: 
"to determine whether government functions can be 
privatised", and 
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"the implementation of privatisation actionsn. 
This demonstrates at least some form 
programme on behalf of the Government. 
of action or 
What remains to 
be seen is how swiftly the Government can process its 
stated commitment to privatisation. 
The question is whether the private sector or public 
sector will take the initiative. In the Standard Bank 
Review, December 1985 the need for action is spelt 
out: "Privatisation remains little more than an idea. 
For it to become a beneficial force it requires two 
things: 
- a willingness on the part of the State to loosen its 
grip on the economy, and 
clarity about priorities in the choice of targets and 
mechanisms to be used." 
It is considered not sufficient for the State to 
"loosen its grip on the economy• as effective 
privatisation is dependant upon co-operation between 
both the public and private sector. The onus is 
therefore on the private sector to meet the State's 
commitment by delivering efficient and effective 
services. One essential ceri teria is 
free and unrestricted competition. 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
the presence of 
This aspect is 
A necessary catalyst in the privatisation action is the 
process of deregulation. This can be described in 
general terms as the entrepreneur being afforded the 
opportunity to act without unnecessary restriction with 
the objective of increasing the efficiency of his 
management and private initiative. Privatisation cuts 
deeply into the Government's regulatory role. 
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The Cape Town City Council on 1985-06-27 adopted the 
following reference: "That it be a reference to the 
Executive Committee to consider and report on the 
formulation of a programme by which a policy of putting 
out to private tender all works of a capital nature can 
be implemented." 
The attitude of the Cape Town City Council is clear (by 
the use of the word •a11• in the above resolution) but 
the question is to what extent and 
privatisation practical 
cornmuni ty receive a better 
and feasible? 




These and other factors are considered in depth in the 
case studies which follow. 
Specific reference 
during the 1986/87 
council delivered 
to privatisation was again made 
Budget Speech of the Cape Town City 
on 1986-05-22. Councillor J Muir, 
Chairman of the Executive Committee reported that 
"Cou·ncil has adopted a balanced approach to the issue 
of privatisation and will be guided only by 
considerations of cost and service to the public. 
It is the Executive Committee's intention to direct its 
attention to the possible privatisation of routine 
operational and maintenance functions•. 
---
The degree to which privatisation could be implemented 
is clearly and confidently stated by the Adam Smith 
Institute (UK) who claim that there is no valid reason 
why even the management of local government per se 
should not also be privatised. (Imeson 1984 : 2.) 
Will it work? 
are waiving caution signs. 
limited history, legal and 
Optimists and sceptics 
Since privatisation has a 
ethical questions abound. Will hoards of public 
20 
officials lose their jobs? Who is liable for meeting 
standards? And what happens if the private company 
goes out of business? (Bernstein 1985 : 53.) Success 
is highly dependent on specific conditions relating to 
the nature of the service, the local authority's skill 
in contract management, the size of the jurisdiction to 
be served, and the availability of competent 
contractors to do the work. The probability of success 
will be improved by giving serious thought and 
attention to these 
(Florestano 1982: 357.) Fosler 
major 
(1978 : 23) 
issues. 
reached 
the same conclusion and adds that the main advantage of 
contracting may be to foster competition among 
organisations providing services whether they be in the 
public or private sectors. 
The success of privatisation in South Africa depends as 
much on po~itical factors as it does on economic 
factors. The African National Congress and the United 
Democratic Front support the Freedom Charter which 
advocates nationalisation of key sectors of the 
economy. This philosophy is in direct conf 1 ict with 
the Business Charter which supports privatisation. 
Innes (1986 13) supports this view: •Although our 
government has opted for the Business Charter approach ----
rather than that of the African National Congress, the 




2.5 CONCEPTS OF PRIVATISATION 
organisations 
•privatisation• could mean either of two concepts: 
which 
- the public sector continuing to be responsible for 
the provision of the service in question (responsible 
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particularly in terms of funding and policy 
determination), while appointing a private sector 
agency to perform the service, or 
- the public sector ceasing altogether to be 
responsible for the service (although maybe reserving 
the right of regulation on the one hand or on the 
other hand the obligation of subsidy), and leaving 
the field open for private sector involvement if it 
so wishes and if it sees financial profit or other 
incentive in the service. 
An example of the first would be the local authority 
closing down its roads construction unit and instead 
calling for tenders from road building contractors. An 
example of the second would be the local authority 
announcing its intention of selling off its buses and 
inviting private bus companies to run services for 
profit or other incentives. Should there be no 
response from private enterprise, then a bus service 
will simply not be run and commuters would have to use 
other modes of transportation. 
A local authority could cease to provide a solid waste 
removal operation and citizens would individually 
contract with one of the solid waste removal private 
contractors. 
The local authority of Albany, Oregon, United States of 
America issues a franchise to a private firm for 
collection and disposal of waste. There is no 
contract; the firm does all the billing and has a 
direct relationship with the customers. 
(Atkinson 1984 : 3 6. ) 
Cloete (1986 89) elaborates on the concept of 
privatisation as meaning any of the following actions: 
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- Cession or divestiture. 
The public authority transfers by contract or sale 
the right or responsibility together with the 
relevant assets and liabilities, for the provision of 
a service or function to a private enterprise. The 
public authority relinquishes total responsibility 
for that service or function. 
- Farming out. 
The public authority retains responsibility for the 
provision of the service but no longer produces it. 
This is achieved by contracting with the private 
sector under specified conditions. 
- Withdrawal. 
The public authority ceases to produce or provide a 
service or function but leaves a vacuum which may or 
may not be provided by the private sector .. 
- Sharing. 
The public authority and the private undertaking 
share the market for the service or function. 
Moor and Parnell (1986 254) further assist in 
clarifying this concept by advising that private sector 
involvement in local authority services may come about 
in three ways. "An authority may be unwilling to plan 
a service, to produce or distribute the service, or to 
finance the continued operation of the service. The 
private sector may be brought in to fulfil any of these 
functions. The precise arrangements for this 
involvement also take three forms: contract mode in 
which the local authority finances and plans the 
service but a private sector firm produces the service 
under a short term contract; regulated mode where the 
authority merely plans the . service; and grant mode 
where the local authority involvement is with finance 
alone. Examples exist in local government of all three 
situations." 
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It is evident from the foregoing that privatisation has 
many facets and there are many different mechanisms by 
which the private sector can become involved in the 
deli very of local authority services. Under the 
circumstances of the statutory requirements governing 
local government it is the contract mode which has 
proved most important. It is therefore to the contract 
mode that the thrust of this thesis is directed. 
2.6 METHODS OF DELIVERING LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICES 
Savas (1977 3 4) identifies six methods of 
delivering a local authority service: 
- a local authority can provide collective services 
directly to citizens via its own agencies and its own 
employees (the direct labour approach) 
- another local authority jurisdiction could be hired 
to supply the service to its citizens 
- a private company could be hired to provide the 
service 
- a private firm could be granted an exclusive monopoly 
or franchise, ( under some farm of regulation) while 
it sells its services to the citizens 
- the free market could be permitted to operate where 
private companies provide the service but citizens 
entitled to the service are subsidised through the 
voucher system or alternatively the service producer 
is subsidised through grants or tax exemptions (used 
for low cost housing provision by the private real 
estate industry) 
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- the local authority articulates a collective need for 
the service, mandates that everyone purchase the 
service in the marketplace, but provides . no subsidy 
to the producer or consumer. 
2.7 THE PRIVATISATION DEBATE: BOTH SIDES 
The debate over privatisation, a word which until 
recently did not even appear in the dictionary, is 
gaining momentum and at this stage it is opportune to 
outline both sides of the argument. 
Advocates of privatisation claim that the private 
sector could deliver a better quality service for a 
lower cost as the profit motive and the competition 
factor are 
productivity 
an inherent guarantee of increased 
and efficiency. The private sector 
further claims to provide more effective and innovative 
management, motivated by the incentive of monetary 
gain, who could bring sophisticated cost-cutting and 
efficiency programmes to local authorities. 
If part of a service were contracted out then a 
'yardstick' would be provided for comparative 
purposes. Specialised skills which are costly and 
difficult to recruit could be made available to local 
authorities on an 'as and when required' basis. 
Economies of scale could be achieved when the private 
sector provides services to multiple customers. It is 
further claimed that tax benefits available to the 
private sector could be utilised to lower service 
deli very costs; bureaucracy could be avoided and the 
role of business and free enterprise in the national 
economy would be recognised. 
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The local authority, by contracting out, could use its 
limited debt capacity to finance other essential 
needs. Responsibility for dealing with trade unions, 
repairs and replacement of equipment, purchasing and 
warehousing are all shifted to the contractor. 
Greater flexibility could be introduced for 'cut-back' 
management in the event of a recession or for work of a 
seasonal nature. 
"On one side of the issue are the contractors, their 
trade associations, local chambers of commerce, many 
state and local public officials, as well as many 
powerful federal figures. These advocates of 
privatisation claim that contracting out is a way for 
financially burdened state and local governments to 
trim budgets, to hold the line on taxes and to improve 
the delivery of services." (AFSCME 1984 : 9.) 
Privatisation could be more costly than public services 
provision particularly when 'hidden costs' e.g. 
contract preparation, administration and contract 
monitoring are taken into account and the necessity for 
profit could also drive up costs. 
Lack of true ..... ---£.?mpetition could negate the benefits 
thereof and as contractors are constantly reducing 
costs in order to increase profits, quality and 
efficiency could decline as the least profitable 
aspects of the service are shed. 
A distinct danger of privatisation is the p9ssibili ty 
of a local authority becoming trapped by a single firm 
which is, or later becomes, a monopoly. 
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A contractor could initially offer a low price but once 
the local authorities' capacity to supply the service 
has been dismantled he could demand substantial price 
increases. 
The question is, could a local authority risk placing a 
service particularly one concerning public health in 
the hands of private enterprise? What is the 
consequence of failure? 
If the contractor, as in any private business, became 
insolvent then the city would be faced with a crisis. 
Drafting appropriate job specifications is difficult 
and the ensuing contract could become too rigid or 
narrow 
little 
to maintain quality public 
room for negotiation in 
contract. 
services. There is 
a tightly worded 
In-house provision 
flexibility for the 
priorities. 
of services has 
local authority 
always instilled 
to control its 
The pool of direct labour employed by a local authority 
could be mobilised quickly to deal with any disaster or 
civil defence emergency. The problem of corruption in 
contracting out has increased dramatically and numerous 
cases of bribery, kickbacks and collusive bidding have 
been documented. Contracting results in less 
accountability by the local authority to its citizens 
and contractors often lack the experience and 
sensitivity to deal with individual citizen's 
problems. Contracting could also inhibit 
experimentation and innovation particularly in the 
field of minimum services for the less affluent areas. 
•on this side of the issue there are public employees, 
public interest organisations, and many state and local 
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government officials and community organisations who 
have experienced contracting out failures in their own 
jurisdictions. To these groups, contracting out, 
rather than always providing a panacea for state and 
local fiscal and service delivery problems can increase 
government's woes. 8 (AFSCME 1984 : 10.) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Local authorities perform two important roles: they 
provide the machinery for community and societal 
decisions, and they provide goods and services. 
Many of the services are "essential services" meaning 
that they impact on public health and the well-being of 
the community and have intangible outputs. 
The importance of the local authority lies in its 
provision of infrastructural and associated services 
which are a basis for the sustained development of the 
local community and its economy. 
The perception of a market economy generally based upon 
the notions of Adam Smith distinguishes clearly between 
the roles of business and government. The private 
sector is viewed as •a composite of homogeneous 
businesses motivated by the desire for profits to 
produce the goods and services demanded by consumers in 
accordance with freely fluctuating prices that 
efficiently allocate resource-s-.--.._The role of the public 
sector is to •protect life and property, assure justice 
and provide the infrastructure or overhead necessities 
(e.g. police and fire protection, street construction 
and maintenance) required to support the activities of 
the private sector•. (Fosler 1978 : 22.) 
What exactly are local authority services? What is the 
purpose of local authorities? May a local authority 
contract out its services? How do the characteristics 
of public, and private goods and services affect the 
choice of agency? Is change necessary and what are the 
alternatives? This chapter seeks to address these 
questions. 
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3.2 DEFINITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY SERVICES 
"Municipal service" is defined in the Municipal 
Ordinance 20 of 197 4 ( Section 2, 1 vi) as "any system 
conducted by or on behalf of a municipality for the 
collection, conveyance, treatment or disposal of sewage 
or stormwater or for the manufacture, generation, 
impounding, storage, purification, distribution, 
conduction, transmission, conveyance, provision or 
supply of water, gas or electricity". 
Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974 is applicable only to 
the Cape Province of South Africa. 
The above definition of municipal services does not by 
any means exhaustively list the services commonly 
provided by local authorities. 
Local authorities usually provide the following 
functions: the provision of water; the provision of 
housing; health services; traffic control; provision 
of electricity; town planning and building control; 
amenities and recreational facilities; sewerage and 
wastewater treatment; libraries and selected cultural 
services; fire protection; solid waste; trade 
1 icensing; fixed property assessment and collection; 
secretarial services to the Council body; the 
construction and maintenance of roads, and the 
necessary range of back-up facilities. 
The frequency and standard of provision of these 
services is not uniform among all local authorities. 
3.3 THE PURPOSE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
The principal task of a local authority is its 
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obligation to provide efficiently and effectively a 
wide range of important services concerned with safety, 
health and well-being. 
The most important reason for maintaining local 
self-government is its superiority to any other form of 
government in terms of its ability to identify many of 
the needs of the community and to satisfy these needs. 
It permits the local citizens to make their own 
judgements, however imperfectly, about what will best 
suit them. Although many citizens are apathetic and do 
not actively participate in local affairs, there is no 
question that the municipality (whether local or 
regional) is a more effective and efficient mechanism 
for ensuring performance of this principal task than 
any provincial or national authority could be. 
Of great importance is the demand (by citizens, by 
private enterprise and by other tiers of government) 
for local authorities to provide an increasing range of 
services. Local authorities in South Africa have 
entered new fields in recent years illustrated by their 
involvement in planning and encouragement of employment 
opportunities through inter alia the provision of 
infrastructure, in urban conservation and renewal and 
in township development. 
The public generally expects that current standards of 
services provided will at least be maintained and in 
some cases improved upon. current standards are 
significantly higher than those provided a few decades 
ago. For example public health in the past was limited 
to the prevention and control of communicable 
diseases. Presently it provides for the maintenance of 
community health · generally, and is involved in the 
control of industrial and environmental health hazards 
and with a variety of matters once considered to be 
entirely in the private domain. Another example is 
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that the standard of wastewater treatment hds risen to 
such an ex t ent t hat in some ci ti es t he produc t is 
potable. 
The traditional role of local authorities has altered 
in that they are increasingly making value judgements 
and choices about the future of the community, rather 
than merely administering routine services. Citizens 
are demanding increased involvement directly in the 
affairs of local government and this effect has 
manifested itself by inter alia the increased reference 
of major planning decisions to local interest groups 
affected. 
Most major decisions made by a local authority are 
political in the sense that they involve officials 
choosing between conflicting values which affect the 
well being of various resident groups differently. The 
local authority provides for and distributes public 
goods such as clean air, public health safety and 
tangibles such as roadways, buildings and recreation 
facilities. These have both an economic and a 
political price. It is not possible to afford all the 
required needs and therefore establishing priorities 
among them is a political risk. 
The construction of a sportsfield or the installation 
of streetlighting are political actions as they involve 
the use of public resources which could have been used 
in some other way or some other place. 
3.4 CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY 
Provision exists in Munici12al Ordinance 20 of 
(.applicable to the Cape Province only ) for a 
authority to make alternative arrangements for 
carrying out of its functions. The alternatives 
be public bodies or private enterprise. 






"(l) A council may enter into a contract with a local 
authority or other person for the exercise or 
performance, either jointly or by any of the 
contracting parties, or any power, duty or function 
whatsoever which the council is from time to time by 
law authorised or required to exercise or perform." 
The Administrator has power to impose a joint 
arrangement or agency arrangement of this type. " ( 2) 
The Administrator may, after consul tat ion with a 
council and one or more other local authorities, by 
notice in writing direct them to enter into a contract 
contemplated by subsection (1) in respect of any power, 
duty or function referred to therein and specified by 
the Administrator in such notice. ( 6) Subject to the 
terms and conditions of any contract contemplated by 
this section entered into between two or more local 
aut.horities -
(a) every such local authority acting separately shall, 
in respect of the areas of its jurisdiction, and 
( b) any such local authority acting on behalf of the 
local authorities which are parties to such 
contract or any joint committee appointed from 
amongst the members of the local authorities which 
are parties to such contract and acting on behalf 
of such local authorities shall, in respect of the 
area affected by such contract, 
mutatis mutandis have the rights and 
including the power to make by-laws, and 
powers, 
perform 
the duties and functions which a council has or is 
required to perform in regard to any matter 
contemplated by such contract." 
(Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974, Section 173.) 
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3 .5 PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE GOODS 
Local authorities render services to promote t he 
general welfare of their citizens. Usually such 
services are only undertaken if the private sector can 
not meet community needs satisfactorily. The private 
sector would only be interested in services that could 
be provided on a financial return basis and conversely 
the public sector provides services that require 
expenditure without concomitant financial returns. 
This implies that there is a difference in nature 
between a public good or service and a private good or 
service. 
Criticism has been levelled at local government in that 
much of its growth has resulted from decisions to 
provide private services at public expense. 
What then are the goods and services that local 
authorities should provide? 
If the answer is simply that local authorities should 
supply public goods and services then what are they and 
what is the nature of goods and services that renders 
some of them public and some private? 
There is no general consensus on the above. 
Circumstances vary from nation to nation, from city to 
city and even within a particular city. There remains 
disagreement with regard to whether certain services 
should be classified as public or private. The issue 
remains how best to provide the collective services 
that local authorities have elected to supply. 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1977 : 7 - 11) provide the following 
definition for a private good and a public good. 












"A public good is defined as one which is not subject 
to exclusion and is subject to jointness in its 
consumption or use• 




be classified along two 
consumed individually or dimensions: whether 
jointly and whether 
(Henderson 1985 : 21.) 
'free rides' can be excluded.• 
At the one extreme private goods for example are 
supermarket foodstuffs, individually consumed and 
exclusive because each consumer pays individually for 
his basket of goods at the till. At the other extreme 
are collective goods for example television or 
broadcasting and national defence, jointly consumed and 
impossible to exclude. In between we have goods like 
cable or toll television, jointly consumed but 
excludable. There are also 'common-pool' goods like 







summarises several key 
to public goods and private 
-----
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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS 
Private Goods 
Relatively easy to measure 
quantity and quality 
can be consumed by only a 
single person 
Easy to exclude someone 
who does not pay 
Individual generally has 
a choice of consuming 
or not 
Individual generally has a 
choice as to kind and 
quality of goods 
Payment for goods is 
closely related to demand 
and consumption 
Allocation decisions are 
made primarily by market 
mechanism 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1977 : 16) 
Public Goods 
Relatively difficult to 
measure quantity and 
quality 
Consumed jointly and 
simultaneously by many 
people 
Difficult to exclude 
someone who does not pay 
Individual generally has 
no choice as to 
consuming or not. 
Individual generally has 
little or no choice as 
to kind and quality of 
goods 
Payment for goods is not 
closely related to 
demand or consumption 
Allocation decisions 
are made primarily by 
political process. 
How then is an essential service like solid waste 
collection and disposal categorised? 















years of solid waste management from a 
public problem indicates that the service 
a public good. The entire community 
decreased values associated with public 
health and aesthetics when even one of its members 
refuses to dispose of his solid waste properly." 
(Marks and Liebman 1971: 16;) 
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Ref~se collection meets the criteria of an essential 
municipal service, yet a survey undertaken by Columbia 
University showed that nearly half of all Americans 
live in cities where private collectors pick up at 
least a portion of the residential refuse. Disposal of 
the wastes, either in a landfill or in a resource 
recovery facility, is also accomplished by the private 
· sector in a substantial number of communities. 
There are other public services that are supplied 
privately in many communities, such as electric power, 
ambulance service, supply of drinking water, street 
maintenance, and even fire protection. 
The characteristics of public goods should be borne in 
mind when deciding whether to provide a service 
in-house or under contract to private enterprise. And 
this should not be compared with the •make or buy" 
decision faced by a business firm which is primarily 
based on economic grounds. In local government the 
objective would be inter alia to provide services at 
the lowest possible cost consistent with the local 
authority's perception of the community interest. But 
besides the cost factor sight must not be lost of · the 
other essential criteria for services in that th~ir 
provision must be continuous, stable and reliable. 
3.6 NECESSITY FOR CHANGE AND ALTERNATIVES 
The necessity for change stems from the present state 
of this country. South Africa is in the grip of civil 
unrest, political reform, unprecedented financial 
stringency, the process of deregulation and the 
imminent introduction of Regional Services Councils. A 
dire need to improve the quality of life and services 
in the townships exists. Never has there been a 
greater need for "best-value~for-money" local authority 
services. 
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Local Government funds in South Africa have become an 
increasingly scarce resource primarily due to the 
recession of the past five years, the high inflation 
rate and the shrinking Government subsidies for service 
provision. If a service can be performed by private 
enterprise effectively with either a service 
improvement or cost savings then it should at least be 
considered. That is a basic management responsibility! 
What alternatives are there for service delivery? 
Traditionally most local authority officials have a 
strong preference for service provision by their own 
departments. It is argued that this arrangement gives 
them greatest control, in the public interest, over the 
provision of services. 
But services could be privatised to different degrees. _,) 
The local authority's structure could remain unchanged 
and a number of individual tasks (e.g. consulting 
engineering work, chemical spraying, 
tasks) could be contracted out. Full 




sector is utilised on an 'as and when required' basis. 
A ---f_ll!!her degree would entail the local authority 
contracting out a number of sub-services on a permanent 
basis, e.g. maintenance of vehicles, park maintenance. 
Officials still plan, direct, and control closely. 
Yet further the local authority could contract out a 










operation and resolving complaints. The contract could 
be for an inclusive annual fee and officials would only 
maintain a monitoring role. 
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It is important to appreciate the difference between 
the production and the provision of services. Although 
a local authority may cease to produce a service it 
could still provide it by means of contracting out. 
The local authority could therefore structure an 
appropriate monitoring programme to ensure timely and 
cost-effective provision of the service thereby still 
retaining control. 
Control could be problematic because of the difficulty 
in monitoring performance and quality. What 
constitutes breach or failure, and what degree of risk 
and level of quality are acceptable to the local 
authority? 
Consider the results of a breach in a fire or ambulance 
service which has been contracted out and contrast this 
with a breach in parks maintenance. What remedies 
should be applied to a breach or failure to perform the 
requirements of the service? The obvious solution 
would be a financial penalty but is this alone 
acceptable where the risk is one of health? 
A concept gaining in popularity is that the public and 
private sectors must work together as partners. 
The City of Winnipeg in Canada which divides refuse 
collection service between contracted private companies 
and municipal crews has proved that both methods are 
worth keeping. A benefit of having in-house forces 
doing a portion of the work is in determining if 
contract prices are coming in too high during the 
tender process. The local authority retains the right 
to reject any or all of the tenders. If a particular 
tender is too high the district involved may calculate 
what the costs would be for the district to take over 
the work. (Ross 1982 : 59.) 
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This concept is referred to as nblending" and its main 
advantage lies in allowing productivity and cost 
comparisions to be made under practical rather than 
theoretical conditions. It facilitates an objective 
decision as to whether to privatise further or perhaps 
resume full in-house provision of the service. 
When a pri vatis.ation transaction is appropriately 
structured both partners will benefit, but neither 
gains at the expense of the other. The private sector 
gets an opportunity to engage in business with a public 
sector client and the public gets a service delivered 
at a cost below its own cost of delivering the service. 
(Goldman & Mokuvos 1984 : 71.) 
Kirlin et al, (1977 : 129 - 146) discuss policy options 
on choosing municipal service delivery arrangements and 
stress that alternatives must exist and be readily 
available. They cite the example of private firms 
delivering solid waste services quite commonly while 
alternatives for basic law enforcement are not so 
widely available. 
Where possible and practical, private enterprise should 
be given the option of performing part of the service 
under equally favourable conditions in order to allow 
comparison between public and private enterprise. 
Initially only a portion should be contracted out but 
at least tenders should be invited. If the price is 
unacceptable the offer can be withdrawn. 
The Institute of Town Clerks of Southern Africa 
supports the concept of privatisation subject to three 
conditions viz: 
- the service must be more effectively delivered 
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- it must be more economically delivered 
- concern for community needs must not be lost. 
(Ravera 1986 : 47.) 
When comparing private and public agency expertise it 
should be appreciated that local authorities are 
required to respond to public policy and there are many 
elements of this policy which run counter to maximum 
efficiency in an operational sense. 
Finally, the impact of any change should not have 
negative implications for low-income or disadvantaged 
groups. (Florestano 1982 : 357.) 
The literature survey revealed very little discussion 
on change or any way of cutting costs other than 
privatisation. Is this the only alternative? 
According to the American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal employees: "The key to improving public 
services is good public management and not the 'selling 
off' of government. All too often, public officials 
have used contracting as a crutch to prop up weak 
management. If a contract works out without much 
controversy the public manager can take the credit, if 
it does not the manager can blame the contractor. But 
in every case of failure, in every case where the 
quality and efficiency of a public service has 
deteriorated and the cost increased, where control over 
a public service has been diminished or lost, where 
corruption has come into play, the public is the chief 
victim: the public endures the consequences and the 
public pays the bill." (AFSCME 1984 : 101.) 
--
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The privatisation concept has considerable meri t and 
where i mplemented in the correct manner and appropr i a t e 
circumstances it has achieved notable success. For 
example, according to TIME 1986-02-10 page 61 "Evidence 
abounds that companies can provide many services more 
cheaply than governments can. When Los Angeles County 
reviewed the results of its extensive privatisation, it 
found that it was saving $23 million a year on 450 
contracts. A study by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) found that cities that have not 
privatised spend an average of 96 % more to build 
streets than they would if they used contractors, 43 % 
more to clean streets, and 73 % more for janitorial 
services." 
However, if there is dissatisfaction for a local 
authority service it should not be automatically 
assumed that privatisation will provide the necessary 
solution. Privatisation is no panacea for local 
authority fiscal and service delivery problems. 
Local authorities can do much to impr·ove the cost and 
quality of the delivery of services based on increased 
productivity and sound economic and management 
principles before privatising. 
It is therefore concluded that privatisation should be 








COMPETITION: THE REAL ISSUE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Michael Heseltine, Britain's former Secretary of State, 
called on every local authority to systematically 
examine its activities with a view to deciding which of 
them should be subjected to the test of competition 
with the private sector. "Competition" he said "is a 
unique discipline in increasing efficiency". 
(Imeson 1984 : 4.) 
Public and private sectors are in agreement that no 
function should be privatised unless there is 
sufficient competition in the field to prevent the 
creation of a monopoly. 
Care must be taken "not to dismantle a public monopoly 
only to create a private one in its place". 
(Florestano 1982 : 357.) 
In the following section certain issues of the 
competitive market are discussed and three brief case 
studies of the Cape Town City Council illustrate the 
practicalities and importance of competition. 
4 .2 THE COMPETITIVE MARKET 









absolutely no guarantee that a service ceased by a 
local authority will immediately (if at all) be 
provided by an enterprising business. 
Further debate 
futile if there 
supplier. The 
on privatisation will t herefore be 
is no potential 
number of potential 
(or enterprising) 
suppliers is a 
critical factor and depends on the particular service. 
If a good number of suppliers is available then i~ is 
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assumed that competition will lower the cost thereby 
making privatisation attractive and viable. Cost is of 
primary concern - is it cheaper for the public agency 
to produce a service or to purchase it? Many cases 
exist where local authorities do both to foster 
competition for an in-house operation. 
Mr Hendrik Schoeman, Minister of Transport, has stated 
that proposals to expose the South African Transport 
Services to competition from private operators are to 
be tabled in Parliament during 1986. The proposals aim 
to outlaw monopolies and cartels in passenger and 
freight services and open all transport services to 
competition. He concluded that competition and freedom 
from regulation are the answer to the price spiral on 
tariffs. (The Argus, 1986-02-18.) 
Direct competition between public and private provision 
of traditional local authority services is not as 
profound in Great Britain and South Africa as it is in 
the United States, except in respect of design and 
construction. As mentioned previously, in Britain the 
_L_o_c_a_l ____ G_o_v_e_r_n_m __ e_n_t ___ P_l __ a_n_n_i_n_g.__ __ a_n_d ___ L __ a_n_d ___ A __ c_t ___ l ........... 9_8_0 has 
legislated for compulsory competition in local 
government construction and maintenance work and was 
designed to put direct labour organisations on a 
competitive commercial footing with the private 
sector. It has been argued that the introduction of 
competition in the delivery of local authority services 
would hardly improve such services, but if an analysis 
is made of comparative data for a service which is 
blended between the public and private sectors, it 
would serve as a tremendous incentive for the public 
sector to improve its productivity. 
"It is not necessary to look far for a means to improve 
service deli very. The market system with its bracing 
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tonic of competi t ion - however imperfect - has served 
our society well i n providing many private goods ver y 
efficiently ." (Savas 1977(A) : 3.) 
Can this same system support the deli very of public 
goods and services? If competition is introduced from 
private or public sources will the citizens benefit? 
The market system can not be advocated so easily in 
certain circumstances as many services traditionally 
provided by local authorities have characteristics 
conducive to natural monopoly. 
"Natural monopoly exists when the technological 
alternatives are such that competition can not work 
effectively. The circumstances inevitably lead to 
monopoly because large scale monopoly supply is more 
efficient and more advantageous to the consumer. This 
is very often assisted by economies of contiguity 
whereby it is not primarily the absolute size of the 
service which gives rise to the economies, but the 
avoidance of duplicated effort in a particular 
geographic area." (Wall 1982 57.) It would be 
uneconomic to have two or more solid waste collection 
services in competition in the same area, with the 
vehicles of each driving the same roads and passing the 
properties served by each other. 
However this view would not be shared by certain 
contractors in the United States where several 
instances occur of private solid waste collection firms 
competing with each other for customers and "one finds 
several different firms servicing a si ngle street". 
(Savas 1977(8) : 718.) 
It is argued that through privatisation it is possible 
for local government to reduc.e its 




levels of service either under contra~t to, or 
completely in the private sector. Therefore, by 
increasing cornpeti tion, pr i vatisaticin could enable the 
economy to become more efficient. 
However it can not be taken for granted that 
privatisation and the free market would simply become 
the panacea for local authority fiscal problems. This 
becomes particularly evident when analysing the nature 
of public goods and services in the previous chapter. 
"The provision of public services must be continuous, 
stable and reliable and public enterprises are not free 
to shift or abandon service purely in response to 
market conditions or to optimise revenue." 
(Bingman 1984 : 7.) 
In this regard a local authority when considering 
privatisation has a definite responsibility to ensure 
that as far as possible the private sector can meet the 
above criteria. 
It should not be forgotten that local authorities 
provide a consulting service to the community which in 
most instances is free of charge. Examples are town 
planning, horticulture, various building services and 
electrical aspects. The cost of such services is 
substantial and perhaps in the market system 
environment a charge should be levied, particularly 
where the service benefactor is an individual or 
business concern. A similar principle applied to a 
"softer" service like libraries could be to charge 
borrowers for works of fiction. 
In the south African economy legislation for 
is competition provided by the Maintenance and 
_P_r_o_m_o_t_1_· o_n_o_f __ c_o_m .... P ..e_t_i_t_i_o_n __ A_c_t __ . , __ 9_6_o_f_l_9_7_9 , the aim of 
which is "to provide for the maintenance and promotion 
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of competition in the economy, for the prevention or 
control of restrictive practices and the acquisition of 
controlling interests in 




Notwithstanding this legislation 
businesses or 
and for matters 
and proposed 
safeguard, free enterprise has the depressing tendency 
to evolve into oligopoly and then monopoly. 
Although privatisation has been successfully introduced 
in America this does not necessarily guarantee its 
success in South Africa as the likelihood of monopolies 
forming in that country is far less than in South 
Africa. Vast numbers of firms exist in America as 
potential suppliers of a service but only a fraction 
exist in South Africa which might limit effective 
privatisation. The fact is that in South Africa a 
handful of giant private corporations dominate the 
private sector of the economy. 
Between them Anglo American, SANLAM, SA Mutual and the 
Rembrandt Group hold 83 % of shares on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. (Argus 1987-02-14.) 
Privatisation could strengthen this grip resulting in 
more price-fixing agreements, more restrictive 





democracy in our country. 
The Trust Bank in its Economic Report dated 1987-02-14 
comments as follows: "We are concerned about the 
progressive concentration of power in the private 
sector with large groups increasing their control of 
certain sectors of the economy. This limits 
competition and lessens cost consciousness, causing 
considerable distortions of free market principles 
preventing the consumer from participating in the 
price-making process." 
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The reali ty of this practice is demonstrated by the 
following example. 
A report dated 1985-0 2-11 titled "Memorandum on 
restrictive practices of construction material 
suppliers in Greater Cape Town" was addressed to the 
Minister of Commerce and Industries by the Cape 
Association of Town Engineers. Specific details were 
supplied pointing out the monopolistic constraints 
prejudicing the cost structures of local authorities in 
the Western Cape. A very few producers of civil 
engineering materials have a stranglehold on certain 
materials which have a considerable influence on 
construction costs. Contractors, either private 
enterprise or public enterprise are forced to purchase 
materials from suppliers in a market where competition 
is virtually non-existent. The resultant influence on 
cost levels can well be· imagined. The only alternative 
in the case of at least two materials is for the local 
authorities acting jointly to enter the present 
monopolistic market as suppliers of materials in order 
to ensure competitive conditions. 
4.3 CASE STUDIES: THE FACTS 
The Cape Town City Council has largely withdrawn from 
the marketplace as . a supplier of materials and plant, 
and as a manufacturer. 
However, it has retained some ability to compete with 
the normal supplier and this has tended to influence 
the prices quoted against public tender. This is 
evidenced by the following three case studies: 
- the supply in Greater Cape Town of crushed stone for 
concrete and premix 
so 
- the supply in Greater Cape Town of premix 
the provision of a solid waste collection and 
disposal service to the Fish Hoek Municipality. 
4.3.1 THE SUPPLY OF CRUSHED STONE 
With one or two small exceptions all ·the stone quarries 
in the Western Cape have grouped into an association 
known as Cape Quarries, which controls all sales. 
Cape Quarries when receiving an order, arrange for 
delivery from one or other of the quarries in the 
group. This situation constitutes a virtual cartel as 
far as the supply of crushed stone in the Cape 
Peninsula is concerned as alternative tenderers have 
limited supply capacity. 
The cartel has had two regrettable effects viz. price 
and quality. 
Over the six years 1980 to 1985 the price of stone has 
increased markedly. The following table summarises the 
price increases in certain sizes. 
SIZE 1980 
3,35 mm R4,80 
6,7 mm R9,19 
13,2 mm R7,21 
13,2 mm cub. R9,04 
37,0 mm R4,70 
53,0 mm R4,70 
(Source: Accepted tender prices on 







Rl 2, 9 7 
Cape Town City 
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A detailed graphical representation of the ~bove table 
over the period 1980 to 1985 is presented overleaf. 
It is evident from the above table that the increases 
ranged from 121 % for 6, 7 mm to 250 % for 3, 35 mm. 
These increases are considered excessive if compared 
with the progressive increase in costs over the period 
1980 to 1985 as reflected by the Haylett formula, the 
"building material price" and 
indicators as published by 
Research of the University 
"general building cost" 
the Bureau for Economic 
of Stellenbosch. These 
indices averaged at 96 % • It is therefore considered 
that these unduly high increases in the price of stone 
can be attributed to lack of competition. 
The background to the formation of the Cape Quarries 
Association was the need to ensure the supply of stone 
to the Cape Town City Council after the closing of the 
Council's quarry. The performance of the Association 
has often been erratic and the experience of the Cape 
Town City Council is that stone is supplied one day 
from one quarry and the next day from another. The 
complaints against .the quarries in respect of stone 
quality relate to flakiness and excessive dust. 
Most of 
quarrying 
the leases on ground 





constitutes a monopolistic market as there is no 
opportunity for any would-be suppliers of stone. 
This monopolistic situation acts detrimentally to the 
interests of the ratepayers. 
Competition must be reintroduced to the market but not 
by the entry of a private . enterprise rival to Cape 
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could be to establish a local authority run stone 
quarry and an investigation into the feasibility 
thereof should be undertaken. However this is a 
capital intensive operation. The likelihood of the 
necessary funds being available for this purpose in the 
current economic climate is remote. 
4.3.2 THE SUPPLY OF PREMIX 
The second example relates to an existing case of the 
cape Town Municipality providing the sole competition 
to what would otherwise be a private monopoly. 
The cape Town Municipality receives from its premix 
plant at N' dabeni most of ( 7 0 - 80 per cent annually) 
what it requires for its own use. 
While the asphalt industry was experiencing utilisation 
rates on existing equipment of about 25 to 30 per cent 
the Cape Town Municipality imported a new premix 
plant. As a result it was accused of competing 
unfairly with private enterprise and of being guilty of 
an unwise investment of public money. 
The facts reveal the following circumstances. The new 
premix plant replaced an old plant of equal capacity~ 
The Municipality has, as in previous years, purchased 
the balance of its requirements from private enterprise. 
The result is that the ratepayers save. The table 
below detailing Much Asphalt's prices to Cape Town 
Municipality and to contractors refers. The price per 
ton is very competitive with the price from the private 
producer. For each of the fallowing years the 
Municipality's pr ice per ton for premix to its elf was 
below that of the price to contractors, which is 
annotated in brackets: 1981 R24,00 (R25,00); 1982 
R27,00 (R33,50); 1983 R30,00 (R36,50); 1984 R41,50 
(R42,00); 1985 R41,50 (R49,68). 
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The capacity to produce from its own plant also ensures 
that the Municipality experiences no delivery problems 
which could otherwise affect construction costs. 
The possession of the premix plant represents a 
significant advantage to the Cape Town Municipality. 
The reason for this is because there is only one 
private producer of premix in the Cape region known as 
Much Asphalt. The Cape Town Municipality is the ref ore 
providing the only alternative supply of this 
material. At least until some other competitor enters 
the market. 
The Municipality's premix plant therefore converts a 
monopolistic situation into a competitive market. The 
Cape Town Municipality also receives much more 
favourable prices than other purchasers of asphalt from 
the Much company. Prices to the Municipality ( table 
below refers) for each of the years 1981 to 1985 were 
below the prices to contractors. The reason is that 
Much is aware that the Municipality can step up 
production from its own plant and cease purchasing from 
them. 
Between 1981 and 1982 the Much price to contractors 
increased significantly. But the price to the 
Municipality retained the same moderate rate of 
increase that it had the previous year. This moderate 
rate of increase was maintained in the next few years, 
except 1985. The following table illustrates the 
comparison: 
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1980 1981 1 982 1983 198 4 198 5 
TENDER NUMBER 8/ 80 8/ 81 8/ 82 8/8 3 8/84 8/8 5 
MU CH ASPHALT: 
- Price to Cape 21,05 23,65 27,13 31,00 33,50 41,30 
Town (per ton) ( 12%) (15%) (1 4%) (8%) (23%) 
- Price to Unknown 25,00 33,50 36,50 42,00 49,68 
Contractors (34%) (9%) (15%) ( 18%) 
(per ton) 
(Percentages in brackets denote increase from previous year.) 
(Source: City Engineer's Department, Stores Division.) 
The Cape Town Municipality's first obligation is to its 
ratepayers. In purchasing and operating its own premix 
plant it has acted in accordance with the ratepayers' 
interests and sound business and economic principles. 
4.3.3 SOLID WASTE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL - THE FISH HOEK CASE 
A decade ago the Fish Hoek Municipality dissolved its 
in-house refuse collection service in favour of 
contracting out. Five years later, for cost and other 
reasons, Fish Hoek considered resuming the in-house 
service. 
In 1984 Fish Hoek asked Cape Town to consider 
undertaking its solid waste collection and disposal 
service and tenders were also invited. The lowest 
tenderer to Fish Hoek ( the tenderer did not allow for 
i ndi vi dual collection of garden refuse) was Rl 94 3 00. 
The Cape Town Council's offer to Fish Hoek ( including 
individual collection of garden refuse) was 
significantly lower to such an extent that Fish Hoek 












The lowest tenderer, incidently the existing 
contractor, then re-negotiated with Fish Hoek. The 
eventual price negotiated by the tenderer on the basis 
of improved service equal to that of Cape Town was 
Rl36 500. The facts of the case are self-explanatory. 
The Cape Town City Council's ability to provide 
competition saved the Fish Hoek Municipality the sum of 
R57 800. 
This resulted in the Fish Hoek Municipality writing to 
the Cape Town City Council on 1985-01-30 stating inter 
alia that: 
RI consider it pertinent to advise you that in 
consequence of the offer made by your council, the 
successful tenderer amended his original tender by 
reducing the rate and increasing the scope of the 
tender at no extra cost, to match the excellent service 
offered by your Cleansing Branch. 
The result has therefore been a considerable saving 
gained by the Fish Hoek ratepayers and the anticipation 
of an appreciable improvement in the service given.ft 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Privatisation could lead to the destruction of 
competition and conversely the local authority's entry 
into the market may create competition where a monopoly 
has previously existed. 
The profit motive of the private sector is no guarantee 
that a particular result will be achieved at the lowest 
cost. However, free and unrestricted competition which 
promotes efficiency could provide such guarantee. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 




THE ~ROBLEM OF REALISTIC COST COMPARISONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Primary to a decision on the choice of agency is that a 
fair comparison should be made between the agencies. 
This comparison is largely dependant upon cost 
information being available in the right form. 
In comparing public and private agencies the cost base 
should not differ significantly as the major portion of 
the costs · of work undertaken would consist of labour, 
materials and transport. These costs should be 
reasonably similar. Similarly there are no real 
differences in the accounting systems. Local 
authorities adhere to the principles of the Institute 
of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants which are based 
as far as practical on international accounting 
standards. 
5.2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
It must · be borne in mind that even if a service is 
privatised the local authority does not relinquish 
total responsibility therefor. The local authority 
retains the ultimate responsibility for the service, 
provides consulting expertise to the contractor, 
ensures the forward planning of the service and attends 
to the demands of those whose needs are not totally 
fulfilled by the contracted service. 
Local authorities have been criticised for their 
apparent lack of motivation resulting from the absence 
of the profit and loss imperative and their alleged 
8 imrnunity to bankruptcyn. 
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On the other hand t he cost of the 
provision of servi ces can only 
pri va t e sector's 
be effectively 
controlled if competition is mainta i ned by regularl y 
reviewing contracts, perhaps on an annual basis. 
But competition must be fair. Instances have occurred 
where tenders have been invited or even a contract 
awarded and the efficient operation by private 
enterprise has been unduly encumbered by restrictions, 
anc administrative procedures or requirements. 
Managing a local authority is similar to any private 
business, but there is one crucial difference. The 
private business is accountable to its shareholders and 
the market and the local authority is accountable to 
its citizens. 
In the one case the accountability is purely economic 
while in the other it is economic and political. The 
primary objective of a private firm is to raaximise 
profits whereas local authorities have traditionally 
aimed to provide high quality services to their 
citizens at the lowest possible cost. 
It is argued that local government does apply and 
utilise sound business principles wherever practical 
but this is hampered by the difficulty of quantifying 
the cost and benefits of many local authority services. 
5.3 PRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTING FOR COSTS 
One of the major problems that must be considered is 
the presentation and publication of all relevant costs 
of a particular service. 
Local authorities are often subjected to t he cri t icism, 
especially if they are responsible for many services, 
that when they publish the costs of their own operation 
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not all relevant costs are revea l ed, theceby making 
them appear to be more efficient than they really are. 
Savas ( 1979 26) after a nationwide study of refuse 
collection in American cities concludes that cities 
which provide the service through a municipal agency 
generally do not know the full cost of the service. 
Savas is not alone in his accusation. 
Spence (1985 26) accuses local authorities of 
ignoring many costs which private enterprise has to 
bear thereby making comparisons invidious. 
• comparisons do not take into account total 
costs; they ignore any allowances for back-up staff, 
office rentals, insurance, tax payments, investments 
capital, research costs, etc., all of which have to be 
faced by the private entrepreneur, but are concealed 
when in-house costs are calculated.• 
Is this so and is this accusation applicable for all 
local authorities? Brand (1985 28) sets the record 
straight: •This is not true for the City of Cape 
Town. The financial statements are dependant on 
realistic accounting of costs. Every job has allocated 
to it its proportion of costs Qt salaries, furniture, --office rental, stationery, insurances and other items•. 
The above argument demonstrates precisely why local 
authorities try to charge out all central 
administrative and service costs. 
Spence's accusation requires further comment. He makes 
reference to •tax payments" but it should be realised 
that a local authority is not a profit-making 
organisation and therefore it would not normally pay 
tax. However, the Croeser · Working Group recommended 
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that local authorities should make profits on any 
service of a trading nature, but naturally they would 
not be taxed thereon. These profits are treated in a 
similar manner as in private enterprise i.e. to 
contribution to a Capital primarily provide 
Development Fund. 
a 
This is utilised to finance future 
capital expenditure and a portion is used as a 
contribution to the rate income of the local authority 
which provides assistance in those 
authorities are faced with a declining 
Spence further refers to •research 
claims are not taken into account 
calculated. How does he propose that 
be hidden when a local authority 
cases where local 
rate income base. 
costs• which he 
when costs are 
these costs could 
like Cape Town 
undertakes substantial research into the planning of 
services which could run into millions of Rand per 
annum? 
In the Cape Town Municipality costs of services are 
presented on both an objective and subjective basis. 
The subjective breakdown of costs would include such 
i terns as repairs and maintenance, salaries and wages, 
capital charges and general expenses (overheads). The 
objective breakdown using the cleansing service as an 
example would include such items as beach, river and 
street cleaning. 
The presentation and allocation of indirect overhead 
costs of local authorities as well as the presentation 
of the complete Financial Statements are recommended in 
terms of the 1951 report (as amended) published by the 
Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants. The 
report is known as the Standardisation of Financial 
Statements of Local Authorities and the majority of 
local authorities adhere to these principles. 
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5 .4 DEPRECIAT I ON OF ASSETS 
Another important factor to be taken into consideration 
is that local authorities do not depreciate assets in 
t he same manner as private undertakings. 
In a private concern expenditure on the acquisition of 
and enhancement of fixed assets is normally funded 
largely from shareholders' equity. Assets are 
depreciated over the period of their anticipated life 
and annual depreciation charges are raised against 
profits before tax. 
A local authority raises loans from the public to fund 
the bulk of its capital expenditure. Interest and 
redemption charges on these loans are raised on the 
service departments which have acquired assets funded 
from this source. Under current municipal practice 
loan redemption periods are normally considerably 
shorter than the life of the asset concerned. 
In Cape Town, repayment of advancep ex The consolidated 
Capital Development and Loans Fund for capital projects 
is made in accordance with advance redemption periods 




Building works - major (over R50 000) 
- minor (up to R50 000) 
Mechanical and electrical equipment 
Vehicles, plant and equipment 















anticipated life of the assets, and do not correspond 
to the depreciation policy followed by private firms. 
In all cases the periods appear far shorter than those 
used by private undertakings and therefore this element 
of cost is not directly comparable. 
Annual interest and redemption charges raised by a 
local authority for a given amount of capital 
expenditure would therefore tend to be significantly 
higher than annual depreciation charges for a similar 
amount raised by a private undertaking. When making 
cost comparisons it is therefore necessary to make 
appropriate adjustments where this factor is regarded 
as material. 
Why do local authorities not depreciate over the life 
of the asset? 
Local authorities normally utilise · the practice of 
carrying external borrowings to a central loans pool 
which includes other capital income and is used to make 
advances to fund capital expenditure. It is normal to 
relate redemption periods to the anticipated life of an 
asset but due to high interest rates, local authorities 
have tended to reduce the periods as far as 
practicable. The following example serves to 
demonstrate this point: 
LOAN OF Rl MILLION AT 18 % INTEREST PER ANNUM 
(ANNUAL ANNUITY METHOD USED) 
Repayment over 15 years R 196 403 per annum 
Repayment over 25 years R 182 919 per annum 
Extra cost per annum R 13 484 
Total cost over 15 years R2 946 045 
Total cost over 25 years R4 572 975 
Saving on shorter period Rl 626 930 
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5.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST AND CHArtGES 
With the exception of a trading or public utility 
operation conducted by local authorities, it is not 
normal practice to levy charges to the public on a 
scale which is designed to cover the full cost of the 
services provided. 
Generally for public services the policy tends to be to 
charge what the market will bear. Cape Town follows 
the policy of charging overhead costs to all services 
so as to identify true costs and the degree of 
subsidisation, but this practice is not followed by 
many local authorities. 
There is a growing need for local government to provide 
value for money, to become more commercially aware or 
at least be able to provide services that are 
competitively priced. (Salmon 1983 : 360.) 
In the case of trading services, such as electricity or 
public transport undertakings, much more accurate 
apportionment and allocation of indirect charges are 
essential for the following reasons: 
- The users of such services may not necessarily be 
ratepayers, and subsidisation of trading services to 
a significant extent by ratepayers or vice versa is 
clearly undesirable unless an informed policy 
decision has been taken by the local authority on the 
matter. 
- Valid comparisons between the cost of such services 
provided by different local authorities, or between 
local authorities and private contractors can not be 
made if all costs are not included. 
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5.6 COMPARISON OF COSTS WITH A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR 
The following factors should be considered when 










usually operate on the basis of calculating charges 
to cover cost only. 
water undertakings 
calculated at a level 
( Exceptions are electricity and 
where tariffs are normally 
which will enable them to make 
a contribution to rates, and passenger transport 
operations which usually operate at a loss and have 
to be subsidised by ratepayers and in some cases 
government) 
municipal services sometimes operate from premises 
which are rent free and have no outstanding loan debt 
e.g. Selkirk Street workshops of the Cleansing 
Branch. Before making comparisons with private 
enterprise, a nominal rental should be charged 
the contractor's price would be subject to General 
Sales Tax in full whereas the local authority would 
only pay General Sales Tax on bought-in factors e.g. 
materials. 
5.7 RECOMMENDATION FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES 
When making comparisons, the following procedures could 
be considered -
Property - Delete capital charges from 
cos.ts and substitute 
realistic rent. 
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Vehicles and plant - Accept City Treasurer's 
capital charges where a large 
fleet is involved. 
(See Appendix c for 
explanation of rationale.) 
Quotations from private contractors may be influenced 
by: 
- economic considerations. In times when business is 
slack, firms may be prepared to quote at cost or less 
to gain orders and make a contribution to their fixed 
expenses. Valid comparisons are not possible in 
these circumstances 












when the local authority has no alternative option. 
Again, valid comparisons can not be made 
- use of outdated or unrealiable equipment or methods. 
This could have an adverse ef feet on quality or job 
performance. Care should be taken to compare like 
with like 
- contractor's facilities may not always be available 
to the local authority when required, e.g. during 
public holidays or in the case of an emergency 
- when calculating the cost of a local authority 
operation, e.g. vehicles or plant, care should be 
taken to calculate rates based on a realistic level 
of utilisation. In some cases machines, e.g. 
bulldozers or fire engines are acquired and held in 
reserve to deal with emergencies. Rates based on the 
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actual utilisation level of such equipment will be 
invalid for comparative purposes 
local authority operations must be costed in such a 
manner as to enable realistic comparisons to be drawn 
with private contractors. There should also be some 
form of costing to reveal the true cost of plant and 
equipment, with regard to renewal or replacement. 
Traditional trading/profit and loss accounts should 
be created for internal services, to which all costs 
relating to the services should be charged. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
While it is acknowledged that there are differences 
between municipal costing and the methods used by 
private enterprise, it must be stressed that valid 
costing procedures must be used before realistic 
comparisons can be drawn between local authority costs 
and those of private enterprise. 
"The services could then recover these costs by setting 
an economic charge to the local authority's other 
departments in receipt of these services. The costs of 
these internal services could then be accurately 
established. These costing and accounting problems 
must be overcome in order to establish a sound basis 
for comparative purposes in the privatisation 
evaluation exercise." (Bendle 1986 : 128.) 
Local authorities have often been criticised in that 
their comparative estimates are inaccurate and that 
costs can easily be "hidden" in a large bureaucracy. 
Is this accusation justified? 
The following response was elicited during the 
interview with the Cape Town Municipality's Deputy City 
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Treasurer: "As far as we are able to ::antral the 
accounting issues we adopt an honest approach. If it 
came to our attention that departments were 
deliberately attempting to hide costs we would take a 
serious view of this and certainly take appropriate 
action. We make fair allocations of costs and we are 
often accused of going to extreme lengths to do this". 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE CHOICE OF AGENCY 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. THE FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE CHOICE OF AGENCY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the preliminary chapters of this thesis the pros and 
cons of privatisation are discussed from a general 
viewpoint. This chapter formally states the factors 
relating to the advantages of public sector and private 
sector agencies for the provision of local authority 
services. The factors are formulated as a result of 
the literature survey, where annotated, and where not 
are added by the author. The factors have been 
modified to reduce emotion e.g. "privatisation leads to 
bribery and corruption" has been changed to read " 
could lead to ... ". It is felt that this results in 
greater objectivity. 
From the literature survey the most important factors 
considered relevant to a south African application of 
privatisation were selected. Thereafter the author 
found that the comprehensive listing of factors could 
be assembled into three groups. This was considered to 
provide an orderly basis from which to investigate and 
evaluate the choice of agency. 
Certain factors could be grouped under more than one 
criteria group but are categorised on a "best fit" 
basis. No attempt has been made for factor weightings 
or ranking order. The factors are listed on a random 
basis as each application will result in a different 
mix, ranking and weighting depending upon the inherent 
characteristics of the service under investigation. 
This comprehensive listing of factors becomes an 
integral part of the decision-making process for choice 
of agency and also forms the framework for 
investigation. 
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The criteria groups identified are: 
- Economic and financial 
- Strategic and political 
- Administrative and managerial. 
The listing of factors is a primary step in the thesis 
methodological approach and is hereafter referred to as 
the •check list•. 
The remainder of this chapter comprises the 
comprehensive listing of advantage factors for each 
agency in the categories defined above. 
6.2 ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE SECTOR AGENCIES 
6.2.1 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL FACTORS 
Privatisation can be less expensive than public 
provision of service. (Florestano 1982 : 353.) If the 
cost of the service can be reduced through utilising 
the private sector then this benefit should be passed 
on to the ratepayers. (Vivier 1982 : 12.) 
Economies of scale can be gained when same private 
contractor provides service to multiple customers. 




As long as 
private sector will operate 
(Vivier 1982: 12.) 
efficiency and cost 
there is competition the 
so as to attract custom. 
Privatisation could allow local authorities to use 
their limited debt capacity to finance other essential 
needs. (Goldman and Mokuvos .1984 : 82.) 
72 
The use of private sector results in tax ;noney being 
returned to the local economy and through the 
consequential multiplier effect spreading wealth. Tax 
benefits could also be used to lower service delivery 
costs. (Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 70.) 
The profit motivation inherent in private enterprise is 
an excellent impetus for an efficient and cost 
effective operation. (Callegari 1985 : 30.) 
The onus for productivity is on 
greater the productivity the 
(Wesemann 1981: 18.) 
the contractor and the 
higher the profit. 
Local government is permitted to take advantage of the 
profit motive. (Florestano 1982 : 353.) 
Private ~ector management is motivated by the goals of 
self-advancement and monetary gain and therefore 
possesses a stronger incentive than public managers to 
perform well. (AFSCME 1984 : 14.) 
The private sector usually 
costs than a local authority. 
has lower fringe benefit 
(Wesemann 1981 : 18.) 
Private contractors have lower personnel costs because 
they do not have to conform to exact government wage 
scales. (Cryder 1985 : 40.) 
Efficiency is higher in the private sector since 
contract service firms know that they can easily be 
replaced if work is not satisfactory or prices are not 
within budgets. (Callegari 1985 : 29.) 
Rapid initiation of new prcjects can be attained 
without large initial outlays for facilities, equipment 
and training of personnel. (AFSCME 1984 : 13.) 
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The pri va t e sector has less leave privileges and 
benefits and construction employees are booked off in 
the event of inclement weather. (Wesemann 1981 : 18.) 
During times of" economic uncertainty or recession it 
may be necessary to cut back on services. contracted 
services can be reduced without employee retrenchment 
and conversely costs in a local authority will continue 
even if the level of a service is reduced. 
The private sector has the single objective of 
operating profitably and hence conducts its operations 
with the maximum efficiency. (Vivier 1982: 12.) 
A private contractor can proceed with a project at a 
faster rate as he can dispense with costly regulations 
and procedures which a local authority must adhere to. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 70.) 
6.2.2 STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS 
The role of business 
national economy 
(Florestano 1982: 353.) 
and free 
will 
enterprise in the 
be recognised. 
Local authorities could determine more flexibly their 
-------own growth and development by not relying so heavily on 
government funding which dictates the ways in which the 
needs are determined. (i.e. minimises central and 
provincial government involvement in local affairs.) 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 72.) 
The growth and size of government will be limited. 
(Florestano 1982 : 353.) 
Bureaucracy is avoided. (Atkinson 1984 32.) 
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Local a uthorities have permissive powers and t he legal 
nature of these powers does not require the local 
authority itself to render the service. 
(Vivier 1982 : 12.) 
Accountability and responsibility could be shifted to 
the contractor. {Florestano 1982 : 353.) 
The contractor is responsible 
unions and other aspects 
{Florestano 1982: 354.) 
for 
of 
dealing with trade 
labour relations. 
A better quality service could be provided by the 
private sector. {Florestano 1982 : 354.) 
6.2.3 AMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL FACTORS 
Privatisation is not just an alternative financing 
technique, it is an alternative management technique 
for providing a necessary service and complying with 
central and provincial government regulations in the 
most timely, cost-effective and politically acceptable 
way possible. {Goldman and Mokuvos 1984: 84.) 
Contract managers can concentrate wholly on improving a 
service without involvement in day-to-day 
administrative issues. (AFSCME 1984 13.) 
When a local authority provides a service it must cope 
with problems which range from payroll administration 
and personnel relations, to equipment operation and 
maintenance, vehicle problems and purchasing material. 
(Callegari 1985: 29.) 
For reason that a private contractor is removed from 
some of the constraints inherent in a local government 
agency there is belief that they can operate more 
efficiently. (Westerhof 1985: 25.) 
75 
Local authority management has more time to plan future 
programmes and development when required only to 
exercise a monitoring role over the contractor. 
(AFSCME 1984 : 13.) 
Recruiting adequate management expertise is 
for local authorities especially in 
sophisticated operations. (Cryder 1985 41.) 
difficult 
highly 
Greater flexibility for innovation is achieved and to 
experimentally or to achieve certain programmes 
discontinue inefficient or 
(Florestano 1982: 354.) 
ineffective programmes. 
Work of a non-permanent or seasonal nature is given 
greater flexibility. (Florestano 1982 : 354.) 
Specialised skills can be obtained from private sector 
as and when required saving cost of keeping specialists 
on the permanent staff. (Callegari 1985 : 29.) 
Privatising part of a service serves as a 'yardstick' 
for comparison of cost and efficiency against . the 
in-house unit. (AFSCME 1984 : 14.) 
Repairs and replacement of equipment become the 
responsibility of the private contractor. 
(Cryder 1985 : 40.) 
6.3 ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCY 
6.3.l ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL FACTORS 
Contracting is more expensive than local authority 
provision of service. (Florestano 1982: 354.) 
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The local authority could become totally dependent upon 
a contractor who is, or later becomes, a monop6ly. The 
lack of competition in the specific field of local 
authority services will mean that no real cost savings 
can be achieved. (Vivier 1982 : 12.) Competition for 
contracts to provide public services is too often the 
exception rather than the rule. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 77.) 
Private companies exist to make a profit. The 
necessity of profit can drive up costs, if not 
immediately, then eventually. (Lampkin 1984 : 50.) 
Rather than saving money, contracting out often results 
in higher costs. Hidden costs such as contract 
preparation, administration and contract monitoring 
usually increase the price of contracted services. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 77.) 
By not using a private contractor services can be 
provided at cost and the profit will not be distributed 
to the company's shareholders (who may be spread 
throughout South Africa) but retained within the 
regtonal economy. 
A common practice among contractors is called 
"lowballing" or "buying in". Initially a very low 
price is offered to obtain the contract but once the 
local authority has disposed of its equipment it is 
wholly reliant on the contractor who can then quite 
easily obtain substantial price increases. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 77.) 
Economies of scale could operate to the advantage of 
the local authority depending on its size vis-a-vis 
private contractors. 
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Contractors are constantly reducing costs in order to 
increase profits. Contracting out can result in a 
decline in the quality and efficiency of services. 
Contractors are tempted to cut corners by hiring 
inexperienced personnel, by ignoring contract 
requirements and providing inadequate supervision. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984: 77.) 
Once a private contractor has secured a contract he 
could seek to shed the least profitable aspects of the 
service and attempt to cut corners. (Imeson 1984 : 4.) 
If the private contractor goes insolvent or into 
liquidation the local authority will be faced with a 
crisis particularly if its own capacity to deliver the 
service has been dismantled. (Vivier 1982: 12.) 
6.3.2 STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS 
The pool of direct labour employed by a local authority 
could be mobilised quickly to deal with any disaster or 
civil defence emergency. 
When citizens complain about a contracted service, 
local authority officials could be left in a position 
with little more to do than complain to the contractor 
or enter into costly contract re-negotiation or 
termination proceedings. (Lampkin 1984 : 50.) 
Corruption in contracting out has increased 
dramatically. Numerous cases of bribery, kickbacks and 
collusive bidding have characterised contracting out. 
In addition, organised crime appears to have assumed an 
even larger role in illegal activities associated with 
contracting out. (Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 77.) 
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Local authorities provide services for need and not for 
profit. (Imeson 1984 : 3.) 
The Labour Relations Act prohibits strikes by local 
authority employees rendering essential services and 
there can be no breakdown of services in times of civil 
unrest. (Vivier 1982: 12.) 
Contracting out results in less accountability by the 
local authority to its citizens. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 7 7. ) 
Contracting out is less responsive to changing service 
needs. (Florestano 1982: 354.) 
Contractors, unlike most councillors have little 
motivation for social welfare, their main concern is 
profit. (Imeson 1984 : 4.) 
Contractors might lack the experience and sensitivity 
to deal with individual citizen's problems. 
Local authorities employ and train apprentices which is 
an important role for the future not enthusiastically 
carried out by private contractors. (Imeson 1984 : 3.) 
Public managers 




On the other 
public workforce have a 
to respond to unforeseen 
hand the contractor can 
refuse to do even the smallest task if its not in the 
contract. If its not in the contract it will cost 
more. (AFSCME 1984: 15.) 
Local authorities observe the health and safety 
requirements and legislation which increases the cost 
of its work making meaningful comparison of costs with 
a private contractor difficult. (Imeson 1984 : 3.) 
----
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Contracting out may provide inf er ior quality services 
for the citizens. (Florestano 1982 : 355.) 
The rendering of services by a private contractor will 
inhibit experimentation and innovation particularly in 
the field of minimum services for the less affluent 
areas (Vivier 1982: 12.) 
A local authority must be able to recruit and retain 
particularly professional staff who must be trained for 
planning and managerial jobs so that they may acquire 
the expertise necessary to reveal for example 
shortcomings in consultant's designs or a contractor's 
shortcuts. 
Lack of experience by private firms in service delivery 
is a major problem. (Imeson 1984 : 4.) 
Few competent and ambitious professionals required by a 
local authority would remain in its employ if the most 
interesting and stimulating jobs are always undertaken 
by the private sector. 
Privatisation leads to loss of public jobs and worse 
conditions for workers. (Imeson 1984 : 4.) 
Contracting is unworkable if private contractors do not 
want to do business with local government. 
(Florestano 1982: 354.) 
Local authorities benefit the workforce in terms of the 
principle of built-in stability of employment in 
providing jobs for school leavers, safety, heal th and 
welfare service, superannuation, sick benefits, etc. 
(Imeson 1984 : 3.) 
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As a local authority increasingly places i ::s workload 
out on contract so it generates less and less expertise 
from within. Therefore it becomes less capable of 
(ever) doing the work itself again. 
6.3.3 ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL FACTORS 
A major difficulty is in the drafting of appropriate 
job specifications and the resultant contract to ensure 
that the local authority gets what it wants for the 
agreed upon price. (AFSCME 1984 : 15.) 
A great deal of time and work 
regular oversight of 
(Florestano 1982 : 354.) 
is required to provide 
this process. 
Many services can not be be delivered independently or 
in isolation because the nature of the services 
requires frequent interaction with other services 
within the local authority's infrastructure. 
The drafting of job specifications and contracts often 
leads to contractor performance which is too rigid or 
narrow to maintain quality public services. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 77.) --
In-house provision of services allows a local authority 
to control its priorities. (Imeson 1984 : 3.) 
Contracting · out is frequently used to mask the 
inadequacies of public officials who can not manage 
their own operations properly. 
(Goldman and Mokuvos 1984 : 7 7. ) 
It is extremely difficult to negotiate a tightly worded 
contract. (Florestano 1982 : 354.) 
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A dual employment system could be created. One with 
public workers subject to strict personnel regulations 
and pay and benefit schedules and another subject only 
to rules of their private employers. 
(AFSCME 1984 16.) 
It is an unproven assumption that local authorities are 
less efficient in the rendering of services than the 
private sector. (Vivier 1982: 12.) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. THE METHODOLOGY OF INVESTIGATION 
The objective of this chapter is to set out the 
characteristics of the methodology of investigation. 
The primary objective of this thesis is stated as 
follows: 
"to contribute to a methodology which will assist the 
choice between a public sector agency and a private 
sector agency for the provision of certain local 
authority services." 
Achievement of the primary objective is attainable 
through the fulfilment of a set of secondary objectives 
relating to: 
- examining the issues involved in comparing private 
and public sector agencies 
- establishing criteria for the assessment of the 
agencies 
- examining the methodological approach and 
illustrating its application by way of actual case 
studies. 
The first of the secondary objectives is fulfilled in 
part one of this thesis. 
Part two of the thesis sets out the factors affecting 
the choice of agency between the private and public 
sectors. These are grouped . under the three criteria, 
thus fulfilling the second of the secondary objectives. 
84 
Sufficient preliminary work is now completed to enab l e 
t he methodological approach to be formall y stated. 
Set out below is the methodological approach which 
requires specific application to each proposal for 
privatisation on its merits as generalisations could be 
misleading. Privatisation could be advantageous in 
certain areas in respect of certain services or under 
certain circumstances and not in other areas or 
circumstances in respect of the same services. 
The first step entails a literature survey of 
privatisation or contracting out generally, 
supplemented by a more specific literature survey 
relevant to the service under investigation. Reference 
is made to the advantage factors for each agency in 
part two of the thesis which serves as a "check list• 
and forms the basis for the necessary investigation. 
(Problems were encountered in obtaining relevant 
literature. An extensive search succeeded in securing 
only one relevant text book. The remainder of the 
literature, mainly in the form of research papers, 
journal articles and periodicals, was imported from the 
Uni tea States and the Uni tea Kingdom. This was 
supplemented further with company reports, annual 
reports and in-house files. Very little published 
material is available on the South African application 
of privatisation.) 
The second step , researches the background and 
investigates the present agency for delivery of the 
service, providing relevant logistical data and details 
of expertise available which is placed in context with 
local authorities adjacent to Cape Town and potential 
private sector contractors. This study of the service 
seeks to determine the pertinent character i stics for 
investigation. 
The third step constitutes the selection of relevant 
factors from the "check list• for investigation. 
The fourth step investigates the service. Personal 
structured interviews incorporating open-ended 
questions form the primary basis for data and evidence 
collection. 
The fifth step discusses and analyses the data and 
information collected and researched under the 
categories of economic, strategic and administrative 
criteria. The findings are evaluated and own opinions 
and comments are formulated. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CASE STUDY: SOLID WASTE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose Of this chapter is to develop a case study 
of the solid waste collection and disposal service 
provided by the Cape Town City Council and place it in 
context with adjacent local authorities and the main 
private enterprise contractors within Greater Cape Town 
with the objectives of: 
- testing the devised methodological approach 
- drawing conclusions and formulating recommendations 
concerning the solid waste service. 
The motivation for selecting the solid waste (collection 
and disposal) service as a case study was two-fold. 
Firstly the literature survey undertaken revealed that 
in the · United States of America and the United Kingdom 
experienc.e this was the public service most frequently 
and extensively privatised. 
Secondly, Wasteman CC actually made representations to 
the Cape Town City Council during 1985 for "one or more 
suburbs of Cape Town to convert to the private 
contracting method." Subsequently on 1986-03-03 the 
Utilities and Works Committee of the Cape Town City 
Council received a presentation from Wasteman cc in this 
regard. 
The literature survey was undertaken in the first part 
of this thesis and outlined the background, trends and 
characteristics of privatisation. From this information 
a comprehensive listing of factors which are private 
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sector agency advantages and pubiic sector agency 
advantages for service provision was derived. This 
comprehensive listing provides the "check list• for the 
case study which follows. 
The complex issues of the privatisation debate 
inevitably raise many questions - does it really work?, 
how much money can be saved?, how many other local 
authorities in the region utilise private contractors?, 
what have been their experiences?, how efficient is 
it?. 
The background to the solid waste function in Greater 
Cape Town is described. The scale, dimensions and 
current status of the operations of the Cape Town, 
Milnerton, Pinelands and Fish Hoek Municipalities and 
the private sector contractors are outlined. 
The approach to the study with parti.cular reference to 
the method, steps and procedures followed is described. 
The data collected and researched is discussed under the 
three identified criteria groupings. 
The findings are analysed and conclusions, comments and 
opinion are derived. 
8.2 BACKGROUND 
The purpose of the solid waste service is in general 
terms to provide the organisation, planning and control 
of an efficient and effective solid waste cleansing 
service to achieve a clean and healthy environment. 
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The statutory responsibility for the collection and 
disposal is vested with local authorities and can not be 
delegated to any other body. However, a local authority 
may contract for the private sector's involvement in the 
service without surrendering its ultimate responsibility. 
The City of Cape Town's population is 991, 000 and the 
number of households (including commercial sites) served 
is 226,000 (twice or more per week). 
In its streetsweeping operation the length of roads to 
be cleaned is approximately 2 200 kilometres. The 
City's cleansing operation employs a total labour force 
of 2 015 employees and the total of its vehicle fleet 
(all types) is 226. 
The following extract from the City's budget for the 
year ended 1986-06-30 clearly demonstrates the magnitude 
of its cleansing operation: 
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OPERATI NG EXPENDITURE R 
Refuse removals 8 149 415 
Street cleaning 11 565 485 
Beach cleaning 546 425 
River cleaning 251 550 
Stercus removal 187 so 5 
Refuse disposal 4 630 005 
25 340 385 
The City operates disposal sites at Vissershok, 
Swartklip and Strandfontein. In addition a pulverising 
plant at Athlone has 100 tons per hour capacity and 
pulverised refuse is transported and tipped at 
Swartklip. There are no government or provincial 
subsidies, and with the exception of minor revenue 
contributions all funds are obtained from rates. 
All rateable properties have a free service for domestic 
refuse but are charged for industrial refuse. 
Non-rateable properties are charged for domestic and 
industrial refuse removal. 
The important feature of the collection function is its 
vast scale, ( Cape Town carries out 450, 000 collections 
per week), requiring close attention to detail. 
Computer aids are available for optimising disposal 
facility locations, routing, "beat balancing" and 
vehicle fleet management. 
Cape Town produces approximately 200 000 tons per annum 
of domestic solid wastes and approximatel y 100 000 tons 






Town Municipality has never contracted out a 
its domestic refuse collection and disposal 
this did come under consideration in 1977, 1980 
The . argument on the one side was based on the 
anticipated stimulus of competition, and on the other 
side the decision not even to try private enterprise was 
based primarily on strategic grounds and secondarily on 
economic grounds. 
The following is the status of the solid waste service 
delivery in three municipalities adjacent to Cape Town. 
Pinelands Municipality's solid waste collection and 
disposal service is presently contracted out to 
Waste-tech (Pty) Limited. This change of agency took 
place in 1976 and the municipality is presently in its 
third contract renewal with the same contractor. 
The population is 12 120 and the numb.er of dwellings 
(premises) serviced is 3 270. Only one compactor is 
utilised by the contractor for the twice weekly domestic 
collection and the once monthly garden refuse collection. 
The reason for contracting out was not primarily cost. 
Pine lands had its own tip site, however this was 
situated . on the windward side of the municipality 
causing the smell to be blown into the residential 
area. The tip was regularly set alight and was 
frequented by vagrants. Burglaries in the area 
increased drastically and complaints to Council reached 
alarming proportions. Another factor was that having 
only one cleansing vehicle led to severe maintenance 
problems and unproductive downtime. Pinelands wanted to 
rid itself of the problems associated with the tip site 
and these could be eliminated by contracting out. 
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The Fish Hoek Municipality first contracted out its 
solid waste service in 1974 and is currently under the 
third 5-year contract with essentially the same 
contractor. 
The population of this municipality is 12 500 and the 
number of dwellings (premises) serviced is 3 7 23. The 
contractor utilises one compactor to provide a similar 
service to that described for Pinelands above. The 
reason for Fish Hoek's decision to contract out was the 
same as Pinelands: to close the tip site in the town. 
The Milnerton Municipality carries out its own solid 
waste collection and disposal. The operating 
expenditure for this service for the year ending 
1986-06-30 is R857 250. The municipality employs a 
total of 53 employees in the delivery of this service 
and utilises 11 vehicles ( including 5 compactors). The 
population of Milnerton is 34 000 and the dwellings 
(premises) serviced are in excess of 10 000. Milnerton 
possesses its own tip site, a landfill site located on 
the northern bound~ry of Tableview. In 1981 contracting 
out was considered by the Council. No formal tender was 
put out but quotes were obtained from private companies 
and comparisons were made with tenders that other local 
authorit1e-s---had put out at that time. No decision for 
change was taken because the Council felt that the price 
comparison between in-house and private contractor 
together with the "risk" of contracting out was not 
strong enough motivation. 
A telephonic survey of other surrounding municipalities 
revealed that the muniGipalities of Kraaifontein and 
Strand contract out collection and disposal. Simon's 
Town's service is currently out to tender. The 
municipalities of Somerset West, Goodwood and 
Durbanville contract out the refuse disposal facet of 
their service to private enterprise. Parow Municipality 
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contracts out waste removal from its composting plant. 
There emerged only two satisfactory private enterprise 
contractors for the refuse collection and disposal type 
of contract put out to tender by the municipalities 
described above. The larger of the two is Waste-tech 
(Pty) Limited, operating since 1975, a member of the 
D & H Group ( Darling and Hodgson) and part of GENCOR. 
Waste-tech is a national company and operates from 
depots in Pretoria, Springs, Durban, Pinetown, East 
London, Port Elizabeth and the Western Cape (three 
depots). Waste-tech is involved in the entire 
waste-handling process and its Western Cape operation 
has a current annual budget of R3,8 million, utilises 54 
vehicles in its fleet including 10 compactors and 
employs a total staff complement of 141. 
Waste-tech has its own sanitary 
Vissershok (adjacent to one operated 
controls and operates another in 
contract to Stellenbosch University. 
landfill site at 
by Cape Town) and 
Bell ville under 
The second major contractor is Wasteman CC which has 
been in business in its present form since 1980 and 
claims an average growth of 31 % per annum. Wasteman 
has over 160 clients and serves more than 500 collection 
points. 
Wasteman operates a fleet of 17 vehicles and employs a 
total of 50 staff but because it is a close corporation 
it does not supply details of its budget. The Company 
does not have its own disposal site and utilises the 





The objective of applying the devised methodological 
approach is to obtain data, information and evidence on 
the factors identified for the solid waste service, 
aided by the •check list• grouped under the three 
criteria for analysis, to determine the most 
advantageous agency. The question is which agency can 
most efficiently deliver this service ... and why? 
A preliminary study of the 
undertaken to identify its 
What clearly emerged was 
solid waste service was 
essential characteristics. 
that solid waste is an 
essential service and therefore its disruption could 
cause serious consequences for the community as it 
carries a health risk. It is in most cases the service 
that has direct contact with the highest proportion of 
the ratepayers and is very much a •visible service•. 
"' The essential criteria and characteristics are 
identified in that the service must be: 
- economic 
- efficient and effective 
- continuous, stable and reliable 
- sensitive to the needs of the community. 
As an analogy, if a fire protection service were under 
consideration for privatisation then the most essential 
characteristic would probably be 'response time'. If 
this were not immediate then even though an alternative 
agency could provide the service at half the cost, 
further consideration would be futile. 
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Th e "check list" of advantage factors for each agency is 
carefully scrutinised bearing in mind the essential 
characteristics to determine which are applicable to the 
solid waste service. 
The relevant factors and variables are identified for 
the purpose of investigation and analysis, and 
consideration is given to relative importance of the 
factors and the degree of information and research 
required for each factor. 
Certain factors in the 'check list' are self-evident and 
do not require research but nevertheless the principle 
should still be considered as part of the overall 
decision for choice of agency e.g. "bureaucracy can be 
avoided" and •contractors have little motivation for 
social welfare• etc. 
The following factors in their criteria grouping were 
considered as important for the analysis: 
ECONOM!C: cost, competition, motivation for 
productivity and efficiency, economies of scale, risk of 
insolvency, staff flexibility. 
STRATEGIC: quality of service, pool of labour for 
emergencies, strike threat, accountability to the 
citizens, compliance with health and safety requirements 
and legislation, loss of public jobs and worse 
conditions for workers. 
ADMINISTRATIVE: managerial effectiveness, provision of 
a monitoring programme, 
handling of citizens 
flexibility. 
administration of the contract, 
complaints, and operational 
--
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As a basis for the background to thi s information annual 
reports, in-house files, journal articles, research 
papers, company periodicals and newsletters were 
scrutinised and informal discussions were conducted with 
various persons in the solid waste industry. 
Data and information were acquired from the 
municipalities of Cape Town, Milner ton, Fish Hoek and 
Pinelands and from the private contractors viz. 
Waste-tech (Pty) Limited and Wasteman cc. 
It was decided for the purposes of this case study that 
personal structured interviews should be held with 
senior management personnel of all the above 
enterprises. The form of questions considered at the 
interviews was open-ended. A questionnaire approach was 
considered limited in that privatisation is a very 
topical matter and could lead to emotive issues. It was 
considered more effective to personally gauge the 
strength of the arguments. Secondly, many of the 
factors under research are difficult or impossible to 
quantify and are therefore impractical for questionnaire 
format. 
In order to obtain a fair comparison of the 
characteristics it was decided to balance the interviews 
for data collection by investigating the following 
categories: 
Two private contractors were selected viz. Waste-tech 
( Pty) Limited and Wasteman cc. 
not selected arbitrarily but 
These contractors were 
on the basis of a 
preliminary survey which showed that they were: 
- the largest solid waste contractors in the Western Cape 
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the only firms tendering and being awarded local 
authority contracts in the region. 
Two local authorities providing this service in-house 
were selected viz. Cape Town Municipality and Milnerton 
Municipality. It was considered necessary· that for 
comparative purposes the local authorities selected were 
not only in the same region but also adjacent to the 
Cape Town Municipality. 
Two local authorities which have contracted out this 
service viz. Pinelands Municipality and Fish Hoek 
Municipality were selected. They both comply with the 
criterion of being adjacent to the Cape Town Municipal 
area. 
The criterion for the selection of candidates for 
interview was that they be the most senior official in 
each organisation. 





information relating to size, 
of the enterprise's solid 
scale 
waste 
- factual information relating to the factors that are 
quantifiable under criteria groups in the sequence; 
economic, stategic and administrative 
an open ended and frank discussion in more general 
terms on factors not easily quantifiable and where 
opinions and suggestions were gathered. Emotive 
issues were aired. 
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A list of questions was used to structure the interviews 
for each of the following organisations: 
- local authorities contracted out 
local authorities providing the service in-house 
- private contractors. 
The list of questions is provided in Appendix G • 
All persons interviewed agreed to the use of a recording 
device which greatly facilitated the pace of the 
discussion and the resultant continuity allowed in-depth 
consideration of the issues. 
The following is the list of persons 
alphabetical order, their designation 







Mr D Barson Works Manager 
Mr I Bewick Regional Manager 
Mr AH Blumenthal Assistant City 
Engineer (Solid 
Wastes) 
Mr JG Brand Former City 
Engineer 
Mr D Brook Deputy Town 
Engineer 
Dr R Coogan Medical Officer 
of Health 
Mr c Davidson Managing Director 
Mr AC De Bruin Vice President 
Mr J H Forbes Principal Officer 
(Costing) 
Mr E Fry Town Clerk and 
Treasurer 
Mr P Hare Marketing Director 
Mr J Hooley Market Development 
Manager 
Mr T Hollis-Turner Director of 
Administration 
Mr R Tyler Deputy City 
Treasurer 
Dr Kc Wall Assistant City 
Engineer 


































8 . 4 I NVEST I GATION 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
- Cost: 
The solid waste service is not subsidised by central or 
provincial government but is financed entirely from the 
rate fund. Cost is therefore of paramount importance 
and in the literature survey has been cited as the major 
reason for contracting out this service. 
The private contractors confidently claimed that they 
could deliver the same service presently provided by the 
Cape Town Municipality for a lesser cost owing to the 
absence of bureaucracy and the incentive for profit. 
The profit motive is no guarantee of cost-efficiency and 
the public agency's costs need not necessarily be higher 
than the private agency. However, it is an acknowledged 
fact that a private enterprise's primary objective is 
profit and it will therefore strive unceasingly to keep 
costs as low as possible. 
The local authorities and the contractors are in 
agreement that •price per bin• is not a suitable unit of 
measure for cor.1parati ve purposes. The contractors 
believe that cost can only be realistic if it is · based 
on the amount of work that the company is going to do in 
terms of the contract i.e. a charge per contract. 
Wasteman charge the Strand and Parow Municipalities a 
•price per month for the full service•. 
Generally when a contractor tenders or quotes for 
collection and disposal he takes the following factors 
into account: 
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- size of area 
number of vehicles required; and 
- size of crew required. 
Wasteman want Cape Town to advise them how much it costs 
to service a specific area; they in turn will quote and 
guarantee to deliver the same service for a lesser cost. 
Cape Town considers it unethical to think that a local 
authority would accept this type of "bargaining" as a 
method of comparing cost. Cape Town: "the only way to 
compete is on an open tender under the same conditions 
and we are confident that we can beat the price of any 
contractor - if they tender true costs!" The contractor 
could quote an unrealistically low price initially by 
subsidising the operation to gain a foothold and this 
possibility of "lowballing" is a very real danger . 
. 
Cape Town's confidence in claiming to be less expensive 
than the private contractors is based on tender prices 
in the Western Cape during the last two years. 
The following two cases substantiate the issue. 
Reference is again made to the Fish Hoek case outlined 
in Chapter 4. 
The private contractor's original price to Fish Hoek was 
Rl95 000. Cape Town's marginal costs, (no overheads 
allowed for) was R85 000. The Cape Town Council would 
not agree to provide this service for marginal cost, but 
at the same rate as the average cost to Cape Town's 
ratepayers. This figure was revised to Rl45 000 
( average cost). This price provided for a more 
comprehensive service than that to be ·provided in the 
original quote from the tenderer. The contractor 
subsequently revised its original tender price down to 
Rl36 000. It can be concluded that the contractor's 
final price must still have been profitable because Cape 
Town's costs (R85 000) were substantially lower. 
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The second example is an actual tender Cape Town put out 
for the sweeping of streets and main roads for a period 
of five years {Tender 396/84). The following is a 
summary of the tenders received. 
TENDERER PRICE 
R 
Spazzini Spa 22 227 500 
Table Mountain Plant Hire {Pty) Limited 5 555 863 
Waste-tech {Pty) Limited 3 859 284 
Cleansing Branch, Cape Town 2 325 407 
The above example is self-explanatory and needs no 
further comment at this stage. 
During the interviews undertaken the author requested 
that the contractors and local authorities supply an 
informal quote as an example based on the standard 
format as detailed hereunder. {The figures for Cape 
Town represent only a portion of the municipality.) 
The data presented below for Waste-tech { Pty) Limited 
refers to its current contract with the Pinelands 
Municipality. Similarly, the data for Wasteman cc 
refers to its contract with the Strand Municipality. 
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WASTE- WASTE- CAP E · MI LNERTON 
TECH MAN TOWN 
Number of 
dwellings 3 150 8 000 34 000 10 560 
M3 collected 24 960 40 000 * 68 500 
Total cost Rl21 500 R300 000 Rl 250 760 Rl65 000 
Cost per 
dwelling/per 
year R38,57 R37,50 R36,78 RlS,62 
Cost per m3 
per year R4,86 R7,50 * R2,41 
(*) These figures could not be obtained from Cape Town 
because all refuse collected is weighed by weighbridge 
at each disposal site and records are kept and analysed 
for wbeat balancing purposesw. Cape Town commented 
that weight is the only proper measurement because of 
the large variation (up to six times in density) of the 
compaction factor. The contractors do not operate on 
the weight basis but use cubic metres as a measurement. 
The above local authorities and contractors readily 
agreed to supply the above information but Wasteman 
warned that this method of comparison could be 
misconstrued and might even wmake their costs appear 
more favourable than they really arew. 
This method was used in a research study comparing 
private and public contractors in the City of Winnipeg, 
Canada. (Ross 1982 : 61.) 
Adjacent local authorities and t he private contractors 
have been unsuccessful in obtain i ng authority from the 
Cape Town Municipality to use the Athlone pulverising 
p l ant. They were critical of Cape Town in t hat this 
exclusion necessitates extra haulage for them, 
considerably increasing their cos t s. 
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Pinelands in particular feel aggrieved that they are 
not permitted to use the nearby Athlone tip site for 
two interesting reasons: 
they could then probably carry out the service 
in-house more economically; or 
- the price of the contractor will be less than at 
present as the refuse is transported a considerable 
distance to Waste-tech's Bellville site. 
The Cape Town Municipality's decision was based on the 
loss of control over materials delivered at the plant 
which could seriously damage the pulverisers, for 
example rags which could wrap around the hammers. Cape 
Town Municipality's trucks which serve the factory 
areas in Cape Town may not utilise the pulverising 
plant. They dump directly at Vissershok. 
- Competition: 
The private sector claim that the waste industry is 
that the extremely competitive. Waste-tech claim 
following are their-----e_gmpetitors: 
W G Waste, Skipaway, Wastemaster and 
Waste Control, 
all the other 
independent operators referred to as "rats and mice". 
Waste-tech encounter problems when competing with the 
small "fly by night" contractors who tender a very low 
price for a contract but dump the waste in the nearest 
bush causing serious environmental problems (many 
actual cases were quoted). Waste-tech have brought 
this to the attention of the Institute of Waste 
Management who are continually striving for tighter 
legislation to control waste disposal. Wasteman more 
realistically cite only three competitors (including 
themselves and Waste-tech) for domestic waste in the 
Western Cape but hasten to add than even that is too 
many! 
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Wasteman warned that the industry in the We.stern Cape 
can not support more than three main contractors unless 
the Cape Town Municipality agreed to privatise part of 
its operation. 
When challenged to support the effect of competition, 
Wasteman claimed that proof of this lies in the fact 
that during the eight years that they have held the 
contract for the Community Development the price has 
come down. The Community Development contract that 
Wasteman holds in Cape Town involves inter alia the 
following establishments: 
Acacia Park, Ysterplaat Air Force Base, Wynberg 
Military Base, Wingfield Military Base, Faure coloured 
corps, Alexandra Institute, Valkenberg Institute, 
various central business district buildings (38 in 
total), the Cape Town castle, Museum, Parliamentary 
Buildings, Kalk Bay Harbour, Bellville Governmental 
Buildings, Pollsmoor and Westlake Complex. 
In 1978 the price per bin was 16,05 cents and in 1986 
the price per bin is 14,05 cents (this is without even 
discounting or allowing for inflation). 
A further challenge on how Wasteman could achieve this 
decrease in price when transport costs have rocketed 
particularly during the last few years evoked a reply 
that the Company had become far more efficient because 
of the effect of competition. 
A survey of the local authorities which have put out 
tenders over the past ten years revealed that the only 
tenderers were Waste-tech and Wasteman. 
Fish Hoek acknowledged that competitive offers are very 
limited and expressed the fear of a possible future 
monopoly. Cape Town considers Waste-tech and Wasternan 
as the only serious and capable contractors. 
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- Mot i va t ion for productivity and efficiency : 
The private contractors were candid in stating that 
their primary objective was profit maximisation and as 
productivity and efficiency were crucial to this aspect 
they received priority attention. 
The contractors were unanimous in that because they 
were not subject to bureaucracy and 'red tape' they 
could do whatever is necessary to achieve optimum 
performance of these two factors. 
In almost all cases the motivation for productivity and 
efficiency for both management and staff is in the form 
of monetary bonuses. Waste-tech crews are on an 
incentive scheme whereby when they have completed their 
task they are allowed to go home. The drivers are on a 
bonus scheme paid on a weekly basis dependent on the 
number of complaints as the driver is also the 
supervisor of the area. Other motivating bonuses are 
paid based on the analysis of tachograph readings and 
the best driver each month earns an extra RlSO. 
Wasteman offers the following incentive schemes: 
- bonus pay structure based on the time it takes to 
complete a certain job. This is measured against 
standard time and a bonus is paid accordingly; 
- efficiency measurement criteria entail a bonus being 
paid on levels of efficiency achieved against 
predetermined levels; 
- cleanliness bonus for vehicle and personal hygiene; 
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- downtime bonus motivating the driver to look after 
his vehicle and drive it correctly to keep downtime 
to a minimum; 
- unbroken attendance and non-use of sick leave leads 
to a bonus; 
- employees are paid an extra bonus annually depending 
on the performance of the company. 
The Cape Town Municipality allows its employees to go 
home after completion of their shift and provides a 
merit award system for good performance. 
Milnerton disclaim that profit is the only motivation 
and conversely state that providing a quality service 
to the citizens is a greater motivation. 
Both the local authorities and the private contractors 
displayed a high regard for each other's productivity 
and efficiency. 
•Neither Wasteman nor any other Cape waste removal 
concern had claimed that they could do the work more 
efficiently than the City Council because- the-Council's 
teams have been very well run• (quoting the Managing 
Director in Wasteman News, Issue 2, May 1986). 
- Economies of scale: 
The Cape Town Municipality claimed they could achieve 
economies of scale due to the size of their operation 
if they tendered for additional or adjacent areas. 
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Th is claim is based on two factors: 
Firstly, they operate a massive transport fleet ( 226 
vehicles) which includes 146 collection vehicles. This 
provides tremendous flexibility in their transport 
operation as its scale allows standby vehicles to be 
available in the event of breakdowns. The size of both 
Waste-tech and Wasteman's fleets could not economically 
support a comparable vehicle standby facility. 
Secondly, the strategically positioned disposal 
facilities and availability of pulverising plants 
demanded by the scale of the City's operation provide 
economies in haulage costs. 
Reference can be made to the relevant table on 
page 104. The major contributory factor for the 
Milnerton Municipality's low costs is the fact that 
they possess their own disposal site within their 
m~nicipal boundary. Haulage distances are therefore 
minimal. 
Waste-tech also claimed they could demonstrate 
economies of scale as they have presently tendered for 
a contract put out by the Simon's Town Municipality. 
They could therefore offer a very attractive price as 
they are presently servicing the adjacent local 
authority viz. Fish Hoek. 
The present vehicle used for Fish Hoek could assist in 
the Simon's 
fully loaded. 
Town operation because it is not 
This is a cost-reducing factor. 
always 
Waste-tech are confident that they could achieve 
similar economies of scale if Cape Town allowed them to 
service an area e.g. Maitland and environs which is 
adjacent to their existing Pinelands contract but not 
so if the area put out to tender were not adjacent e.g. 
Sea Point. 
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Wasteman does not agree that economies of scale could 
be achieved from their operation. Each contract wou l d 
individually require vehicles, labour and transport to 
the tip even if the contracts were geographically 
adjacent. According to the Managing Di rector of 
Wasternan: • If 
not operating 
place.• 
economies are achieveable 
our fleet eff±ciently in 
- Risk of insolvency: 
then we are 
the first 
This factor is of critical importance as solid waste is 
an essential service. The private contractor is 
running a business and within any business the risk of 
insolvency is inherent. 
Even if a portion of Cape Town were contracted out e.g. 
Maitland and environs and through the contractor 
becoming insolvent the Council had to resume the 
service it would still lead to chaos. There are no 
spare trucks (6 would be required) within the service, 
these would have to be ordered allowing for a lead time 
of 6 to 12 months, but before they could be ordered 
many months would be lost in obtaining the necessary 
authorities from Council and the Administrator. 
Milnerton are concerned that if they dispose of their 
fleet they would realise very little value in monetary 
terms as they operate older vehicles the cost of which 
had been written off many years ago. Maintenance is 
their only cost at present. Should the contractor 
become insolvent then a resultant cost of 
re-establishing the fleet for the municipality would be 
almost totally prohibitive. 
In the Fish Hoek contract Waste-tech have provided for 
a bank surety against insolvency to the amount of 
R20 000. 
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Waste-tech commenced operating in 1975 and Wasteman in 
1980 and both have survived the recession of the 1980's. 
Wasteman claim that they can provide sufficient 
collateral in any contract to overcome this fear. 
Both Fish Hoek and Pinelands admitted that should their 
contractors become insolvent then they would appeal to 
Cape Town Municipality for assistance. 
- Staff flexibility: 
If, due to financial stringencies, the local 
authorities are required to reduce their level of 
service, then they would not be able to reduce their 
staff complement commensurately. In the cape Town 
Mu~icipality amendments to the fixed establishment with 
regard to the abolition of a post deemed to be 
redundant are handled in two ways: 
( i) The incumbent shall be retired from the service in 
terms of the Pension Fund Rules. In effect the 
municipality would have to bear the cost for 
employees up to their normal pensionable age, 
whereupon the Pension Fund would take over the 
liability. 
(ii) The incumbent shall be carried in a supernumerary 
capacity at his previous rate of pay until by way 
of wastage or otherwise a vacancy is created in 
another post on the fixed establishment in which 
he may be suitably employed. 
( Cape Town Municipality Conditions of Service of 
Employees Paragraph 8(6)(a).) 
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The above could entail considerable long-term costs for 
the local authority. 
Conversely when extra staff 
approval is necessary and the 
lead to inefficiencies in 
are required Committee 
resultant delays could 
the operational and 
managerial activities. The creation of new posts for 
additional services could take many months to proceed 
through the various committees. For example in the 
Cape Town Municipality the relevant report is submitted 
to the Town Clerk in the first instance, thereafter it 
is considered by the Municipal Service Commission for 
onward transmission to the Executive Committee and 
finally Council. 
The private contractors can engage and dismiss their 
employees more easily. The notice period for a driver 
is 24 hours and a labourer 48 hours. This ensures 
greater flexibility for work of a non-permanent or 
seasonal nature. 
STRATEGIC FACTORS -
- Quality of the service: 
Local authorities consider it a prerequisite that due 
to the nature of the service a very high standard must 
be maintained. Solid waste as an •essential service• 
must be maintained at a quality level of 100 % as the 
entire community could suffer in decreased values 
associated with public heal th if even a small sect ion 
endures a breakdown in continuity. 
Any financial pressure on the contractor could be 
likely to affect standards adversely. 
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Cape Town's Medical Officer of Health advises: "If the 
contract stipulates that the contractor be given a 
trial period to prove his ability to carry out the 
contract satisfactorily with the proviso that it was to 
the standards required by the Health Department of the 
City then I would not object to such a contract." 
"My mind is not closed to the suggestion of 
privatisation provided they satisfy our requirements 
and that we have redress if they do not. We must not 
be bound by a contract while the contractor is 
rendering an unsatisfactory service." 
The Medical Officer of Health stressed the importance 
of control over services which impact on public health 
whether they are carried out in-house or under 
contract. If an in-house operation does not comply 
with standards laid down in terms of the Public Health 
Act the matter is. taken to the Health Committee and 
then to council. He does not want a situation to arise 
whereby a contract with a private contractor takes this 
power away. The monitoring aspect and the ability to 
put things right if necessary is essential. The 
Medical Officer of 
responsibility under 
Health can not abdicate 
the Health Act 63 of 
his 
1977 
particularly Sections 20 and 23. 
An examination of the records of Pinelands and Fish 
Hoek revealed that complaints are down to an acceptable 
level and the local authorities are generally satisfied 
with the level of service provided by the contractors. 
Pinelands experienced severe problems with their 
contractor during the first contract due to managerial 
changes in the company at that time and complaints were 
averaging more than 50 per day compared with the 
present average of 2. 
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In terms of · the contract negotiated by Fish Hoek, if 
the contractor fails to deliver the agreed level of 
service then they are empowered to call in an alternate 
contractor to rectify the situation and offset the cost 
against the original contractor. 
The Cape Town City Council recently· conducted an 
Opinion survey to ascertain the public's view of the· 
services it provided, both in respect of importance of 
service and level of satisfaction. The City's refuse 
collection was rated first by a long way on both 
aspects. Details of results are provided in Appendix D. 
- Pool of labour for emergencies: 
The facility of having a large labour force available 
has been of inestimable value to the Cape Town 
Municipality in times of emergency. The labour force 
of the Cleansing Branch can be assembled during the 
night - and this has been done on many occasions. In 
fact the resources of this large labour force form part 
of the civil defence plan for the City. 
Milnerton Municipality operates on a similar basis. 
This fact is of minor importance to Fish Hoek and 
Pinelands as the relatively small labour force they 
would have employed in-house would be of little 
consequence and road works and parks labour gangs are 
available. This contingency would not form part of the 
contract entered into with a private contractor. 
- Strike threat: 
A strike is illegal when: 
- there is a current industry agreement 
- less than one year after a wage determination 
- the industry is an ftessentialft industry or service. 
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The Labour Relations Act 2 8 of 19 56 prohibits strikes 
by the employees of local authorities rendering 
essential services. It could be argued that if the 
service is privatised then the contractor would be 
delivering the essential service and therefore in terms 
of the Act his Company would not be subject to a strike 
action. This is not so. 
Section 65 and 46 of the Act read together clearly 
state •employees of the local authority• and therefore 
the employees carrying out the service for the private 
contractor are not subject to the same legislation. 
Neither Waste-tech nor Wasteman have been subjected to 
a strike a~tion but acknowledge that they would have a 
major problem. In recent times a new labour disruption 
termed •stayaways• has emerged. The effect of this 
disruption during the current year (for the 1st May and 
16th June) on the Cape Town and Milnerton 
Municipalities has been very slight and the service was 
virtually unaffected. 
Both private contractors experienced a total stayaway 
resulting in no service to their respective 
municipalities. In both instances an extra collection 
was provided on the preceeding day. 
It is a condition of employment (Condition of Service 
5(2)(b)(ii)) that all employees of the Cape Town 
Municipality become members of a labour union. 
Waste-tech and Wasteman's employee~ are not members of 
a labour union. 
The Cape Town cleansing operation has a comprehensive 
Emergency Plan which allows for the possibility of a 
strike situation. The service although in a modified 
form would continue. 
such contingency plan. 
The private contractors have no 
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- Accountability to the citizens: 
If only a portion of the City were contracted out then 
Cape Town would continue to be responsible for the 
overall planning and control by way of an appropriate 
monitoring programme and therefore accountability to 
the citizens should not be effected. 
Pinelands and Fish Hoek do not supervise, inspect or 
monitor the contractor and merely pass on complaints 
from the citizens to the contractor. Accountability to 
the citizens is somewhat diminished. 
- Compliance with health and safety requirements and 
legislation: 
The local authorities treat this factor with the utmost 
importance and adhere rigidly to provision of the 
Public Health Act and the Machinery and Occupational 
Safety Act. Designated positions exist for a Safety 
Officer and "responsible person" in terms of the Act. 
cape Town has attained a 4-star NOSA rating. 
The private contractors are equally committed to the 
protection of the environment. Waste-tech employ a 
qualified B Sc graduate at each depot throughout the 
country to set standards and effect heal th controls. 
"Waste-tech is committed to preserving unpolluted, that 
land which we have, and reclaiming and restoring 
derelict land." Waste-tech supply all the necessary 
facilities to have attained a 3-star NOSA rating. 
- Loss of public jobs and worse conditions for workers: 
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In bot h the municipaliti e s of Pinelands and Fish Hoek 
no re t renchments were effected when t he service was 
contracted out. The relatively small staff complements 
were absorbed by natural wastage. 
Wasteman offer to employ good staff . from any 
municipality for which they obtain a contract. This 
was demonstrated in their recent contract for the 
Strand whereby Wasteman undertook transfer of 14 
employees all at packages in excess of their former 
earnings. The same exercise was undertaken when Parow 
contracted out the waste disposal from its compost 
_plant. 
The following is a comparison of current wage scales 
for bench posts of labourer and driver: 
WASTE-TECH MILNERTON CAPE TOWN 
Labourer: 
Per Hour Rl,20/Rl,30 Rl,60/Rl,96 Rl,81/R2,20 
Driver . 
Per Hour R2,25 R2,54/R3,38 R2,95/R3,52 
Wasteman's scales were not provided but were claimed to 
be 25 % higher than those of the municipalities. It 
should be noted that the private contractors pay 
substantial incentive b~nuses. Details are provided in 
the factor "Motivation for efficiency and productivity• 
discussed on page 107. 
Bot h the local authorities and the private contractors 
offer 15 days leave per annum. 
Medical Aid and pension schemes are subsidised by both 
contractors. Preferential interest rates are 
negotiated by the companies for employees wishing to 
purchase their own dwelling. The Cape Town and 
Milnerton Municipalities employ local labour but 
Waste-tech and Wasteman recruit Black labour mainly 
from the Transkei. 
--
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Waste-tech provides a hostel to house these labour ers. 
Although the private contractor's employees do not 
belong to a union they are still afforded the 
opportunity to appeal to management through the 
Company's in-house grievance procedures. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS 
- Managerial effectiveness: 
The Regional Manager of Waste-tech (Pty) Limited 
claimed that their effectiveness and efficiency is a 
result of not operating in a bureaucratic environment. 
He further claimed that a local authority does not have 
the incentive to improve its productivity. He 
emphasised that Waste-tech's managerial effectiveness 
is a result of their ability to make fast decisions and 
capitalise on opportunities without costly delays to 
which local authorities are subject as a result of the 
committee system. 
Subsequently, Wasteman were challenged with this factor 
which drew the following response. The Managing 
Director of Wasteman explained: "We will do any area 
for less than the City council because we don't have 
the overhead costs, the bureaucracy, red tape and 
legislation laid down by Provincial Administration - we 
do things that are expedient and profitable and for the 
benefit of our employees and customers - and we do this 
quickly - this results in the savings." 











management. Cape Town demonstrates its effectiveness 
by the result of its placement as number one in the 
Opinion Survey. (Appendix D.) 
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Further, unlike their count e rparts in t he pr i vate 
sector some of their decisions were based on social 
rather than economic criteria as part of the objective 
of a local authority viz. to create a satisfactory 
urbanism (way of life) for the citizens and profit was 
not the only measure of effective management. The 
local authorities solid waste top management were all 
professional and registered engineers whereas the 
private sector management had no specialised academic 
skills. 
- Provision of a monitoring programme: 
Even if a portion of the Cape Town Municipality were 
contracted out, provision would still have to be made 
for the monitoring and supervision of the contract. 
This is necessary to ensure that standards have been 
met and maintained and to provide feedback for the 
overall planning and control of the whole service. 
Pinelands and Fish Hoek Municipalities have both 
elected to dispense with any form of supervision over 
the contractor's performance and rely totally on 
complaints from the ratepayers as a measure of 
performance. --
- Administration of the contract: 
Pinelands and Fish Hoek have experienced no real 
problems with the administration or interpretation of 
their respective contracts. 
Cape Town is wary of the safeguard clauses written into 
the contract which they feel would be meaningless if 
the contractor defaulted. 
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- Handling of citizens complaints: 
This factor is important as it serves as a measure of 
the effectiveness of the service. Local authorities 
provide an open channel for the expeditious handling of 
complaints. Fears that the private contractor will 
overlook this sensitive area were examined. 
Complaints against Waste-tech are logged officially by 
the local authority and handed to the driver each 
morning. Provision exists for urgent complaints to be 
telephoned directly to Waste-tech's head office. 
Wasteman demonstrated their commitment to this aspect 
by providing the Strand Municipality with a radio at 
no charge. If a complaint is received by way of a 
ratepayer telephoning the municipality then the 
official speaks directly to the driver on the air and 
the problem is dealt with immediately. Wasteman's 
managing director echoed his Company's commitment: nwe 
guarantee that all complaints are dealt with in two 
hours.n "It is important that our drivers hear the 
complaint directly.• A •complaint free• bonus is 
payable to drivers. 
- Operational flexibility: 
Milnerton claims this as a major advantage of providing 
the service in-house. It provides for the ability to 
change routes or service schedules to suit the needs of 
the municipality and not being bound by tender 
stipulations. Individual citizen's needs can, if 
necessary, be attended to quite easily particularly 
elderly or handicapped citizens. 
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Cape Town concurs that special events or circumstances 
can be handled expeditiously but if it is not written 




From the evidence researched it has not been 
established that the private contractor could deliver 
the same service in the Cape Town municipal area for a 
lesser cost. The Fish Hoek case and the tender for 
streetsweeping substantiate this conclusion. 
As a further example, Cape Town and Waste-tech operate . 
adjacent landfill sites at Vissershok. Cape Town 
charges a tipping fee of RS, 00 and Waste-tech R4, 9 5. 
If Cape Town were not operating this facility the 
contractor could charge an exorbitant fee. Cape Town 
has proved that it can place a limit on private 
enterprise in the interests of its ratepayers. 
In attempting a cost comparison account must be taken 
of the overhead charges which would not be reduced to 
any considerable extent as Cape Town would still have 
to provide a monitoring service. 
A considerable threat exists that a contractor might 
initially tender an attractive price only to establish 
the service. Thereafter the municipality would be 
virtually compelled to utilise the service of the 
contractor on expiry of · the initial contract period 
because it would no longer have the vehicles or staff 
to resume the service. 
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There is a positive danger that the whole service may 
fall into the hands of a private enterprise monopoly to 
the prejudice of the municipality and its ratepayers. 
The solid waste operation being an essential service 
should not be wholly or partly dependent upon a private 
company. Although there are numerous waste firms in 
the Western Cape, only Waste-tech and Wasteman have 
tendered for municipal contracts over the past 10 
years. They are considered to be the only competent 
contractors to handle a local authority contract. 
Should Cape Town put out a sizeable contract, there is 
every possibility that the companies may colluse or 
merge thereby creating a monopolistic situation. 
This scenario is supported by Robin McGregor, publisher 
of Who Owns Whom: "With more than 83 per cent of the 
shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in the 
control of four conglomerates, South African business 
can only be riddled with monopolies and cartels." 
("SA Riddled with cartels", Argus 1987-02-14.) 
On the other hand should Cape Town put out a large 
enough contract there is every possibility that a large 
group from Johannesburg or Durban might tender and 
increase the competition. However, should it be a 
giant corporation like Anglo American there could be 
more fears of a monopolistic situation. 
Anglo American has shown a significant rise from 54.l % 
(1986) to 60,l % control of all shares on the market. 
(Argus 1987-02-14.) 
Any private company is prone to bankruptcy as this is 
an inherent business risk and this is probably Cape 
Town's greatest fear. 
Should the contractor become insolvent Cape Town 
Municipality would not be able to take possession of 
the plant. This is in terms of the provisions of the 
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Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936. This was confirmed by 
way of a legal opinion from the City Legal Adviser of 
Cape Town during the interview with him. 
The contractor's plant would not be located in one 
place and would therefore have to be identified as 
being used in connection with the municipality's 
contract. The location of the plant would have to be 
specified and this could be difficult if the plant were 
also used on other contracts. In terms of the legal 
opinion referred to above the incorporation of clauses 
binding the contractor's plant to the local authority 
in the event of insolvency would be void. In terms of 
the insolvency legislation the creditors would have to 
be satisfied proportionately. The suggestion that the 
local authority purchase the plant and lease it to the 
contractor would not be acceptable as it would place 
the local authority in the invidious position of having 
to supply and maintain the plant and no incentive or 
responsibility would be placed upon the contractor to 
use the plant judiciously. 
A further scenario that the financier of the plant 
re-leases it to the local authority in order to 
continue the contract is aiso considered impractical. 
This would inhibit the contractor and he would not 
operate as efficiently, as the local authority would be 
dictating how the contract is to be financed (e.g. on a 
leased system). To emphasise the importance of this 
point reference was made to the American application 
where within hours a fleet of special compactor refuse 
trucks could be hired. This facility does not exist in 
South Africa and it would be difficult to hire even a 
single compactor. This was substantiated by Cape 
Town's Assistant City Engineer (Mechanical) who 
operates all the Municipality's tenders for vehicles 
and plant. 
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Waste-tech claimed that they are operating Pinelands 
and Fish Hoek contracts at cost. Reference was made to 
this by the Town Engineer, Pinelands and by Wasteman 
(who offered this as a reason for not having won the 
tenders). Waste-tech are a national company, part of 
the D & H group and GENCOR. GENCOR are accountable to 
their shareholders and not ratepayers and should 
Waste-tech continue, as claimed, not to make profits 
they would probably be closed down. This would be a 
sound business decision but disastrous for the 
municipalities contracted to Waste-tech. 
The contractors, particularly 
innovative in providing an 
incentives for their employees 









incentives must have a marked impact on productivity. 
The local authorities should take heed of this 
incentive scheme. 
Contractors have a cost saving advantage over Cape Town 
in that they have the ability to increase or decrease 
staff at very short notice depending upon their 
workload. 
Cape Town is able to exploit economies of scale in 
respect of services which far surpass those that are 
available to any private contractor. 
The escalation factor in the contract is also an 
unknown quantity and as these, contracts are normally 
awarded for a period of 5 years this could become a 
cause for concern. 
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STRATEGIC 
Due to the nature of the service and its impact on 
public health a very high standard and quality is 
essential. The present standard provided by 
contractors in adjacent local authorities is acceptable 
but this has not always been the case. Pine lands 
specifically experienced severe problems during a 
particular period when the service was described by the 
Town Engineer as "shocking". The quest for profit with 
the consequence of compromising standards will always 
be a threat to the excellence of the service. 
Cape Town's Medical Officer of Health concurs that if a 
contractor were given a limited area on a trial basis 
initially, it would have to be under the direct 
monitoring and supervision of the Heal th Department to 
ensure that the function was carried out 
satisfactorily. Public health standards, fly-breeding 
and rodent infestation which could cause diseases such 
as gastro-enteritis are all involved in the adequate 
clearing of waste. If a private contractor could meet 
and sustain the standards set by the Health Department, 
then the Medical Officer of Health would not oppose 
such contract. 
The Medical Officer of Health advocates that where 
public heal th is at stake, each case for contracting 
should be treated on an ad hoc basis on its own 
merits. The proviso is that he reserves the right to 
withdraw his consent based on the performance of the 
task over a fixed period. 
The Cape Town Municipality has built up a strong 
"esprit de corps" which has come to the fore during 
stressful times. They know the local problems caused 
by seasonal and geographic factors. This know-how 
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needs to be retained. Contractors can not build this 
up because if they lose the contract the next 
contractor starts all over again. The •esprit• has 







of having labour available for 





out then labour 
would still be 
The major reason that adjacent local authorities 
contracted out was not the cost factor. The reason was 
strategic in that they either did not have their own 
tip site 
problems 
or the residents wanted the tip and 




Cape Town Municipality does not have this problem as it 
has a transfer station at Athlone and sanitary landfill 
sites at Strandfontein, Swartklip and Vissershok. 
The strike threat vulnerability of the private 
contractors is a serious danger. The current unrest in 
South Africa, the revolutionary labour movements and 
the emergence of strong trade unions will lead to a 
greater need for labour relations and negotiations. 
Neither of the contractors' employees are members of a 
labour union. South Africa is being increasingly 
subjected to strikes as evidenced by the fact that 
there were 195 strikes in 1980 and 425 strikes in 
19 84. (Source: Department of Manpower Utilisation.) 
The Cape Town Municipality is somewhat protected from 
strike action through the legislation of the Labour 
Relations Act. Labour disruptions termed "stayaways" 
e.g. May 1 and June 16 resulted in no service by the 
contractors to their client local authorities. Cape 
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Town's service, although modified, continued. 
During the unrest in the so-called Coloured areas, the 
Cape Town Municipality managed to maintain essential 
services in all areas including some . areas where riots 
were actually taking place. Cape Town has an 
established Emergency Plan in the event of unrest or 
civil disaster. The contractors have no such 
contingency. 
The contractors pay a lesser basic wage than - the local 
authorities but they are not competing in the same 
labour market. The contractors are recruiting Black 
labour from the Transkei who accept a lower wage. The 
contractors could be faced with a dilemma if they were 
awarded a sizeable contract and needed to recruit 
labour. Should they recruit from the local market they 
would have to pay the market (higher) wage and this 
could affect their existing cost structure considerably. 
It is also considered more advantageous to have the 
City serviced by inhabitants of the City. 
Wasteman has made considerable efforts to alleviate the 
problem of retrenchment caused by privatisation by 
offering to employ displaced local authority employees 
albeit on a small scale (14 in the Strand Municipality). 
Attempting the same principle on employees of the Cape 
Town Municipality might become protracted when 
negotiating with the 12 000 member strong Cape Town 
Municipal Workers' Association. 
Both the Cape Town Municipality and the contractors 
adhere strongly to and enforce health and safety 
requirements. Cape Town Municipality supplies a more 
comprehensive range of safety protective clothing and 
equipment than the contractors. 
I 
The contractors generally supply only an overall and 
boots. 
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Cape Town Municipality supplies the following to the 
collection crews: 
2 x overall (orange top) 
Safety cap (PVC) 
Gloves (knitted) 
Oilskins (full suit) 
Rubber gumboots 
( Interview with the Cape Town Municipality's 
Occupational Safety Manager.) This is substantiated in 
"The City of Cape Town's Schedule of Uniform and/or 
Protective Clothing and Equipment." 
The contractors displayed a positive commitment to the 
protection of the environment. 
Satisfaction of the community is a very significant 
factor and this was achieved by Cape Town's cleansing 
operation in · terms of the criteria of importance and 
level of satisfaction in the Opinion Survey. Cape Town 
was placed first in both criteria ratings. 
(Appendix D.) 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
A major problem is the drafting of appropriate job 
descriptions and a satisfactory contract particularly 
where a full service · like solid waste collection and 
disposal is being contracted out. 
After contracting out the local authority could 
discover that work previously done as a matter of 
course is not included in the contract. 
Contracting out could result in a diminished control 
over the service and a loss of operational 
flexibility. Ability to respond to or assist in the 
special needs of the community or individual ratepayers 
could be forfeited. A cardinal principle of local 
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government in South Africa is that elected councillors 
and the local authorities they represent are ultimately 
responsible to the citizens. Should a citizen have a 
complaint he need merely contact the relevant 
department of the local authority to seek 
satisfaction. Should this prove fruitless the citizen 
has redress to his city councillor. Councillors who 
ignore the complaints of their electorate do so at 
their own political peril. By contracting the service 
out a barrier is placed between the citizens and the 
contractors. Any complaint received can only be passed 
on to the contractor for corrective action. The ref ore 
the contract rather than the local authority or the 
councillor becomes the controlling force of the service. 
The service could tend to become rigid being supplied 
only in terms of the specifications of the contract. 
The contractors proved impressive in their ability to 
handle and attend to complaints from ratepayers. They 
are wise in this approach as their ability to satisfy 
the ratepayers could be a determining factor when the 
contract is renewed. But this is only significant if 
competition exists, if not the same contractor would 
probably gain the contract anyway. 
The administration of the contract could be problematic 
and there exists doubt as to whether any of the 
•safeguard clauses• written into the contracts could be 
enforced should the contractor default. In any event 
such types of financial guarantee are expensive 
therefore increasing the cost to the local authority. 
The contractors have a major managerial advantage 
leading to efficiency in that they are able to make 
fast decisions and capitalise on opportunities. The 
local authorities being bureaucratic organisations are 
subject to the committee $ystem, which could cause 
delays in the decision-making process. 
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In recent years the management of the Cape Town 
Municipality has been granted greater delegation of 
powers. This has facilitated the management process 
resulting in decisions being taken at the lowest level 
possible. The role of Organisation and Methods has 
been effective in devising improved methods and 
procedures. 
The contracting out of part of the City would not 
decrease Cape Town's bureaucratic procedures or 
administrative burden as the infrastructure for 
provision thereof would be utilised anyway. In fact 
the drawing up and administration of a contract would 
increase the burden. 
8.6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Cape Town's cleansing operation is providing an 
efficient service and fragmentation of the operation 
could decrease its operational proficiency. 
One way to determine if privatisation could be 
beneficial to the local authority is to implement it on 
a trial basis in a limited area . It is essential that 
there be a means to compare and one equitable way is 
for the local authority and the private sector to 
compete. This would ensure that the in-house operation 
and the private contractor would have to work 
consistently · hard for comparative purposes. Further 
consideration of privatisation could then take place 
under practical rather than theoretical conditions. 
This would determine the optimum balance between the 
two agencies and it would be competition at its best. 
A tender for the collection and disposal of refuse for 
a suitable suburb of Cape Town should be put out 
enabling the private contractors and the in-house 
operation to tender. 
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The most important conditions of the recommended 
contract should be: 
- that the service meets the standards set by the 
Medical Officer of Health, and if not, a right of 
redress must be provided; and 
- that adequate financial guarantees acceptable to the 
City Treasurer are lodged. 
Should the contractor prove unsatisfactory for whatever 
reason the service could be continued by utilising 
existing employees and plant from other districts on a 
shift basis in the short term. 
It is not economically viable for the smaller local 
authorities to undertake their own collection and 
disposal as the contractors are providing an efficient 
and reliable service at a reasonable price. For the 
purpose of this thesis "smaller" is defined as local 
authorities comprising less than 8 000 dwellings. 
Reference is made to the relevant table on page 104 . 
Although Milnerton Municipality falls just outside this 
definition its costs are low because of the 
availability of disposal facilities within its 
municipal area. Haulage costs are the ref ore kept to a 
minimum. The availability of disposal facilities does 
not exist in the "defined" smaller local authorities 
viz. Pinelands and Fish Hoek. 
Cape Town should continue to monitor 
comparative purposes when tenders are 
neighbouring local authorities. 
pr ices for 
put out by 
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CHAPTER NINE 





CASE STUDY: CIVIL ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING 
CONSTRUCTION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a case study 
of the civil engineering construction and building 
construction function of the Cape Town City Council and 
to place it in context with the civil engineering and 
building construction industries in the Western Cape 
with the objective of: 
testing the devised methodological approach 
drawing conclusions concerning the construction 
function. 
The selection of the construction function of the Cape 
Town Municipality for the testing of the devised 
methodological approach is based on the following 
motivation. 
It is considered to provide 
authorities are expected to 
physical infrastructure of 
involves the undertaking of 
a good example as local 
continually improve the 
their areas and ·- tni's 
capital works. Strong 
competition and claims exist from the private sector to 
construct these works. It provides a market that is 
not confined to a few cases but widespread which 
affords the opportunity to amass data that can be 
researched and analysed for the purposes of this thesis. 
The investigation is framed in terms of the devised 
methodological approach by firstly the 1 i tera ture 
survey in the initial part of this thesis and secondly 
the 'check list' of factors in favour of public sector 
and private sector provision of this function. . The 
research was undertaken in terms of the three criteria 
identified viz. economic, strategic and administrative. 
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The majority of the Cape Town Municipality's 
construction has already been privatised. Reference is 
made in the relevant table on page 152. But should all 
construction work be contracted out? can private 
contractors undertake these projects for a lesser cost, 
and produce the same standard? Is the dissolution of 
the municipality's construction capacity in the 
interests of the City and what are the ramifications? 
What degree of privatisation is desirable and what 
should the balance be between the public and private 
sector? This case study seeks to explore these areas. 
The background to the construction function of the Cape 
Town Municipality is described together with that of 
the associations which represent the civil engineering 
and building contractors viz. The South African 
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors and the 
Master Builders and Allied Trades Association 
respectively. 
The approach to the study with particular reference to 
the method, steps and procedures followed is described. 
The evidence 
under the 
and information researched 
economic, strategic and 
criteria groupings. 
---




The Cape Town City Engineer's Department comprises 
sixteen branches. Three of these branches viz. 
Building and Production, Roads and Waterworks employ 
specialised construction units. 
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A Departmental Construction Unit is a direct labour 
organisation employed by a local authority which 
undertakes construction and maintenance work i n a 
specialised sphere of the operations of that local 
authority. 
The Building and Production Branch's housing building 
unit was established in 1953 for the purpose of 
building low cost housing and associated civil 
engineering and road services. Civil engineering works 
were undertaken departmentally but the policy was to 
put at least 50 % of the housing contracts out to 
private enterprise. The construction of mass low cost 
housing was discontinued in 1977 when it was decided to 
contract all this work out to private enterprise. 
Subsequently, departmental 
limited to the building of 
construction has been 
service and leisure type 
buildings required by the City such as libraries, 
poly-clinics, fire stations, community civic centres, 
pavilions, toilet blocks and depot complexes including 
associated civil engineering works. 
current policy is to retain a balanced workload to 
maintain the unit at a small but efficient level and 
put the remainder of the work out to private 
enterprise. This construction unit employs a total of 
146 staff and is hereafter referred to as the •building 
unit". 140 of the building unit's staff are employed 
in a special category termed •hire and fire". This 
affords greater flexibility in response to fluctuating 
workloads. The Cape Town Municipality is required to 
employ staff on a permanent basis. Temporary employees 
may only be engaged on projects of a limited duration 
not exceeding six months. This requirement is in terms 
of Condition of Service 7 of the Cape Town 
Municipality. The 'Hire and Fire' category of employee 
is specifically precluded from this Condition of 
Service. 
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The Roads Branch's construction unit constructs roads, 
foot ways, retaining walls and minor concrete works. It 
also undertakes sewer and stormwater reticulation on 
behalf of the Sewerage Branch. 
Consultants and contractors are employed on the design 
and construction of new road works where the branch 
does not ha.ve the size or skill of workforce or the 
equipment to undertake the project. This branch 
employs design expertise and also makes considerable 
use of consultants for large projects. 
The Waterworks Branch undertakes maintenance work and 
responds to emergencies such as burst watermains in the 
municipal reticulation system. 
In this branch there is a strong inter-relationship 
between maintenance and capital works. Construction 
crews can not be - productively employed on maintenance 
alone. Therefore the laying of pipe mains is 
economically viable. 
Except for specialised work e.g. a geological study, 
nearly all design work is undertaken by the Waterworks 
Branch. However, in terms of construction all large 
projects e.g. Riviersonderend Pipeline, Blackheath 
Treatment Works and Wemmershoek Treatment Works were 
constructed by private sector contractors. The 
Assistant City Engineer (Water) defined 'large 
projects' as those having a current value in excess of 
RSOO 000. 
The South African Federation of Civil Engineering 
Contractors is a Trade Association registered as a 
non-profit making concern. The purpose of the SAFCEC 
is to promote civil engineering work by contractors. 
Its membership nationwide · totals 400 (members). 
' 
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SAFCEC's ~embership accounts for about 80 % of all 
civil engineering work carried out by contrac:t in the 
country. 
The objectives of SAFCEC are inter alia: 
to exchange information between members 
to improve working conditions for members 
to improve general conditions of contract under 
which they work 
to assist in the advantageous 
materials for its members 
purchasing of 
to manage the civil engineering training scheme (a 
Government scheme). 
(Source: Interview Regional Manager SAFCEC.) 
SAFCEC has employed an expert labour lawyer to handle 
industrial relations for its members. 
The Master Builders and Allied Trades Association (West 
Cape) has adopted inter alia the following objectives -
to promote excellence in work and just and 
honourable practice in the conduct of business and 
to suppress malpractices 
to regulate relations between members and their 
employees and to protect and further the interests 
of members in relation to their colleagues 
to promote and uphold the status of the Building 
Industry in general. 
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( Extract from the cons ti tut ion in the Master Builders 
and Allied Trades Association (West Cape)). 
The MBA (West Cape) has recently merged with its Boland 
and Worcester branches and has a membership in excess 
of 700 contractors. Murray and Roberts, OVCON, LTA and 
other large contractors are members. 
Persons eligible for membership are: 
•Building contractors in the Building Industry who 
shall be persons who observe standard conditions of 
employment, are employers of labour and who, in the 
opinion of the Branch Exe cu ti ve Commit tee, possess the 
necessary technical qualifications, knowledge and 
practical experience or who employ in positions of 
responsibility a person or persons therewith to ensure 
that all building projects are carried out in a 
workmanlike and economical manner.• 
The employees of contractors who are members of the MBA 
represent 80 % of all employees in the building 
industry in the country. 
9.3 APPROACH 
The objective of applying the devised methodological 
approach is to obtain data, information and evidence 
with regard to the factors identified in the •check 
list• under the three criteria to identify the most 
appropriate agency for the civil engineering and 
building construction functions. 
A preliminary study of the construction function was 
undertaken to identify its essential characteristics. 
The essential characteristics identified were that 
construction must be: 
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e conomi c 
efficient and effective 
flexible and responsive ( to undertake a variety of 
work at short notice) 
sensitive to the needs of the community (.e.g. 
breakdowns and emergency works, design of community 
facilities, public liability). 
construction was identified in terms of 
facets viz. civil engineering construction 
construction and for the purpose of this 




The "check list" of advantage factors for each agency 
was carefully scrutinised while considering the 
essential characteristics of construction to obtain the 
framework for the research. 
The investigation is structured around the economic, 
strategic and administrative criteria which affect the 
decision for choice of agency. 
As a basis for the background to the research, annual 
reports, journal articles, research papers, and 
in-house files were scrutinised and informal and ad-hoc 
discussions were conducted with various persons in the 
construction industry. 
Data, information and evidence were acquired from the 
Cape Town Municipality particularly the Building and 
Production, Roads and Waterworks branches, the South 
African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors and 
the Master Builders and Allied Trades Association 
hereafter referred to as SAFCEC and MBA respectively. 
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Personal structured interviews were held with senior 
management personnel in all of the above organisations. 
The form of questions cons~dered at the interviews was 
open-ended. The following methodology was considered 
appropriate. 
This case study differs slightly in approach f ram the 
solid waste case study in that individual factors are 
not discussed separately but rather. under each of the 
criteria on a corporate basis. The reason for this is 
that the two facets of construction operate within the 
vast environment of the construction industry wherein a 
large number of private contractors operate. It was 
considered more beneficial to adopt a macro-viewpoint 
of the issues for the purpose of this thesis. This 
also demonstrates that the methodological approach can 
be applied on either a micro or macro basis. 
The selection of candidates for interview was based on 
the following reasoning. Unlike the solid waste case 
study which is currently provided totally in-house the 
construction function (civil engineering and building) 
has already been privatised to a considerable extent. 
It was anticipated that the application of the 
methodological approach to the construction function 
would conclude whether or not this function should be 
privatised in toto. 
Senior officials directly involved in the civil 
engineering and building construction function of the 
Cape Town Municipality were interviewed. Owing to the 
vast number of contractors operating in the Western 
Cape it was considered impractical to select only a 
limited number of civil engineering and building 
construction contractors for interview. In an at tempt 
to obtain a fair comparison of the relevant 
characteristics, the President of the Master Builders 
and Allied Trades Association (West Cape) and the 
National Past President of the Building Industries 
Federation ( S A), Mr Leon Glaser was interviewed. The 
M B A (West Cape) has a membership in excess of 700 
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contractors and the employees of the contractors 
nationally affiliated thereto represent 80 % of all 
employees in the building industry in the country. 
Mr Glaser's input is considered reliable and valuable 
not only for his role as representing the MBA and BIFSA 
but also for the fact that he is the managing director 
of his own building construction company. 
Similarly, for the civil engineering construction 
function the Regional Manager of the South African 
Civil Engineering Contractors, Mr J Hollingshead was 
selected for interview. The Regional Manager 
represents all affiliated civil engineering contractors 
in the entire Cape Province. SAFCEC' s national 
membership accounts for 80 % of all civil engineering 
work carried out by contract in the country. The input 
from Mr Hollingshead is considered equally valuable and 
reliable not only for his role in SAFCEC but also for 
the wealth of experience he has gained from more than 
thirty-five years in the civil engineering industry. 
The personal interviews 
following phases: 
were structured on the 
directly factual inform~tion relating to the role, 
purpose, background and dimensions of the in-house 
construction units and the associations representing 
the contractors 
factual information relating to the factors that are 
quantifiable under the criteria groups in the 
sequence; economic, strategic and administrative 
an open-ended and frank discussion in general terms 
on factors not easily quantifiable and where 
opinions and suggestions were gathered. Emotive 
issues were noted. 
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A list of questions was used to strilcture the 
interviews for each of the following organisations: 
the Association's representing civil engineering and 
building construction private sector contractors 
the in-house civil engineering and building 
construction units of the Cape Town Municipality. 
The list of questions is found in Appendix H. 
The use of a recording device greatly facilitated the 
pace of discussion and the resultant continuity allowed 
in-depth consideration of the issues. 
The following is the list of persons interviewed in 
alphabetical order, their designation or function and 
their respective organisation. 
NAME 
Mr D Bradley 
Mr JG Brand 
Mr J B Cox 
Mr L Glaser 
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DESIGNATION/FUNCTION 
Assistant City Engineer 
(Mechanical) 








Mr D Hodson Assistant City Engineer 
(Water) 
Mr J Hollingshead Regional Manager 
Mr R Ortlieb Director 
Mr D Riley Assistant City Engineer 
(Roads) 
Mr J Smit Chief Engineer 
(Construction) 
Mr E Thompson Assistant City Engineer 
(Quantity Survey) 
Mr R Tyler Deputy City Treasurer 
Dr K Wall Assistant City Engineer 








D Glaser and Sons 
Building Contractor 
Master Builders 
and Allied Trades 
Association 
Building Industries 






















9.4 INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS 
9.4.1 CIVIL ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
During the interview with the Regional Manager of the 
South African Federation of Civil Engineering 
Contractors it was evident that they ar,e sceptical 
about cost comparisons between the contractors and 
local authorities. There is a reluctance for 
contractors to tender against in-house uni ts as they 
• do not trust their costing systems because they are 
not comparable on the same basis•. SAFCEC cite the 
costing and audit system differences as the major 
problems. Encouraging in-house units to tender in 
competition with private contractors for local 
authority work does not satisfy the contractors. They 
perceive this only as an attempt to put the public and 
private sectors on a competitive basis, but hardly 
equitable. They do not believe that a local authority 
like Cape Town knows what it costs to undertake 
in-house construction work. They feel that transfers 
of funds are too easily allowed thereby distorting the 
true costs. This is considered to be subjective 
comment. Reference is made to Chapter 5, particularly 
Section 5.8. 
The key factor to civil engineering cost is the plant. 
SAFCEC does not accept that a local authority can 
administer proper plant costing procedures. The cost 
of plant is a major element in civil engineering work 
and could total up to 40 % of the total cost of the 
project. 
The Regional Manager SAFCEC alleged the following: 
"The procedure for buying the plant is cumbersome, 
likewise the procedure for disposing of such plant, so 
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t here is a tendency to hang on t o it and the yards are 
stacked with under-utilised plant.• 
Cape Town's Assistant City Engineer (Mechanical) 
disputed this claim: •There are no hidden costs as 
in-house hire rates include all operating, supervision, 
management and administrative costs.• The plant pool 
operates on the same basis as a plant hire contractor 
in that all costs and income are accounted for 
meticulously. 
Claims that in-house costs are manipulated are untrue 
because the City Engineer's Department Cape Town 
operates its own budgetary control system which is not 
only monitored by the department but is also subject to 
audit control by both the City Treasurer and the 
Provincial Administrator. 
It is essential to provide certain i terns of plant to 
deal with seasonal and emergency projects e.g. a low 
ground pressure bulldozer (not available on private 
hire in Cape Town) which might well be under-utilised 
but nevertheless necessary for strategic reasons. The 
in-house plant pool operates a continuous computerised 
monitoring operation and a regular comparison is 
undertaken between internal and private sector plant 
hire rates. 
Cape Town's in-house construction units are essential 
as cost •yardsticks• for comparative purposes with 
contractual bids and/or as a resource to call upon 
should the bids be excessive i.e. an anti-exploitation 
price watchdog. The knowledge that the local authority 
monitors the cost-effectiveness of the private sector 
and its own construction uni ts must have an impact on 
the private sector's tender prices and contract 
performance. 
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Local authorities generally believe that it is the 
necessity for profit that makes private enterprise more 
expensive. Conversely, private enterprise claims that 
it is the quest for profit that enables them to achieve 
the efficiencies necessary to lower the cost. 
SAFCEC explained the profit factor as rather the 
•profit and contingency• factor e.g. this is the margin 
the contractor must add after assessing the risks 
involved in the project. They claimed that the 
published accounts in the construction 
revealed that contractors operate 




large, successful and well-run companies like Murray 
and Roberts, LTA, D & Hand Wimpey. They are tendering 
to get work on about 5 % or 7 % on turnover. 
( Percentages supplied by Regional Manager SAFCEC.) It 
is a claimed characteristic of civil engineering that 
if all goes well the contractor may clear 5 % on a 
project but if it goes sour he might not only lose 5 % 
or even 10 %, he could lose 50 %. It was submitted as 
an estimate that this could happen to one in ten 
projects. 
The private sector has lower personnel costs than the 
local authorities whose construction employees' 
salaries and --.benefits exceed those of their ----
counterparts in the private sector. Contractors work 
to a wage determination which lays down minimum wages. 
However, some contractors pay slightly more than the 
minimum. 
To examine this point the wage scales of two categories 
of employees viz. labourers and artisans in the public 
sector and the private sector were examined. 




Civil engineering contractors* Rl,55 
Cape Town Municipality: civil 
engineering construction unit Rl,91 - R2,02 
ARTISAN 
Civil engineering contractors* R3,71 
Cape Town Municipality: civil 
engineering construction unit R4,75 - RS,30 
*Government Gazette No. 10107, 1986-02-28 p.20. 
According to SAFCEC the contractor's medical aid and 
pension contribution is modest compared to the local 
authority. Contractors book their employees off in the 
event of inclement weather. 
SAFCEC is confident that contractors can carry out any 
construction--'tl..Q_fk for a lesser cost than the local 
authority because of competition and the risk factor. 
The private contractor has to be either as or more 
efficient than his competitors or he could go out of 
business. A contractor either does or does not get the 
contract, but if he gets it by too wide a margin i.e. 
his price is too low he could suffer substantial losses. 
Privatisation could 
creating a monopolistic 
destroy competition 





and inefficient alternative to in-house 
Local authorities could place a limit on the 
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price demanded by private enterprise and force an 
i mprovement in the response and quality of th e private 
enterprise alternative. 
There was general consensus among 
Municipality officials (listed on page 143 




construction work out on contract if they operated in a 
truly free enterprise society where sufficient 
competition ensured keen prices. They agreed that this 
worked well in the United States of America but in 
South Africa there are limited resources controlled by 
a small number of conglomerates or linked directorships 
so the prospect of monopolistic tendencies developing 
is tremendous. The conglomerates referred to are Anglo 
American, SANLAM, s A Mutual and Rembrandt Group which 
together control 83 % of shares on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. 
(•s A Riddled with cartels", Argus 1987-02-14.) 
According to the Assistant City Engineer Mr D Riley, 
(previously Director of Works, Mitchells Plain): 
•ouring recessionary times we get good service from the 
contractors but in boom times they would not hang 
around for Council work, they would rush off to where 
the profitability is greater. This actually happened 
during the construction of the Mitchells Plain 
Development." 
The alleged lack of competition was disputed by the 
Regional Manager of SAFCEC: "There never has been and 
there never will be a cartel in the civil engineering 
construction industry." He claimed that they are not a 
price-fixing organisation and that they bel i eved in 
competition and the competitive tender s ystem. Their 
aim is to see that all tenders are put on an equal 
footing as far as possible. . They support t he "select 
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list system" in that contractors should be selected on 
the basis of their experience for particular projects. 
SAFCEC is adamant that competition in civil engineering 
construction will always be free because anyone can 
start out as a civil engineering contractor if he has 
the knowledge, the energy and he is prepared to take 
the risk. 
SAFCEC claims that there will always be strong 
competition for work put out by local authorities 
provided that the conditions of tender are equitable, 
and that the supervising engineers are fair. Local 
authorities must themselves not become the reason for 
restrictive tenders in that contractors might not want 
to do work for the local authority if they can do work 
for some other client. This situation can occur with 
difficult and unreasonable clients and non-payers, and 
could restrict the number of tenders. 
In America the tendency is for nearly all large 
projects to be undertaken by a group of contractors (a 
consortium) in order to spread the risk. 
The risk of the contractor defaulting or going 
insolvent was examined. Should this occur and it 
became necessary to change contractors, the inherent 
costs could be very high. SAFCEC acknowledged this but 
counter-claimed that this did not occur very often. If 
it did occur it was usually as a result of inadequate 
pre-tender information, or inexperienced contractors 
e.g. the contractor is induced to 'stick his neck out' 
and does not go into detail sufficiently. The most 
common cause of financial failure in the construction 
industry according to SAFCEC, is lack of liquid funds 
owing to over-trading or delay in being paid by the 
client. 
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Design is a critical part of construction projects and 
it is claimed that consultants are only interested in 
profitable jobs and do not pay much attention to 
detail. But it is the detail that determines how well 
the project performs. 
PROJECT 
The Assistant City Engineer {Water), Mr D Hodson 
substantiated this point "The worst plant we have is 
Voelvlei an absolute disaster designed by private 
enterprise. In-house engineers can achieve much better 
designs because they have specialised expertise and 
training and actually operate existing plants and know 
their operation.• 
The consultancy costs of a few civil engineering 
projects which were undertaken in-house in recent years 
were compared with fees which would have been paid to 
consultants. The fees are in accordance with the 















The Cape Town Municipality takes the following criteria 
into account before in-house construction is utilised: 
cost, expertise, expediency, urgency, experience and 
co-ordination required, current economic conditions, 
specialised nature of the work and departmental 
resources available. 
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According to the Regional Manager of SAFCEC there is a 
universal movement towards the privatisation of every 
form of economic activity, on the grounds of greater 
efficiency and the need to use available public funds 
to the best advantage. SAFCEC urged the Cape Town 
Municipality not to lag behind. 
STRATEGIC FACTORS 
Maintenance work is largely undertaken in-house at 
present but there have been times when a contractor was 
unattainable to carry out the necessary work. 
Waterworks and Roads kept only the nucleus of the 
workforce to undertake basic maintenance work. There 
is a strong inter-relationship between maintenance and 
capital works. Construction crews can not be employed 
productively on maintenance work alone and therefore 
the laying of all pipelines by private enterprise is 
not an economically viable proposition. It is vital 
that Waterworks does not relinquish the knowledge and 
expertise of laying watermains in case an urgent job 
has to be undertaken requiring in-house expertise. 
In-house capacity is at least necessary in retaining 
the basic skills, equipment and some staff to cater for 
emergencies, as an insurance against 
default, and as a control of costs. 
contractor 
SAFCEC believes that privatisation, properly 
controlled, is the most effective way of carrying out 
capital works. They concede that there is no doubt 
that every public authority should retain a small 
nucleus of in-house construction capacity for 
maintenance work and emergency work i.e. work which can 
not be readily measured for payment or organised on a 
contract basis. Apart f ram · this, they see no reason 
why all construction can not be contracted out. They 
are concerned about the possible expansion of in-house 
capacity. 
1.52 
It is claimed that South Africa has the h i ghest 
proportion in the western world of people working in 
the public sector. SAFCEC claims that despite this, 
frequent appeals are made by the Government for the 
private sector to assist in the economic revival of the 
country. They allege that the public sector becomes 
involved in matters that it should not be involved in. 
SAFCEC is reluctant to state what it feels is a fair 
balance of work to be undertaken between the private 
sector and the public sector. They advocate the basis 
that the local authority should put out all conceivable 
work possible to the private contractors. To examine 
further the question of balance of work, the author 
extracted and analysed the expenditure on civil 
engineering construction undertaken by the City 
Engineer's Department over the past five years. The 
following table refers: 
CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY 
EXPENDITURE ON CIVIL ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK 
YEAR CONTRACTUAL DEPARTMENTAL TOTAL 
% of % of 
R million Total R million Total R million 
1981 36,671 78 10,334 22 47,005 
1982/83 55,779 81 12,791 19 68,570 
(18 months) 
1983/84 27,798 61 17,480 39 45,278 
1984/ 85 26,359 56 20,707 44 47,066 
1985/86 37,327 57 28,370 43 65,697 
TOTAL 183,934 67% 89,682 33% 279,616 















































































































































































































































































































































It is evident from the totals of the above table that 
two-thirds of the average expenditure on civil 
engineering construction over the past five years have 
been channelled to the private sector. 
However an examination of the trend over the same 




















The percentage of the total of contractual work has 
decreased from 78 % ( 1981) to 57 % ( 1986), a decrease 
of 45 % in real terms, while the percentage of 
departmental work has increased from 22 % (1981) to 
43 % (1986). It can be concluded that over the above 
period Cape Town's in-house construction unit has 
increased its turnover by SO% in real terms. The 
significant change in the ratio of contractual to 
departmental work from 1983/84 may be attributed to a 
reduction in expenditure on contractual works arising 
from the completion of: 
- major civil contracts at Mitchells Plain 
Mitchells Plain pulverising station 
- Riviersonderend water augmentation scheme. 
There was a concurrent increase in expenditure on 
departmental works viz: 
- ----
155 
- roadworks in areas such as Athlone, Hanover Park and 
Newfields together with sewers and stormwater drains 
- earthworks at Khayelitsha 
YEAR 
1981 
- waterworks trunk mains and distribution mains. 
These relate to preparatory works while tender 
documents were being prepared and tenders invited and 
were undertaken in-house to save time. Construction 
commenced immediately after tenders were awarded. 
Details of capital expenditure of the City Engineer's 
Department, Cape Town Municipality, from 1981 to 198 6 
was extracted and analysed. The following table refers: 
CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY 
CITY ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT: CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
PERIOD: 1981 TO 1986 
CONTRACTUAL DEPARTMENTAL TOTAL 
R MILLION % OF R MILLION % OF R MILLION 
TOTAL TOTAL 
73 677 80 18 907 20 92 584 
1982/ 83 102 319 84 19 989 16 122 308 
1983/84 43 934 68 20 734 32 64 66 8 
1984/ 85 51 950 67 25 511 33 77 461 
1985/86 91 138 71 37 972 29 129 110 
TOTAL 363 018 75 123 113 25 486 131 














































































































































































































































































It can be concl uded from t he above t able t hat for the 
period 1981 to 1986 on average, 75 % of the total 
capital expenditure of the City Engineer's Department 
is diverted to the private sector. This draws 
attention to the considerable extent to which private 
enterprise has been used for capital works. 
The Civil Engineering Advisory Council ( CEAC) provided 
guidelines for the balance of work between the private 
and public sectors in its circular to inter alia the 
Cape Town City Engineer's Department dated 1981-11-20. 
The correspondence referred to as the Memorandum in 
respect of Planning, Design and Construction of Public 
Civil Engineering Works stated inter alia: 
• it was of major importance that Government 
departments and agencies should be adequately staffed, 
that sufficient civil engineering design and 
construction should be carried out directly by them to 
provide adequate training and experience for this staff 
and to provide the required overall guidance and 
control of such work.• 
•That public bodies should be provided with basic staff 
to carry out work not suitable for assigning to the 
private sector, to carry out maintenance and to be in a 
position to deal with emergencies.• 
The full text of this memorandum is provided in 
Appendix E. 
The construction uni ts enable Cape Town to respond to 
emergencies and civil defence demands. 
What is the extent or frequency of emergency 
construction work? 
Over the last three years 51 burst watermains occurred 
in Rondebosch, Newlands and . Camps Bay while 18 bursts 
occurred in Hanover Park, 
Estate and Sherwood Park 
suburbs. 
Heideveld, Manenberg, Surrey 
to take just two groups of 
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SAFCEC concede that the local authority sho uld ha ve t he 








contractors could however respond if t he necessary 
mechanism could be set up. They are concerned t hat 
they have never been approached by Cape Town's Civil 
Defence Organisation with the objective of assisting in 
an emergency as there are many contractors with 
considerable capacity in plant, labour, management and 
vehicles. This facility needs to be organised. 
The Assistant City Engineer (Water) ref er red to 
occasions in the past where private enterprise has not 
been interested in undertaking certain types of 
projects at a reasonable price due to factors such as 
danger, smell and nuisance. Reference was made to 
routine maintenance of watermains and the laying of 
small mains in the municipal area. This is considered 
troublesome and time-consuming work because of the many 
underground services involved and it is not attractive 
in terms of profit. 





agree that a contractor would charge an 
if he were required to carry out 
for a local authority as there are 
for most jobs and standard plant hire 
In-house design and construction ensure that the 
necessary quality is attained and that there is no 
cutting of standards. 
SAFCEC agreed that design should not be done on a 
competitive basis and if a contractor (many of whom 
operate design facilities) were requested or offered to 
undertake a project on a design and construct basis 
then the client should examine this very caref ully "to 
ensure that corners are not cut". 
l.59 
ADMINIS TRATIVE 
In-house construction uni ts can be more flexibly 
employed and have the capacity to respond to unforeseen 
circumstances. This comes to the fore when they handle 
work of a special nature, requiring specialised 
knowledge, experience and a close co-ordination with 
other municipal services. 
SAFCEC is concerned that where in-house units are 
operated there is a built-in tendency to enlarge them. 
"The managers running them have a vested interest in 
increasing the size and scope of the unit. 
Construction work ebbs and flows with the seasons not 
only with the money supply and work available. An 
in-house unit has to "mark time" if work falls away 
until something comes up. The "ebb and flow" could be 
taken care of by taking on temporary staff but the 
tendency is that they become permanent." They claim 
that the system is inflexible in that employees can not 
be ~aid off or benefits reduced according to work flows. 
It must be acknowledged that a large direct labour 
organisation can only be economically viable if it 
receives a sufficient and consistent volume of work. 
--~ ven if a substantial ratio of labour was employed on a 
temporary basis, the local authority inevitably has a 
high percentage of overhead costs on a fixed basis 
which can not be adjusted rapidly to respond to 




claim that there is an inherent tendency to 
construction units justified? An examination 
personnel records of employees involved in 
construction in the Waterworks and Roads Branches over 



















This analysis reveals that the Waterworks construction 
personnel have decreased by 20 % and the Roads by 14 % 
over the last five years. 
Reference is made to the table headed "Expenditure in 
civil engineering construction work" on page 152. This 
demonstrated an increase in the percentage of 
construction work carried out departmentally from 1981 
to 1986. It is not possible to correlate a definite 
relationship between the two aspects of data viz. 
increase in percentage of expenditure and decrease in 
personnel 
follows. 
involved in construction. The reason is as 
R Million. 
The table on page 152 details expenditure in 
Although this figure has increased from 
1981 to 1986, this is owing mainly to the fact that 
approximately so % of the expenditure on civil 
engineering construction is spent on materials which 
are purchased from the private sector. Inflation has 
increased the cost of material considerably over the 
period concerned. 
The decrease in the number of construction employees 
may be largely attributed to the recession which has 
caused the Cape Town Municipality to "freeze" vacant 
posts. This policy came into effect in 1983. The 
second reason is that the City Engineer's Department 
Cape Town's construction has been subjected since 1983 
to a productivity drive led by the P E Consultants 
Group who were employed to audit productivity studies. 
Th e productivity drive, applicable to both the 
Waterworks and Roads branches, has contributed to the 
decrease in personnel. 
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"A sample of productivity drives in the City Engineer's 
Department shows an annual saving _ of R200 000, 
according to independent consultants. 
The saving was identified by consultants after studying 
productivity efforts by only 12 % of the department's 
direct labour force." (Argus 1985-06-12.) 
Further claims are that: 
- Contractors can save on the purchasing of material 
and services as they are able to capitalise on fast 
decisions as opposed to local authorities who are 
compelled to use time-consuming and bureaucratic 
tender procedures and necessary approval of 
committees. 
- Privatisation clarifies the accountability and 
responsibility of the project in terms of the 
contract, but SAFCEC states conversely that problems 
of the in-house unit are "hidden". 
\ 
- A great many advanced and innovative ideas have been 
initiated by contractors stimulated by economic 
pressure. SAFCEC is doubtful whether local 
authorities have this impetus. 
In this regard Cape Town has proved its innovation in 
civil engineering projects by winning the following 
awards, (only three are listed): 
- The Most Outstanding Civil Engineering Achievement 
in 1967, awarded by the S A Institution of Civil 
Engineers, for the freeways of Cape Town 
- The Most Outstanding Civil Engineering Achievement 
in 1979, for Mitchells Plain 
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The s A Institution of Civil Engineers' Regional 
Award for Excellence in Civil Engineering in the 
Western Cape Areas in 1982, for the Blackheath 
water treatment plant 
Cape Town Municipality stressed the importance of being 
able to attract and retain professional staff and 
training them in planning and management functions. 
Job satisfaction is of paramount importance and 
expertise can only be gained from all-round 
experience. 
employ of 
Competent engineers will not remain in the 
the local authority if most of the 
interesting and exciting jobs are always designed and 
constructed by the private sector. There would be no 
job satisfaction if in-house staff were only 
responsible for routine maintenance jobs. As the local 
authority puts out more and more work on contract so it 
would generate less and less expertise within its own 
ranks and probably have to pay higher salaries to 
attract suitable professionals into a somewhat routine 
activity service. 
SAFCEC does not believe that it is necessary for staff 
to be trained by local authorities as they feel that 
they could be trained by the private sector. 
9.4.2 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The building unit provides a "yardstick" for comparison 
of the private contractors' prices and serves as an 
in-house check on tenders received. The MBA contended 
that for the in-house unit to provide a "yardstick" for 
comparison of costs it could only be effective if it 
were comparable on the same basis. They are sceptical 
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of the true costs of local authority projects. The 
President of MBA/BIFSA strongly emphasised: "We have 
never yet seen published in any document any projects 
undertaken by the Cape Town Municipality taking into 
account its true costs including overheads, plant, 
etc." "How is the administration and the plant charged 
and what about the time of engineers going out on 
site?" Reference is made to last paragraph on page 68 
for comment on this statement. 
They complained about the vast value of idle plant and 
equipment owned by the Cape Town Municipality. The 
principle of alleged "unfair depreciation facilities" 
of local authorities was propounded. This matter was 
previously commented on under the civil engineering 
construction section. 
They claimed further that a local authority's function 
of purchasing goods and materials is time consuming and 
wasteful and i terns are not ordered economically. It 
was alleged that a contractor could go out of business 
on this basis. 
The maintenance and cost of rectifying defects would be 
the responsibility of the contractor. This matter was 
examined further. A recent project undertaken by the 
building unit was the Mitchells Plain 
Fire Station. The total construction 
Rl 651 252 and the subsequent cost of 









against inflated industry prices 
during peak economic conditions. 
18 - 19) explains: "The departmental 
building units established in most major local 
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authorities have more than proved themselves. Their 
primary aim has not been to compete with private 
enterprise but to ensure a steady output of houses 
while at the same time maintaining an effective 
yardstick for cost control.• 
The building unit serves a valuable role as a buffer 
agains~ the excesses of consultants and contractors. 
There have been times when due to the buoyant state of 
the economy tenders have been exorbitant or few in 
number. On these occasions the availability of 
in-house construction has been a great source of 
economy to the City. 
The MBA argues that Cape Town's building unit should 
never have been allowed to undertake the construction 
projects that they have because it could not have been 
an efficient program. 
This opinion can be disputed. 
The building unit does operate efficiently and this was 
borne out by the management consultants Pim Goldby in 
their recent maintenance report. •The building unit in 
general iS a well-run unit with high professional 
standards which provides Council with all the necessary 
technical building skills and backup.• 
(Building Maintenance Report 1985 : p43.) 
The MBA perceives 
•self-policing• because 
the building 
in current times 
to 30 contractors on a tender list. 





Most of the 
have to be 
competitive to get work so the absolute lowest price is 
offered. 
"There is plenty of competition because it costs a 
contactor money to tender. They will not tender just 
to test the market - they tender to get the job and 
they know that if their price is too high they will be 
unsuccessful." 
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The MBA stands firm: "There is no car t el in the 
construction industry because contractors are al 1 
different and individual. How could there be a cartel 
between a public company like LTA or Murray & Roberts, 
R H Morris or Stocks and Stocks which is a Pretoria 
based company." 
They warned local authorities not to expect keen prices 
if they pu~ out a II rubbish document 11 • They cited the 
example of the contractor being expected to take 
ridiculous risks or being asked for a fixed price 
contract for a three year period. "Cape Town does not 
accept the Haylett formula but all other authorities in 
the country accept it. This is totally unreasonable -









as opinion. An 
s A Transport 
Executive, SANLAM and 
Southern Suns for example do not accept the Haylett 
formula. They negotiate fixed price tenders. 
Both BIFSA and the MBA compel their members to tender 
using the Haylett formula and have instituted a system 
of marking tender envelopes accordingly. Clients must 
make a choice when opening the tenders. Either 
BIFSA/MBA members or non-members - but not both! 
MBA By-Law 5: Official tender envelope. 
11 5 .1 A member shall not tender · in competition with a 
non-member for services in excess of R250 000 or 
for services in excess of R25 000 if normally 
classified as sub-contract work except in the 
envelope officially approved by BIFSA bearing an 
endorsement to the effect that ...... " 
Developers claim that the system smacks of a cartel and 
is highly inflationary. Members who do not comply 
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with BI FSA/MBA rules of tender could face a fine or 
even expulsion. The application of the Haylett formula 
has been criticised for its inflationary effect as 
there is little, if any, incentive for builders to 
contain costs if they can be passed on to developers. 
(Financial Mail 1984-10-12 p.71.) 
The Cape Town Municipality does not accept the Haylett 
formula because it is considered inflationary and is 
therefore not in the interests of its citizens. The 
above substantiates that the building industry 
certainly could have cartel tendencies and at the least 
is restricting free competition amongst competitors in 
the building industry. 
The building unit provides the Cape Town Municipality 
with the ability to spend State or Provincial monies 
that are allocated at short notice towards the end of 
the State's financial year, failing which the monies 
are forfeited. 
The building unit is beneficial for maintenance or 
smaller new works, where the tender or even negotiated 
contract process would be expensive and time consuming 
in proportion to the value of the job. 
The MBA is in agreement with this advantage. 
Where time is of the essence, departmental work can 
usually commence at very short notice, depending on 
present workload and the availability of materials. 
Five or more months of documentation, tendering and 
contract award time, as well as escalation and quantity 
survey fees, could be saved. At the average rate of 
inflation, this delay could result in a significantly 
increased basic cost. 
The MBA does not accept this as an advantage. They 
claim that if such an urgent project arises, it can not 
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be started before plans are available. They argue that 
it is possible to get a tender on a set of plans within 
10 - 14 days. Special permission could be obtained to 
go out on tender without a bill of quantities or the 
quantity surveyor could be brought in simultaneously. 
The ability of a private contractor to match the speedy 
start-up time of an in-house construction unit was 
challenged during the interview with Mr Leon Glaser. 
The following statement was enthusiastically 
forthcoming: 
situation or 
nif Cape Town has an 




6 or 7 
contractors that they have worked with and they know 
can handle the job. Put the plans on the table and 
come to a method of pricing it and having schedules of 
rates, etc. - there are all sorts of technical ways. 
There is no way that the Council can carry out 
construction quicker than a contractor whose business 
it is to get things done.n 
However, after the 1984 storm in Cape Town the 
construction unit repaired more than 500 roofs in the 
municipal area within 10 days. Private contractors 
quoted earliest start dates for roof repairs which 
varied between 4 and 12 weeks. 
STRATEGIC FACTORS 
The building unit allows the local authority to switch 
activities quickly to accommodate at short notice a 
change in its priorities. 
This factor was not accepted by the MBA who 
retaliated: ncouncil must get its act together in this 
day and age. A contractor can not run a business on 
these lines so why should a local authority?n 
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Cape Town's Assistant City Engineer (Building and 
Production) claimed t hat t heir standard of workmanship 
is equal to or higher t han the best in t he Western Cape 
construction industry. Could a contractor ensure this 
level of quality? 
The MBA emphasised that the contractor's standard must 
be up to the standard of workmanship required and 
documented for the job. "Whatever the local authority 
wants it must get, so get the right contractors and 
know their standard." (Quoting Mr Leon Glaser.) 
In-house construction allows for minimal disruption to 
the public, for example, during the construction of 
Muizenberg Pavilion certain facilities remained open 
while construction was in progress. 
Contractors would have no difficulty in meeting this 
requirement. The example was cited of Murray and 
Roberts building the Cape Sun Hotel in the centre of 
the City on negotiating public facilities not being 
disrupted. 
Cape Town claims that through its experi e nce of 
building public amenities it is sensitive to the needs 
of the community. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS 
The building unit provides project management "package 
deals• for Cape Town. An example is the construction 
of the Muizenberg Pavilion where all aspects of the 
project were co-ordinated by the building unit i.e. 
sub-contracted works, civil work, horticultural work 
and electrical installations. 
The MBA was confident that any of its member 
contractors could provide this same service as a matter 
of course. 
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Where documentation or design information are to a 
greater or lesser extent not available at project 
commencement stage, departmental construction can 
commence immediately. In-house construction allows for 
flexibility in that alterations to designs and 
specifications can be made while the project is under 
construction. Under similar circumstances contractors 
could, and often would, exploit the situation to their 
financial advantage. 
The MBA disputes that a contractor could exploit this 
situation. The basis is that in the bill of quantities 
which is submitted, every i tern has been priced. If an 
alteration to specifications is made then the 
particular i tern on the bill of quantities is amended 
either up or down in the standard way. This can not be 
exploited as the quantity surveyor can monitor the 
pr iced bill of quantities. They concede that the only 
argument that could be raised is on time but not 
financial terms i.e. if adjustments are required it 
might require extra time to effect such. 
The building unit provides an estimating service for 
planning and for capital estimates, an advisory service 
on feasibility of projects, and a professional 
technical advisory service to all departments of the 
Cape""Town Municipality. 
The importance of providing staff, particularly the 
professionals, with a satisfactory variety of 
experience is stressed. If the work handled by the 
local authority were simply confined to maintaining 
existing facilities then it would experience even 
greater difficulty in recruiting suitably qualified and 
motivated staff. It is essential that the local 
authority handles work that is interesting and requires 
conceptualisation and innovative ability. 
The future managers of the local authority must have 
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e xper ience that i s both ba l anced and comp l e x t o enable 
th em t o effectively i nitiate, pl an and direct wit h 
flair and efficiency, whether the work i s carried out 
in-house or by consultants and contractors. 
The last two factors did not raise any objective 
comment from the MBA. 
9.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The major portion of the Cape Town Municipality's civil 
construction function is already privatised. Reference 
to the relevant table on page 152 reveals that on 
average over the period 1981 to 1986, 67 % has been 
undertaken by the private sector while 3 3 % has been 
undertaken in-house. Similarly, from the applicable 
table on page 155 it is concluded that over the period 
1981 to 1986 on average 75 % of all the City Engineer's 
Department's capital expenditure has been channelled to 
the private sector. It is essential that this local 
authority retains its own capacity to undertake both 
civil engineering construction and building 
construction to ensure continuity and protection 
against maiket and economic fluctuations. This 
conclusion is supported by Imeson (1984 : 3) •there ~ re 
now 532 local authorities in Britain with some kind of 
direct labour building department n. Hepworth ( 197 6 
17) confirms that there are 548 local authorities i n 
Britain. It is therefore concluded that 97 % of all 
British local authorities utilise some form of direct 
labour building capacity. This must be some proof of 
their worth. 
The civil engineering construction uni ts ( Building and 
Production, Roads and Waterworks of t he Cape Town 
Municipality ) have increase~ their turnover by 50 % in 
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real terms over the last 
state of the economy has 
amount of work in the 
construction uni ts have 
the balance, on total 
equitable. 
fi ve years. The recessionary 
led to a considerably reduced 
industry and although the 
not increased their capacity, 
value of work is no longer 
In this regard the Cape Town Municipality should 
decrease its share of civil engineering construction 
and embark on a planned programme over the next few 
years of putting more work out to the private sector. 
This programme should be undertaken on a phased basis 
to avoid the problems and costs of redundancies and 
retrenchments. Staff levels could be reduced in most 
cases by natural wastage. 
The phased reduction of in-house construction 
enable the local authority to closely monitor 
will 
the 
programme in terms of results achieved. An analysis of 
the results will reveal when an optimum and fair 
balance has been restored by taking into account 
expected 
and the 
and sustained competition, 




Although a considerable number of building contractors 
exist in the marketplace they are not subject to free 
and unrestricted competition. Cape Town's building 
unit is providing the necessary competiton and this is 
a sound strategy which is in the interests of the 
citizens of the local authority. 
The number of employees engaged on building work 
represents only O, 3 % of the building industry labour 
force in the Western Cape. 
(Source: BIFSA Annual Report 1985.) This hardly 
represents a threat to the building industry. 
The building unit has not increased in size over the 
last five years but nevertheless has retained a 
consistent level of work eveh though the total value of 
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building construction in the industry ha~ decreased 
considerably. Currently the degree of balance between 
the building unit and the private sector in terms of 
available work is not equitable. 
The building unit's work programme should be reassessed 
with the objective of determining an optimum staff 
level and commensurate volume of work (in monetary 
terms) per annum to achieve maximum efficiency. This 
would determine an economic limit on the building 
unit's work programme and all work over this limit 
should be put out to the private sector. 
Should the optimum level of staff be determined at less 
than the present workforce then a reduction could 
readily be affected as the majority of its employees 
are on a •hire and fire" basis and redundancies would 
be avoided. 
The above recommendations may be viewed as enhancing a 
principal advantage of privatisation which is the 
fostering of competition among organisations whether 







1 0.1 GUIDELINES FOR CONTRACTING OUT 
The advantages of privatisation and the advantages of 
in-house provision of local authority services provide 
a fair indication of the strength and complexity of the 
issue and what clearly emerges is that success can not 
be guaranteed by change. 
The proof lies in whether the local authority obtains a 
more efficient and cost effective service and can only 
be achieved if change is made, even experimentally. If 
change is made to the private sector then the following 
crucial factors should be considered: 
- the extent of competition in the area 
- the record of the potential contractors in terms of 
reliability and strength; and 
- the problem of how to use departmental staff declared 
redundant. 
If a contract is to be let for the performance of a 
local authority service by the private sector then the 
following guidelines are recommended: 
- each tenderer should be required to submit his 
audited final accounts for the last three years as 
well as a bankers report and a bankers guarantee 
- the conditions of contract should be attached to t he 
tender form and should be clear and precise as to the 
rights and obligations of the respective parties 
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- the local authority s hould have sufficient 
supervisory staff to monitor the performance of the 
contractor and these costs would have to be added to 
the cost of the service 
the tenderer should be required to indicate his 
system of organisation and the approved organisation 
system should form part of the contract; and 
- the contractor should provide for the commandeering 
of the service during any disaster or civil defence 
emergency. (Vivier 1982 : 12.) 
Atkinson ( 1984 40) suggests that local authorities 
should examine the range of experiences that the 
contractor has shown including : 
- the nature of the plant or project 
- the length of · time the company has been in business 
- the companies references and past experiences; and 
- the companies record of renewals. 
P s Florestano, • contracting with the Private Sector" 
National Civic Review 1982, pp 352 353.) suggests 
consideration of the following factors before deciding 
which types of services might best be contracted out. 
- Legal: 
Ordinances or other legislation should be checked to 
determine whether it is legally possible to contract a 
particular service. 
have permissive 
In Sou th Africa local authorities 
powers and the legal 
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nature thereof does not require the local authority 
itself to render the service. Special care should be 
taken in the area of industrial relations and labour 
law. 
- Political tradition: 
The political beliefs or traditions of the community 
should be considered. Some communities may prefer a 
dominant private sector with local government providing 
the infrastructure and the private sector bringing 
strong competition into the process. Other communities 
may be concerned over local government growth and 
perceive local authorities as inefficient and are 
therefore supportive of a reduction of employees in 
that sector. Yet other communities may perceive 
contracting negatively as they view local government as 
an instrument to provide citizens with jobs or to 
accomplish other social or economic objectives. They 
might also be concerned about the sensitivitiy and 
responsiveness of private contractors to the attainment 
of public goals. 
- Administrative: 
Consider the characteristics of the service, as a 
tangible service with clear-cut dimensions, is more 
readily contracted. New services are more apt to be 
contracted than those services which have been provided 
by the local authority for decades. Consider frequency 
and uniqueness criteria e.g. a seasonal service or the 
use of specialised equipment or facilities at 
intermittent intervals make contracting more viable. 
If there is a good number of suppliers it is assumed 
that competition will lower the cos~; but if there are 





Cost is of primary concern is it cheaper for 
in-house provision or contracting? The size of a 
local authority affects finances: small local 
authorities usually contract for selected services 
because they lack the resources to provide them or 
conversely they may elect to provide fewer 
services. But a word of caution. Local 
authorities must realise that paying an inadequate 
fee is advantageous only in the short term. A 
private enterprise that does not make a profit will 
reduce the quality of service until it either 
receives a satisfactory return on investment or it 
goes out of business. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate continues whether it is beneficial for local 
authority services to be provided in-house or under 
contract to the private sector. It evolves around 
questions such as whether in-house work is cheaper or 
more expensive, more efficient or less efficient than 
work undertaken by private contractors. One can be in 
agreement that both sectors are competent to provide 
local authority services. Each has its role to play 
and each agency has its advantages and disadvantages. 
Local authorities should continually evaluate the 
efficiency of their service delivery and where 
advantageous the private sector should be afforded the 
opportunity of performing part of the service. 
Similarly those services contracted out to private 
enterprise should be subject to a constant 
re-evaluation by the local authority. This would allow 
a continuous comparison which would be in the interests 
of both the public and the private sectors. 
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It is essential to strike a proper balance between the 
public and private sectors bearing in mind inter alia 
the urgency, experience and co-ordination required, the 
prevailing economic conditions, the specialised nature 
of the service and the local authorities' resources 
available. Optimimum balance should be determined by 
what is in the best interests of the citizens of the 
local authority. 
Adequate and free competition is the most important 
factor in achieving cost-efficient services. 
Privatisation could lead to the destruction of 
competition and conversely the local authorities' entry 
. into the market may create competition where a monopoly 
has previously existed. 
Privatisation has many disadvantages as well as 
advantages and each potential case should be examined 
on its merits. No overall standard can be applied, 
particularly when community services with a public 
health facet are under consideration. 
The profit motive factor is not necessarily a guarantee 
for cost-efficient service delivery particularly if 
work is plentiful and competition is inadequate. 
Efficient provision of local authority services is 
dependent upon sound management principles whether they 
are provided by the public sector or the private sector. 
Responsible cost-conscious management is essential to 
obtain maximum results from limited resources available. 
The decided commitment to privatisation as a policy, by 
local authorities before such campaign is embarked upon 
is essential for optimum results. In all instances the 
decision should be for a good reason and not merely for 
the sake of privatisation. 
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10 .3 THE OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED 
In Chapter 1, Section 1.2 the primary objective of this 
thesis was stated as being "to contribute to a 
methodology which will assist the choice between a 
public sector agency and a private sector agency for 
the provision of certain local authority services." 
A methodological approach was devised in the earlier 
chapters and formulated in Chapter 7. It is 
anticipated that this methodological approach could be 
of practical value to any local authority. This study 
is applicable to a particular set of time, circumstance 
and background and conclusions drawn should not be 
construed as being generally applicable anywhere else 
at any other time. 
In summary, the three other objectives of the thesis 
relate to: 
- examining the issues involved in comparing private 
and public sector agencies (Chapters 2 to 5) 
- establishing criteria for the assessment of both 
agencies (Chapter 6) 
- examining the · devised methodological approach and 
illustrating its application (Chapters 8 and 9). 




181 APPENDIX A 
CAPE TOWN CITY COUNCIL: SURVEY OF PRIVATISED SERVICES 
CITY ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT 
1. ARCHITECTURE: Large works are not normally designed by the 
Architectural Branch, but rather allocated to private firms. 
2. BUILDING AND PRODUCTION: Council has a building unit which can 
undertake emergency work, work which must be completed before the 
end of a financial year and work which from. time to time can be 
used for comparision with the private sector. Effectively, 
however, 95 % of building construction is contracted to the 
private sector. 
3. ROAD CONSTRUCTION: Council is chiefly responsible for the 
maintenance of roads and undertakes only small road construction 
works. Major road construction is largely handled by private 
contractors and recently the construction of carriageway crossings 
was privatised on a trial basis. This was not successful, 
however, the quality being inferior to and the cost no cheaper 
than that provided by council. 
4. STORES: Uniforms and protective clothing for Council staff are 
manufactured by private contractors and redundant equipment, plant 
and stores are auctioned by private auction firms. 
5. 
6. 
TOWN PLANNING: Specialist planning surveys are 
consul tan ts, however, much of the Town Planning work 
the branch itself. 
TRANSPORT AND MECHANICAL PLANT: Additional 
particularly specialist plant are regularly 




is done by 
and plant 
supplement 
7. TRANSPORT PLANNING: 
degree in this area. 
council makes use of consultants to some 
8. WATERWORKS: The department undertakes minor pipelines and 
maintenance work, however, larger projects are contracted out. 
ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT 
Capital works represent the only significant area of privatisation in 
the department. 
CITY TREASURER'S DEPARTMENT 
1. ATTORNEYS: Private attorneys are employed to deal with debt 
collection, non-payments, litigation, etc. 
2. BROKERS: 
matters. 
Insurance brokers advise the department on insurance 
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3. CONSULTANTS: Council has made use of consultants to revise 
accountancy systems and computer and systems analyst consultants 
to design most computer systems. 
4. FINANCIAL ADVISORS: Loan-raising and general financial advice is 
provided by private firms. 
5. INVESTMENT ADVISORS: Pension Fund decisions are taken in 
consultation with private investment advisors. 
6. MERCHANT BANKS: Council makes use of the various services 
provided by Merchant Banks. 
CITY ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT 
1. ABATTOIR: The gut factory, the slaughtering, flaying and dressing 
of carcasses, the salvaging of hides and processing of offal have 
all been privatised. 
2. AMBULANCE SERVICE: Only the Hospital Transport Service, a taxi 
service for out-patients not including casualty conveyance, has 
been privatised. 
3. BATHING AMENITIES: Beach and swimming pool restaurants and 
kiosks, amusement activities e.g. miniature trains, boat rides, 
water slides and miniature golf are all run by the private 
sector. Similarly life saving services are only augmented by 
Council which hires temporary life savers during the summer months. 
4. CATERING: Catering in the staff restaurants and for some Mayoral 
functions is performed by a private catering management service, 
however, attempts to privatise the catering service for the Fire 
Brigade proved unsuccessful and this service is now provided 
in-house. 
5. CIVIC BUILDINGS: Office cleaning __ in the Civic Centre and 
specialist building maintenance aspects have been privatised, 
although routine building maintenance is undertaken internally. 
At present the Council is considering the employment of a 
marketing agency to promote the use of the Good Hope Centre and 
other exhibition facilities. 
6. ESTATES: The sale and valuation of property is given to agents on 
occasion. 
7. FRESH PRODUCE MARKETS: Sales of fresh produce are handled by 
agents who rent space on the market floor. 
8. HOUSING: The sale of Council houses is handled by Estate Agents 
on occasion. 
9. LEGAL ADVICE: Council makes ext.ensive use of attorneys for items 
requiring senior counsel op1n1on, arbitration, conciliation, 
conveyancing and litigation, although it has its own team of legal 
advisors. 
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10. MANAGEMENT SERVICES: Council employs consultants fo r special 
assignments relating to the organisational structure and the 
investigation of operational systems, however, it also makes 
extens ive use of its own Organisation and Methods Unit. 
11 . PERSONNEL: Some staff training is undertaken by private training 
bodies e.g. the Graduate School of Business of the University of 
Cape Town,Deltek, etc. Council has recently undertaken its own 
job evaluation project, however, on two previous occasions 
consultants were employed to do this. Recruitment advertising is 
handled by a private agency. 
12. PRINTING: Certain high quality colour work and continuous 
stationery is given to private printing firms. Council's own 
printing division handles all other printing requirements. 
13. PUBLIC RELATIONS: Specialist projects e.g. the completion of a 
special supplement to the Financial Mail on Cape Town are 
contracted out, however, many aspects of Public Relations are 
handled by Council's own Public Relations Officer. 
14. SECURITY: Private security patrol services are employed to 
protect depots etc. and a security firm transports cash from 
collection points to the Council's bank. Council has its own 
security division for the protection of the Civic Centre, vital 
installations and national key points. 
15. SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA: This was recently privatised with the 
establishment of a company in terms of Section 21 of the Companies 
Act. It is believed that the Orchestra could function more 
successfully if run less bureaucratically. 
16. TOURIST AUTHORITY: Captour provides this service, receiving a 
grant-in-aid to cover a large percentage of its operating expenses. 
17. TRAFFIC: Private contractors operate certain parking garages 
owned by Council. 
---18. TYPING SERVICES: A private secretarial agency has provided 
assistance on occasion. 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
At present no privatisation in health services, which are subsidised 
by the State, has been achieved. A Health Matters Advisory Committee 
is investigating health services rendered by local authorities and a 
cabinet committee will be looking at privatisation in its review of 
health services. 
2252M 
184 APPEND IX B 
JOB ADVERTI SEMENTS FOR SENIOR POSTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 





Coomencing Qlary •• SM per annum. · ............ 
• "" appropm,re three-year quaUtlcadon PLUS 
• Extensive appropriate experience. • 
Dullea · 
• Responsible for the execution ot investigations to determi~wtlemer 
government activitieS can bl' privatised. 
• Give guidance ro investigaoon offieers. 
• Concrol invesrtgalions executed by invesllgatlon _officers. 
• liai~ With pa,oes concerned. 
Note 
· • Experience ot the fallowing wiU bl' a recomrnenmaon: 
•Organisalion and Worlt Study 
•R~arcn 
* Investigations 
• Applicaoons must be submitted on form Z.83 and be accompanied 
by cemfied copies ot ~ations. 
Appllaldanl. staong reference number 19970. to tne Secref.ary. 
Commission for Mninistralion. Private Bag x121 . Prerona 0001. II•• Knqutre.a Mr S.A. Visser. tel. (0121 21-+41 Ix 224. 
Clollfte dlllet 16 May 1986. 
Investigation 
Officer• 
Privatisation (Various posts) 
Pretoria 
Salary~ up to •H .... per annum depending on experience 
and qualifications . ............... 
• An approp~te three-year quafificalion PLUS 
• At least four years appropriate experience. 
Duties 
• Execute investigations to determine wnemer government activities 
can be pnvaosed. 
• Implementation ot pnvaosaoon actlonS. 
Note 
• Experience ot tne following will be a recommendation: 
•Organisalion and Wortc Study 
•R~arcn * lnvesogations 
• Applicalions must be submiaed on form Z.83 and be accompanied 
by certified copies ot qualiflQtions. . 
Appllatlonl. stating reference number 19971 . to me Secret.ary. 
Coml11ISS1on ror Admlnlstraaon. Private Bag X 12 1. Pretcria 000 I . 
.... , .... ,,...Mrs.A. V11ser. tet. 1012121-4411 x 224 . 
. Cloll119 datet 16 May 1986. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































],86 APPENDIX D 
CAPE '?OWN OPINION SURVEY 
Services Provision bythe City Council 
PAI.'? 1: PSYCBOD'rllIC MODEL 
~ BANKING ANALYSIS 
CITY OF CAPE TOWN 
CITY ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT 
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MEMORANDUM m RESPECT OE' 
PLANNING, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
OF PUBLIC CIVIL ENG!NEFRING WORK~. 
1. The Civil Engineering Advisory Council found it necessary to 
consider, and make recommendations in respect of, the planning, 
design and construction of publj c civil engineering works and 
particularly in the sharing of this work between the public and the 
private sectors. 
2. The Council found that while the declared policy of Government of 
not doing work itself unless it had good reasons for doing so was 
the guideline, it was of major importance that Government 
departr;1ents and agencies should be adequately staffed, that 
sufficient civil engineering design and constructicn should be 
carried 01..t directly by then: to provide adequate training and 
experience for this staff and to provide the required overall 
guidance and control of such work. 
3. The Co'...lilcil also found that uniformity and compatibility in public 
civil engineering works was necessary, together with appropriate 
and adequate standards, and codes of procedure, and tJ-.is made it 
necessary for the public sector to be responsible for overall and 
long tern: planning. 
4. Council's views are summarised as:-
4 .1 Government's stated policy of net doing work itself ur,less it 
had good reasons for doing so was the guideline. 
4. 2 The public sector should er.sure that unnecessary costs are 
avoiced in civil ~r.gineering works carried out by itself or 
the private sector. 
4. 3 tong term planning and even preliminary design, or basic 
planning, should be done by public bodies with expert 
assistar.ce from the private sector when necessary. 
4.4 Adequate guidance and ~onitoring of design rm:.st be carried cut 
to ensure that safe and adequate but not unduly expensive 
standards are used. 
4.5 Tha public sector should itself prepare sufficient designs to 
ensure that "dequate expe:::tisc is developed a."'ld u:aintained 
within it and to ensure that design requirements for public 
works are complied with and also to ensure adequate 
development o~ . staff. 
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4. 6 The pubL.c sector should itself carry out sufficient 
construction work, the extent of which should be a minority of 
new construction, and also supervise sufficient construction 
carried out under contract by the private sector, to ensure 
that adequate expertise is developed and maintained within it 
and to ensure adequate development of staff. 
4. 7 That tenders froo the private sector for "design and 
construction" of works should be considered when suitable. 
4. 8 That public bodies should be provided with basic staff to 
carry out work not suitable for assigning to the private 
sector, to carry out maintenance and to be in a position to 
deal with emergencies. 
4. 9 That putlic bodies should have sufficient professional and 
technical staff to draw up, or guide the production of 
appropriate cedes, standards and guides, for their civil 
engineer~ng works. 
4 .10 That provisicn for aaequate- dissemination of information on 
design and construction practice and experience should be 
ensured. 
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APP ENDIX F 






Development and Loans Fund 
Haylett formula 
monopolistic market 
r ed tape 
a mechanism that 




an environment having different 
levels of authority, where work 
is governed by definite and 
impersonal rules. Each official 
has his own particular function 
and his own set of rules to 
apply. 
a market situation in which the 
sellers of the good or service 
make joint rather than 
independant decisions about the 
price output and other policies. 
exists in a given market 
wherever each buyer and each 
seller of a good or service in 
that market can improve his own 
economic position only by 
offering more for less. 
the object of this fund is to 
concentrate all loans raised and 
all monies in the hands of the 
Council which are not 
immediately required for the 
defrayment of expenditure 
therefrom in one central fund so 
as to facilitate the control and 
management thereof, the payment 
of interest on loans raised and 
the investment of funds. 
a work group, index-based 
contract price adjustment 
formula used for the calculation 
of any fluctuations in building 
costs within the work groups 
during the contract period. 
Based on indices released by the 
Central Statistical Services in 
Pretoria. 
unlimited influence over the 
provision of a good or service 
on the market place where price 
is not influenced by competition. 
a proliferation of forms and an 
over-concern with strict 
adherence to regulations. 
----
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AP PENDIX G 
SOLID WAST E: COLLECT I ON AND DISPOSAL 
LIST OF QUESTIONS CONSIDERED AT THE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WITH 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHICH HAVE CONTRACTED OUT 
What is the population of your local authority? 
How many premises are serviced? 
How many refuse removal vehicles (compactors) are involved in 
this operation? 
When did your local authority first contract out this service? 
What was the motivation for this decision? 
Which company currently holds your contract and for how long? 
How many tenderers competed at each change of contract? Who 
were they? 
Have you had occasion to change contractors? Why? 
What is your council's policy towards privatisation generally? 
What is your opinion of the extent of competition for the 
s upply of this service? 
What advantages or benefits has contracting out brought to 
your local authority? 
What disadvantages or problems have you encountered since 
contracting ou t ? 
What is the cost of this service in terms of the present 
contract? 
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What is the frequency and timing of the service? 
During periods of civil unrest or during "stayaways" has this 
service been disrupted and to what extent? What interim 
remedial measures are available to your local authority? 
Have the service quality or operational activities provided by 
the contractor declined during the duration of the contract? 
What aspects and to what extent? e.g. has the contractor 
employed inferior staff, cut corners on certain aspects or 
tried to shed the least profitable aspects? Please supply 
data or evidence, if any. 
How do you measure and control the quality of the service 
provided by the contractor? 
What methods and channels are used for handling citizens' 
complaints? 
What has the extent and frequency been of complaints over the 
duration of the contract? What is the attitude and response 
time of the contractor? 
Would your local authority consider resuming this service by 
using direct labour? Why? Why not? 
To what extent (if any) has 






the cost of 
Has your local authority ever possessed its own dump/tip 
facilities? 
Have you ever had reason to consider that the contract is too 
rigid or narrow to maintain a quality service? 
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In general terms, i s t he contract f l exible enough in t he even t 
of a special circumstance? 
If your local authority experienced a disaster or civil 
emergency, would you have immediate access to a "pool of 
l abour"? 
What contingency plan do you have if your contractor were to 








was contracted out what arrangements 
your employees previously providing 
problems, if any, were encountered? 




The remainder of the interviews involved open-ended 
discussions on applicable factors listed in Chapter 6. 
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SOLID WASTE: COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL 
LIST OF QUESTIONS CONSIDERED AT THE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WITH 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHICH HAVE NOT CONTRACTED OUT 
Brief background and history to the provision of the service. 
Desciption of the service and its objectives. 
What are the most important characteristics of the service? 
What are the resources utilised to provide the service e.g. 
personnel, equipment, vehicles and materials? 
What is the timing and frequency of the service? 
What is the number of premises serviced in your local 
authority? 
What is the operating expenditure for the current year? 
What disposal sites do you possess? 
Has your local authority ~er- considered contracting out? 
Why? Why not? 
What economies of scale can you achieve? Details? 
What are your current costs for delivering this service? e.g. 
price per bin or cubic metre. 
Why do you feel that this service can best be delivered 
in-house? 
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Has your local authority ever put out a tender for this 
service? Details? 
What in your opinion is the extent of competition for the 
provision of this service? 
Why are other local authorities and private contractors 
prevented from utilising your pulverising plants? 
In the absence of profit what is your primary motivation? 
What means do you have for measuring productivity and 
efficiency? What evidence can you supply? 
How do you measure and evaluate the quality of the service you 
provide? 
Do you have evidence on how your ratepayers perceive this 
service? How are ratepayers' co~plaints handled? 
What is the salary range in your local authority for (a) a 
labourer (b) a driver? 
What fringe benefits are provided? 
Please supply details of incentive schemes operated for 
motivational purposes. 
Have you ever had occasion to use this "pool of labour" for 
any emergencies. What were the circumstances and results? 
In times of civil unrest or "stayaways" has the continuity of 
this service ever been disrupted? What were the circumstances 
and results? 
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To what extent does your local authority adhere t o healt h and 
safety requirements for your employees providing this service? 
The remainder of the interviews involved 
discussions on a~plicable factors listed in 




LI ST OF QUEST I ONS CONS I DERED AT THE INTERVIEWS CON DUCTED WITH 
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 
Brief background history of your organisation. 
What are your capital budget and operating budget for the 
current year? 
Details of staff employed. 
How many collection vehicles (compactors) do you operate? 
Are they purchased, leased or financed in any other way? 
What dump/tip facilities do you operate? 
Please supply details of contracts currently operated by your 
company? 
What economic or financial advantages do you claim for private 
enterprise in respect of the provision of this service? 
What is your charge per household, per bin or per cubic 
metre? Please supply a breakdown of your costs. 
What comparative cost information can you supply for the 
provision of this service in the public sector and in the 
private sector? 
Can you provide this service for a lesser cost than the Cape 
Town Municipality? Can you substantitate? 
What is the extent of competition in this industry? What 
i nformat i on can you supply to demonstrate t he effect of 
competition on prices for the provision of this service? 
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Can you provide any competitive tendering data? 
To what extent can economies of scale be achieved in 
provision of this service by your organisation? 
information or comparative data can you supply? 
the 
What 
How do you measure and evaluate productivity and efficiency? 
What productivity incentive schemes do you operate for (a) 
management (b) other employees. 
Please supply details of personnel costs particularly (a) a 
labourer and (b) a driver. 
What fringe benefits are offered? 
What degree of flexibility can you exercise in the operational 
activities of this service? 
How quickly and to what extent can you adjust levels of 
service or type of service offered if necessary? 
How quickly can persons be employed and conversely dismissed 
if necessary? 
Does your organisation have an Industrial Relations policy? 
Please describe. 
Is there any form of recognition agreement in practice? 
Have labour disruptions or 'stayaways' had any detrimental 
effect on the provision of your service? 
What contingency plan do you have in the event of being 
subjected to a strike? 
Can you provide a better quality service at a lower price than 
a local authority? Why? How? 
What extraordinary management expertise does your organisation 
possess? 
Do you have 
difficult for 
recruit? 
any specialised skills which e.g. might be 
some other organisation or local authority to 
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What protection do you have against insolvency? How do you 
allay obvious fears a local authority might have in this 
regard? 
Please supply details of your organisation's adherence to 
health and safety requirements for your employees? 
The remainder of the interviews involved 
discussions on applicable factors listed in 





CIVIL ENGINEERING AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION 
LIST OF QUESTIONS CONSIDERED AT THE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WITH 
ASSOCIATIONS REPRESENTING PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRACTORS 
Briefly desccibe the background of your Association. 
What is the primary function of your Association? 
What are its objectives? 
Please supply data concerning the scale and level of influence 
of the contractors that you represent. 
What do you deem to be the essential characteristics of 
construction? 
What economic or financial advantages do you claim for 
privatisation? 
Do you feel that private contractors can undertake 
construction for a local authority at a lesser cost? 
What evidence can you supply to substantiate your answer? 
Is it not reasonable that a local authority possesses the 
capacity to undertake certain construction works which provide 
a cost yardstick for comparative purposes with contractual 
bids? Why? Why not? 
What is the extent of competition in the construction industry? 
could you demonstrate that this competition is free and 
unrestricted? 
To what extent can economies of scale be effected if private 
contractors undertake construction for local authorities? 
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What effect does the profit motivation factor have on the 
performance of contractors? 
What do you feel is the effect of the absence of this 
motivation from local authorities providing the service? 
To what do you attribute the claim of higher productivity for 
the private sector? 
What are the primary motivators and incentives generally 
applicable to contractors? 
Please supply details of remuneration per hour in terms of 
applicable legislation for (a) labourers (b) artisans. 
What fringe benefits are offered? 
Do you claim greater efficiency among contractors in the 
private sector? 
To what do you attribute this? 
To what extent do you believe that "red tape" affects the 
pe rformance of a local authority providing this service? 
Do you consider that a local authority should provide a 
construction function in the first instance? 
What comment do you offer regarding a local authority 
performing routine maintenance and emergency construction 
works? 
In your opinion would contractors be interested in undertaking 
this type of work? 
For what reason do you consider that contractors could provide 
a better quality of construction? 
Do contractors possess special skills or expertise which a 
local authority might find difficult to obtain? 








to that of local 
flexibility for 
What safeguards could be provided in the event of a contractor 
defaulting or going insolvent? 
Why does your Association insist on all your member 
contractors including the Haylett formula in each contract? 
Why can they not decide for themselves? 
The remainder of the interviews involved an open-ended 
discussion on applicable factors listed in Chapter 6, 
"Advantages of Private Sector Agency", Section 6.2. 
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LIST OF QUESTIONS CONSIDERED AT THE INTERVIEWS WITH 
MANAGEMENT OF THE CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY'S IN-HOUSE 
ENGINEERING AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION UNITS 
SENIOR 
CIVIL 
Briefly describe the background to your construction unit? 
What is the nature or specialised expertise of the 
construction undertaken? 
How many employees are involved? 
What do you deem to be the essential characteristics of the 
particular construction undertaken by your unit? 
Could you provide the construction function for a lesser cost 
than a contractor? Why? 
What economies of scale could be achieved? 
To what extent would contract preparation, administration and 
monitoring increase the price of the contracted service? 
What economic advantages do you claim for a local authority 
undertaking this function? 
If all construction works of your local authority were 
privatised what would be the effect and resultant cost of 
retrenchments and redundancies? 
Local authorities have been accused of hiding costs when 
undertaking projects. What comment do you offer? 
Do you feel that there is adequate competition amongst the 
contractors in the construction industry? 
If a contractor defaulted or went insolvent while providing 
this service how serious would the consequences be? 
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What advantages does the pool of direct labour provide in the 
event of an emergency or civil disaster? 
What is your local authority's policy regarding privatisation 
generally? 
Contractors are driven by the motivation of profit. What is 
your motivation? 









What is your local authority's current salary for (a) a 
labourer (b) an artisan? 
To what extent does your local authority comply with health 
and safety requirements? 
In what way can you provide a higher quality level of service 
than a contractor? 
What difficulties could be experienced in drafting contracts 
or specifications for the type of construction that you 
provide? 
How do you measure the efficiency of your construction unit? 
What criteria are taken 
construction is utilised? 
into account before in-house 
Do you consider that there is adequate expertise amongst local 
contractors to undertake the type of construction presently 
provided by your unit? 
206 
Can your unit be more flexibly employed than a contractor? 
How? 
What has been the growth or 
staff over the past five years? 
decrease of your construction 
Please supply details. 
Why does your local authority not accept the Haylett formula? 
The remainder of the interviews involved an 
discussion on applicable factors listed in 
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